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The	   study	   investigates	   the	   overreaction	   effect	   and	   associated	   January	   seasonality	   on	   the	  
Nigerian	   Stock	   Exchange	   (NSE),	   a	   pioneer	   study.	  Both	   anomalies	   are	   also	   investigated	  on	   the	  
Johannesburg	   Stock	   Exchange	   (JSE)	   for	   persistence.	   The	   study	   finds	   evidence	   of	   overreaction	  
and	  seasonality	  on	   the	  NSE,	   in	  contrast	   to	  past	   studies	   that	   find	   it	   to	  be	  weak-­‐form	  efficient.	  
The	  observed	  overreaction	  effect	  on	   the	  NSE	  was	  accompanied	  by	  a	   January	  effect.	  Monthly	  
seasonality	   was	   also	   found	   on	   the	   NSE	   in	   the	   calendar	   month	   of	   June	   –	   a	   “June	   Effect”;	  
confirming	   earlier	   findings	   on	   the	   NSE.	   For	   the	   JSE,	   the	   study	   does	   not	   find	   evidence	   of	  
overreaction.	  This	  implies	  the	  overreaction	  effect	  can	  be	  arbitraged	  away	  over	  time.	  Although,	  
a	   mild	   January	   effect	   is	   evidenced	   on	   the	   JSE,	   it	   is	   only	   marginally	   significant,	   and	   partly	  
supporting	  the	  notion	  of	  possible	  arbitraging	  away	  of	  anomalies	  with	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  and	  
increased	  relative	  efficiency.	  A	  strong	  “October	  effect”	  was	  found	  on	  the	  JSE,	  however.	  As	  this	  
is	   the	   first	   documented	   overreaction	   effect	   on	   the	   NSE,	   the	   evidence	   from	   the	   JSE	   suggests	  
these	   anomalies	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   arbitraged	   away	   in	   the	  Nigerian	   equity	  market	   over	   time	   as	  
well.	  This	  would	  be	  an	  area	  for	  future	  research.	  In	  regard	  of	  the	  supposed	  congruity	  of	  return	  
and	  investor	  sentiment,	  only	  the	  NSE	  shows	  evidence	  of	  this.	  The	  study	  finds	  that	  when	  there	  is	  
an	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  a	  bourse,	  there	  is	  a	  similar	  trend	  –	  albeit	  in	  absolute	  terms	  –	  observed	  
with	  respect	  to	  investor	  sentiment	  represented	  by	  the	  share	  turnover	  ratio.	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1.	   INTRODUCTION	  
1.1	   Background	  
Fama	   (1970)	   posits	   that	   security	   prices	   reflect	   all	   available	   relevant	   information	   and	   that	   as	  
such	   it	  would	  be	   impossible	   for	  any	   investor	  to	  consistently	  beat	  the	  market	  and	  consistently	  
generate	   abnormal	   returns	   (Efficient	  Market	  Hypothesis	   (EMH)).	   The	  works	   of	  De	   Bondt	   and	  
Thaler	  (1985),	  Fama	  and	  French	  (1988),	  Lo	  and	  MacKinlay	  (1988),	  Jegadeesh	  (1990),	  Jegadeesh	  
and	  Titman	  (1993)	  and	  many	  others,	  raise	  questions	  about	  this	  position.	  To	  this	  day,	  the	  debate	  
still	   rages	   on	   about	   market	   efficiency	   with	   two	   increasingly	   distinct	   schools	   of	   thought	  
emerging:	  Traditional	  finance	  (proponents	  of	  the	  EMH)	  and	  Behavioural	  Finance.	  
	  
De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler	   (1985)	   highlight	   how	   contrarian	   investment	   strategies	   consistently	  
generate	  alpha	  across	  three	  to	  five	  year	  time	  horizons,	  an	  occurrence	  at	  variance	  with	  the	  EMH.	  	  
This	   seminal	   work	   on	   “investor	   overreaction”	   or	   the	   “winner-­‐loser	   effect”	   showed	   a	  
preponderance	  of	  the	  excess	  return	  performance	  occurring	  in	  January,	  especially	  for	  the	  “loser”	  
or	  contrarian	  portfolios.	  Small-­‐cap	  firms	  were	  also	  found	  to	  outperform	  large-­‐cap	  ones	  thereby	  
raising	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   the	   winner-­‐loser	   effect	   wasn’t	   just	   another	   instance	   of	   the	  
“size-­‐effect”	  extensively	  studied	  by	  Banz	  (1981),	  Reinganum	  (1981),	  Schwert	  (1983),	  et	  cetera.	  
Similar	  arguments	  have	  been	  raised	  for	  the	  seasonality	   in	  the	  return	  reversals	   for	  winner	  and	  
loser	  portfolios	  especially	  in	  the	  calendar	  month	  of	  January,	  that	  is,	  a	  “January	  effect”	  or	  “Turn-­‐
of-­‐the-­‐year	  effect”	  and	  whether	  this	  couldn’t	  be	  explained	  to	  be	  as	  a	  result	  of	  tax-­‐loss	  selling	  by	  
investors	   in	  consonance	  with	  observations	  by	  Reinganum	  (1983),	  Schultz	   (1985),	  et	  cetera,	  ex	  
post	  the	  seminal	  discovery	  of	  that	  calendar	  anomaly	  by	  Rozeff	  and	  Kinney	  (1976).	  	  Apart	  from	  
showing	   better	   return	   performance,	   the	   observed	   biases	   were	   also	   more	   prevalent	   for	  
contrarian	  portfolios.	  	  
	  
In	   a	   subsequent	   study,	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler	   (1987)	   attempted	   to	   offer	   explanations	   for	   the	  
numerous	   arguments	   spurred	   by	   their	   earlier	   work.	   They	   were	   not	   however	   convincing	   at	  
explaining	  the	  observed	  seasonality	  of	  the	  excess	  return	  performance	  recorded	  for	  the	  winner	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and	   loser	   portfolios.	   	   In	   fact,	   “many	   puzzles	   remain,	   especially	   regarding	   the	   seasonality	   in	  
excess	  returns”	  (De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler,	  1987:579).	  	  
	  
Most	  of	  the	  subsequent	  literature	  regarding	  overreaction	  have	  had	  more	  of	  an	  empirical	  than	  
theoretical	   focus	  and	  yet	  evidence	  of	  seasonality	  pervades	  these	  studies,	  a	  preponderance	  of	  
which	   are	   for	   Non-­‐U.S	   markets	   –	   Australia	   (Gaunt,	   2000),	   G-­‐7	   Countries	   (Baytas	   and	   Cakici,	  
1999),	  Asia	  (McInish,	  Ding,	  Pyun,	  and	  Wongchoti,	  2008),	  China	  (Kang,	  Liu,	  and	  Ni,	  2002),	  South	  
Africa	  (Cubbin,	  Eidne,	  Firer,	  and	  Gilbert,	  2006),	  Turkey	  (Bildik	  and	  Gulay,	  2007),	  Tunisia	  (Dhouib	  
and	  Abaoub,	  2007),	  et	  cetera.	  Thus,	  while	  seasonality	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  recurring	  observation	  in	  
overreaction	   studies,	   an	   explanation	   for	   its	   occurrence	   has	   not	   enjoyed	   as	   much	   attention	  
and/or	   success.	   They	   are	   important	  nonetheless	   as	   robust	  out-­‐of-­‐sample	   confirmation	  of	   the	  
overreaction	  hypothesis	  across	  geographies	  and	  time	  periods.	  
	  
Past	   attempts	   at	   explaining	   the	   seasonal	   anomaly	   include	   the	   tax-­‐loss	   selling	   (Chan,	   1986;	  
D’mello,	   Fernis,	   and	  Hwang,	   2003),	   “window-­‐dressing”	   by	   institutional	   investors	   (Lakonishok,	  
Shleifer,	   Thaler,	   and	   Vishny,	   1991),	   “data-­‐snooping”	   (Lo	   and	   Mackinlay,	   1990;	   Sullivan,	  
Timmerman,	  and	  White,	  1999)	  and	  “parking	  the	  proceeds”	  (Ritter,	  1988)	  hypotheses.	  There	  is	  
also	   a	   seeming	   consensus	   that	   the	   January	   effect	   is	   largely	   a	   small-­‐firm	   phenomenon	  
(Lakonishok	  and	  Smidt,	  1988;	  Ritter,	  1988;	  Haug	  and	  Hirschey,	  2006).	  A	  later	  effort	  (Haug	  and	  
Hirschey,	   2006)	   at	   explaining	   the	   turn-­‐of-­‐the	   year	   effect	   suggests	   that	   an	   exhaustive	  
explanation	   for	   the	   January	   effect	   remains	   elusive	   still	   since	   its	   first	   discovery	   by	   Rozeff	   and	  
Kinney	  (1976).	  	  
	  
What	  seems	  to	  be	  consistent	  in	  the	  literature	  are:	  buying	  pressure	  in	  January	  is	  biased	  towards	  
undervalued	   stocks	   in	   the	   prior	   December,	   tax-­‐loss	   selling	   –	   though	   not	   an	   exhaustive	  
explanation	  –	  seem	  a	  motivation	  for	  some	  investors	  to	  sell	  losing	  stocks	  in	  December	  in	  markets	  
such	   as	   the	   United	   States	   (Schultz,	   1985)	   –	   even	   though	   Reinganum	   (1983),	   and	   Haug	   and	  
Hirschey	  (2006)	  refute	  this	  –	  and	  for	  other	  reasons	  in	  some	  (Kato	  and	  Schallheim,	  1985;	  Berges,	  
McConnell,	  and	  Schlarbaum,	  1984).	  Tax-­‐loss	  selling	  doesn’t	  explain,	  however,	   the	  subsequent	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buying	   activity	   in	   January.	   Other	   alternative	   explanations	   (Lakonishok	   et	   al.,	   1991;	   Lo	   and	  
MacKinlay,	  1990;	  Sullivan	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  et	  cetera)	  have	  not	  been	  found	  to	  be	  exhaustive	  either	  
since	   the	   January	   effect	   continues	   to	   persist	   irrespective	   of	   investor	   type	   or	   any	   supposed	  
statistical	   bias.	   Additionally,	   the	   observed	   seasonality	   in	   winner-­‐loser	   portfolios	   with	   loser	  
stocks	   or	   hitherto	   undervalued	   stocks	   earning	   significant	   positive	   risk-­‐adjusted	   returns	   in	  
January	  (De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler,	  1985;	  Jegadeesh,	  1990;	  et	  cetera)	  continues	  to	  be	  unexplained	  
by	  existing	  theory	  (De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler,	  1987).	  	  
	  
1.1.1 Efficiency	  Studies	  and	  return	  trends	  on	  the	  Nigerian	  Stock	  Exchange	  
For	  the	  Nigerian	  equity	  market,	  the	  existing	  evidence	  (Ayadi,	  1984;	  Olowe,	  1999;	  Tijjani,	  Power,	  
and	  Fifield,	  2009;	  Okpara,	  2010;	  et	  cetera)	  suggests	  it	  is	  weak-­‐form	  efficient.	  Methodologies	  of	  
these	  studies,	  however,	  were	  largely	  autocorrelation	  tests.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  a	  dearth	  of	  studies	  of	  
trading-­‐rule	  efficiency	  tests	  like	  that	  used	  for	  this	  study.	  Other	  drawbacks	  in	  these	  prior	  studies	  
include	  small	  sample	  sizes	  –	  Olowe	  (1999)	  used	  fifty-­‐nine	  (59)	  randomly	  selected	  securities	  as	  
its	   sample	   and	   Tijjani	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   used	   sixty-­‐nine	   (69).	   Additionally,	   they	   do	   not	   include	  
observations	   beyond	   the	   year	   2006,	   a	   period	   for	   which	   the	   Nigerian	   bourse	   experienced	  
marked	  activity,	  and	  thus	  the	  start	  of	  a	  relatively	  higher	  level	  (frequency)	  of	  market	  activity.	  	  
	  
In	   the	  context	  of	  efficiency	  of	  markets,	   residual	   returns	  of	   loser	  and	  winner	  portfolios	  on	  the	  
NSE	   are	   mapped.	   And	   as	   is	   evident	   in	   Figure	   1,	   there	   is	   cursory	   evidence	   of	   loser	   portfolio	  
returns	  behaving	  differently	  than	  winner	  portfolio	  returns	  in	  ways	  that	  warrant	  deeper	  analysis.	  
Similarly,	   Figure	   2	   shows	   a	   markedly	   different	   pattern	   for	   loser	   portfolio	   returns	   than	   the	  
winner	  portfolio	  return	  pattern	  in	  the	  JSE.	  The	  differential	  portfolio	  return	  patterns	  in	  these	  two	  
distinct	   major	   equity	  markets	   of	   Africa,	   point	   to	   a	   compelling	   need	   to	   explore	   in	   depth	   the	  
issues	   of	   anomalies	   such	   as	   overreaction	   and	   seasonality	   of	   returns	   in	   these	   increasingly	  




Figure	  1:	  Residual	  returns	  for	  Loser	  &	  Winner	  Portfolios	  for	  NSE-­‐listed	  stocks	  (1-­‐36	  months	  into	  the	  test	  period	  





















Loser	  Pormolio	  (P5)	  
Winner	  Pormolio	  (P1)	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1.1.2 Efficiency	  Studies	  and	  return	  trends	  on	  the	  Johannesburg	  Stock	  Exchange	  
Evidence	  of	   investor	  overreaction	  on	   the	   Johannesburg	   Stock	  Exchange	   (JSE)	   (Page	  and	  Way,	  
1992;	  Muller,	  1999;	  Cubbin,	  Eidne,	  Firer	  and	  Gilbert,	  2006;	  Venter,	  2009;	  Hsieh	  and	  Hodnett,	  
2011)	  has	  been	  relatively	  consistent.	  Findings	  on	  the	  efficiency	  of	  the	  JSE	  (Gilbertson	  and	  Roux,	  
1977;	  Strebel,	  1987;	  Knight	  and	  Affleck-­‐Graves,	  1985;	  Thompson	  and	  Ward,	  1995;	  Philpott	  and	  
Firer,	  1995)	  and	  the	  January	  effect	  (Bradfield,	  1990;	  Robins,	  Sandler,	  and	  Durand,	  1999;	  Auret	  
and	   Cline,	   2011),	   however,	   remain	   mixed.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   this	   is	   due	   to	   study	   period	  
differences	  since	  the	  highlighted	  studies	  used	  data	  for	  different	  periods	  –	  Page	  and	  Way	  (1992)	  
and	  Cubbin	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  used	  data	  for	  the	  period	  1974	  –	  1989	  and	  1983	  –	  2005,	  respectively.	  	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Residual	  returns	  for	  Loser	  &	  Winner	  Portfolios	  for	  JSE-­‐listed	  stocks	  (1-­‐36	  months	  into	  the	  test	  period	  





















Post	  -­‐forma]on	  month	  
Loser	  Pormolio	  (P5)	  
Winner	  Pormolio	  (P1)	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1.2	   Purpose	  of	  the	  study	  
The	  purpose	  of	   this	   research	   is	   to	   investigate	   the	   relationship	  between	   investor	  overreaction	  
and	   seasonality	   –	   the	   January	   effect	   in	   particular,	   for	   which	   an	   explanation	   has	   remained	  
elusive	  thus	  far.	  The	  intuition	  that	  is	  investigated	  is	  as	  follows.	  The	  losing	  streak	  of	  loser	  stocks	  
in	   a	   prior	   period	   is	   spurred	   by	   pessimism	   (negative	   investor	   sentiment)	   as	   suggested	   by	  
DeBondt	  and	  Thaler	  (1985);	  disequilibria	  that	  then	  persist	  for	  varied	  periods	  up	  until	  the	  turn	  of	  
the	   year.	   Subsequently,	   optimism	   (positive	   investor	   sentiment)	   around	   the	   New	   Year	   lead	  
investors	   to	   take	   a	   chance	   on	   these	   supposed	   “losers,”	   as	   evidenced	   by	   their	   positive	   risk-­‐
adjusted	   return	   performance	   in	   the	   calendar	   month	   of	   January.	   If	   an	   investor	   sentiment	  
measure	  is	  found	  to	  behave	  in	  this	  way	  in	  relation	  to	  loser	  returns,	  it	  would	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  
generalizations	  about	  the	  Overreaction	  and	  January	  effects	  around	  investor	  sentiment.	  	  
	  
Baker	  and	  Wurgler	  (2006)	  define	  investor	  sentiment	  as	  “optimism	  and	  pessimism	  about	  stocks	  
in	   general”	   (p.	   1649);	   and	  use	   share	   turnover	   as	   one	  of	   their	   proxies	   for	   investor	   sentiment.	  
Other	   proxies	   that	   have	   been	   used	   are	   “closed-­‐end	   fund	   discount,	   the	   number	   and	   average	  
first-­‐day	   returns	   on	   Initial	   Public	   Offerings	   (IPOs),	   the	   equity	   shares	   in	   new	   issues,	   and	   the	  
dividend	  premium”	  (Baker	  and	  Wurgler,	  2006:1655).	  Share	  turnover	  has	  also	  been	  found	  to	  be	  
seasonal.	   Eleswarapu	   and	   Reinganum	   (1993)	   use	   share	   turnover	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   liquidity	   and	  
present	  evidence	  showing	  the	  “liquidity	  premium	  is	  reliably	  positive	  only	  during	  the	  month	  of	  
January”	   (p.	  385).	  Lee	  and	  Swaminathan	   (2000)	  also	  present	  evidence	  showing	  underreaction	  
and	   overreaction	   are	   linked	   by	   trading	   volume	  proxied	   by	   the	   turnover	   ratio	   (defined	   as	   the	  
daily	  ratio	  of	  traded	  shares	  to	  the	  number	  of	  shares	  outstanding	  for	  each	  stock).	  Additionally,	  
Campbell	  et	  al.	  (1993)	  and	  Blume	  et	  al.	  (1994)	  provide	  theoretical	  evidence	  that	  shows	  strong	  
linkages	   between	   stock	   returns	   and	   trading	   volume.	   Al-­‐Khazali	   (2014)	   also	   asserts	   investor	  
sentiment	   is	   germane	   to	   the	   return	   process.	   Further	   to	   these	   insights,	   this	   study	   uses	   share	  




1.3	   Empirical	  Scope	  
This	  study	  is	  conducted	  using	  data	  from	  two	  of	  Africa’s	  largest	  bourses:	  the	  Johannesburg	  Stock	  
Exchange	  (JSE)	  and	  the	  Nigerian	  Stock	  Exchange	  (NSE).	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  JSE	  overreacts	  
(Page	  and	  Way,	  1992;	  Cubbin	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  etc.).	  For	   the	  Nigerian	  equity	  market,	  however,	  an	  
empirical	   study	   to	   determine	   if	   it	   overreacts,	   with	   the	   tandem	   January	   effect,	   as	   has	   been	  
determined	   for	   other	   equity	   markets,	   United	   States	   (De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler,	   1985,	   1987)	  
including	  South	  Africa	  (Page	  and	  Way,	  1992;	  Cubbin	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  conducted.	  	  
	  
1.3.1	   The	  Johannesburg	  Stock	  Exchange	  
Established	   in	  1887,	   the	   Johannesburg	  Stock	  Exchange	   (JSE)	   is	   the	  oldest	  and	  most	  advanced	  
bourse	  on	  the	  African	  continent.	  The	  bourse	  has	  since	  grown	  from	  a	  market	  capitalization	  of	  51	  
billion	   South	   African	   Rand	   (ZAR	   51bn)	   in	   1978	   to	   almost	   11	   trillion	   South	   African	   Rand	  
(equivalent	  of	  US$	  1	  trillion)	  in	  2013;	  accordingly	  Figure	  3	  maps	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  JSE	  All	  
Share	  index	  for	  the	  period	  2002-­‐2011.	  It	  was	  just	  half	  of	  its	  2013	  size	  in	  2009	  at	  6	  trillion	  South	  
African	  Rand	  (ZAR	  6	  trillion).	  As	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2013,	  there	  were	  327	  companies	  listed	  on	  the	  JSE.	  
According	  to	  the	  World	  Federation	  of	  Exchanges	  (WFE)	  statistics,	  the	  JSE	  ranked	  19th	  by	  market	  
capitalization,	  26th	  by	  liquidity,	  and	  22nd	  by	  market	  turnover;	  all	  globally	  in	  2013.	  Participants	  on	  
the	  JSE	  have	  access	  to	  bid	  and	  offer	  prices,	  can	  continuously	  trade	  electronically	  and	  prices	  are	  
disclosed	  in	  real	  time.	  Thus,	  the	  JSE	  is	  a	  model	  African	  bourse.	  




Figure	  3:	  Johannesburg	  Stock	  Exchange	  (JSE)	  All	  Share	  Index	  (ASI)	  for	  the	  years	  2002-­‐11	  
	  
1.3.2	   The	  Nigerian	  Stock	  Exchange	  
The	   Nigerian	   Stock	   Exchange	   (NSE)	   was	   established	   in	   1960.	   According	   to	   its	   2012	   annual	  
reports,	  the	  NSE	  had	  an	  end-­‐2012	  market	  capitalization	  of	  8.98	  trillion	  Nigerian	  Naira	  (NGN	  8.98	  
trillion)	  or	  57.77	  billion	  United	  States	  Dollars	  (USD	  57.77	  billion)	  with	  an	  average	  daily	  turnover	  
for	  equities	  of	  NGN2.65	  billion	  (USD	  17.05	  million).	  As	  in	  Figure	  3	  above,	  representing	  trends	  in	  
the	  JSE,	  Figure	  4	  paints	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  NSE	  All	  Share	  index	  performance	  for	  the	  same	  period	  of	  
2002	  to	  2011.	  From	  trades	  totalling	  NGN	  4.4	  million	  by	  value	  in	  1962,	  NGN	  658.2	  billion	  worth	  
of	  trades	  were	  executed	  on	  the	  NSE	  in	  2012.	  Number	  of	   listed	  equities	  on	  the	  NSE	  has	  varied	  
between	  131	  in	  1990	  to	  201	   in	  2011.	  The	  NSE	  has	  a	  trading	   limit	  up/limit	  down	  threshold	  for	  
listed	   equities	   of	   5%.	   Upon	   the	   introduction	   of	   primary	   market	   making	   in	   September	   2012,	  
















































































































































































































































Figure	  4:	  Nigeria	  Stock	  Exchange	  (NSE)	  All	  Share	  Index	  (ASI)	  for	  the	  years	  2002-­‐11	  
	  
The	   apparent	   differences	   between	   these	   two	   major	   African	   bourses	   are	   another	   important	  
motivation	  for	  this	  study;	  that	  is,	  could	  some	  salient	  differences	  between	  these	  markets	  explain	  
empirical	   differences	  documented	  about	   the	  examined	  market	   return	  anomalies?	   It	   could	  be	  
that	  the	  relative	  levels	  of	  efficiency	  of	  equity	  markets	  reflect	  the	  overreaction	  and	  seasonality	  
phenomena	  differently;	  and	  such	  differential	  findings	  could	  assist	  authorities	  in	  Nigeria	  fashion	  
a	  much	  more	  informed	  reform	  and	  growth	  agenda	  for	  their	  market.	  
	  































































































































































































1.4	   Hypotheses	  
The	  null	  hypotheses	  for	  the	  statistical	  tests	  of	  the	  study	  are	  as	  follows:	  
	  
1. Ho1:	  As	  markets	  are	  efficient,	  there	  is	  no	  investor	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  the	  NSE.	  Thus,	  
loser	  portfolios	  do	  not	  outperform	  winner	  portfolios	  on	  the	  NSE.	  
	  
2. Ho2:	  As	  markets	  are	  efficient,	  there	  is	  no	  investor	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  the	  JSE.	  Thus,	  
loser	  portfolios	  do	  not	  outperform	  winner	  portfolios	  on	  the	  JSE.	  
	  
3. Ho3:	   As	  markets	   are	   efficient,	   there	   is	   no	   January	   effect	   (or	   other	   seasonality)	   on	   the	  
NSE.	  Thus,	  portfolio	  returns	  for	  the	  month	  of	  January	  (or	  any	  other	  calendar	  month)	  are	  
not	  different	  from	  those	  of	  other	  calendar	  months	  on	  the	  NSE.	  
	  
4. Ho4:	  As	  markets	  are	  efficient,	  there	  is	  no	  January	  effect	  (or	  other	  seasonality)	  on	  the	  JSE.	  
Thus,	  portfolio	  returns	  for	  the	  month	  of	  January	  (or	  any	  other	  calendar	  month)	  are	  not	  
different	  from	  those	  of	  other	  calendar	  months	  on	  the	  JSE.	  
	  
5. Ho5:	   As	   markets	   are	   efficient	   and	   investor	   sentiment	   behaves	   similarly	   as	   return,	  
investor	  sentiment	  is	  the	  same	  irrespective	  of	  portfolio	  or	  calendar	  month.	  	  	  
	  
1.5	   Significance	  of	  the	  study	  
This	   is	   the	   first	   overreaction	   study	   for	   the	   Nigerian	   equity	  market.	   In	   light	   of	   the	   significant	  
interest	   in	  emerging	  and	  frontier	  markets	   like	  the	  South	  African	  and	  Nigerian	  equity	  markets,	  
the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  should	  find	  a	  huge	  audience	  amongst	  global	  portfolio	  managers.	  Also,	  
the	  overreaction	  and	  seasonal	  anomalies	  are	  amongst	  the	  few	  return	  dependencies	  that	  have	  




The	  study	  finds	  evidence	  of	  overreaction	  and	  seasonality	  on	  the	  NSE,	  in	  contrast	  to	  past	  studies	  
that	   find	   it	   to	   be	   weak-­‐form	   efficient.	   The	   observed	   overreaction	   effect	   on	   the	   NSE	   was	  
accompanied	   by	   a	   January	   effect.	   Monthly	   seasonality	   was	   also	   found	   on	   the	   NSE	   in	   the	  
calendar	  month	  of	  June	  –	  a	  “June	  Effect”;	  confirming	  earlier	   findings	  on	  the	  NSE.	  For	  the	  JSE,	  
the	  study	  does	  not	  find	  evidence	  of	  overreaction.	  This	  implies	  the	  overreaction	  effect	  may	  have	  
been	  arbitraged	  away	  over	  time.	  Although,	  a	  mild	  January	  effect	   is	  evidenced	  on	  the	  JSE,	   it	   is	  
only	   marginally	   significant,	   and	   partly	   supporting	   the	   notion	   of	   possible	   arbitraging	   away	   of	  
anomalies	  with	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  and	  increased	  relative	  efficiency.	  A	  strong	  “October	  effect”	  
was	  found	  on	  the	  JSE,	  however.	  	  
	  
As	   this	   is	   the	   first	   documented	   overreaction	   effect	   on	   the	   NSE,	   the	   evidence	   from	   the	   JSE	  
suggests	   these	  anomalies	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  arbitraged	  away	   in	   the	  Nigerian	  equity	  market	  over	  
time	  as	  well.	  This	  would	  be	  an	  area	  for	  future	  research.	  In	  regard	  of	  the	  supposed	  congruity	  of	  
return	  and	  investor	  sentiment,	  only	  the	  NSE	  shows	  evidence	  of	  this.	  The	  study	  finds	  that	  when	  
there	  is	  an	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  a	  bourse,	  there	  is	  a	  similar	  trend	  –	  albeit	  in	  absolute	  terms	  –	  
observed	  with	  respect	  to	  investor	  sentiment	  represented	  by	  the	  share	  turnover	  ratio.	  
	  
1.6	   Outline	  of	  the	  report	  
Having	   presented	   an	   overview	   here,	   subsequent	   chapters	   take	   a	  much	  more	   comprehensive	  
look	   at	   the	   highlighted	   points.	   Chapter	   Two	   surveys	   the	   literature,	   which	   then	   feeds	   into	  
underpinning	  considerations	  for	  the	  method	  adopted,	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  Three.	  The	  Results	  
and	  Findings	  are	  presented	  in	  Chapter	  Four	  and	  summary	  insights,	  contributions,	  and	  areas	  for	  
future	  research	  are	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Five.	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2.	   LITERATURE	  REVIEW	  	  
	  
The	   review	  centres	  on	   five	  major	   themes:	  efficient	  markets,	   asset	  pricing	  models,	   anomalies,	  
stock	   market	   seasonality,	   investor	   overreaction	   and	   underreaction.	   Firstly,	   the	   concepts	   of	  
efficient	   markets	   and	   asset	   pricing	   models	   are	   considered	   to	   establish	   the	   orthodoxy.	  
Thereafter,	   anomalies	   are	   looked	   at	   in	   general	   and	   the	   contrasts	   with	   the	   Efficient	   Market	  
Hypothesis	   (EMH)	   brought	   forth.	   As	   investor	   overreaction	   is	   a	   type	   of	   anomaly,	   the	   varying	  
arguments	   on	   whether	   it	   is	   evidence	   of	   market	   inefficiency	   or	   otherwise	   is	   better	  
contextualized	  having	  established	  the	  notion	  and	  shortcomings	  of	  efficient	  markets	  and	  asset	  
pricing	  models.	   Since	   seasonality	   has	   been	   observed	   in	   studies	   other	   than	   overreaction	   and	  
underreaction,	  alternative	  arguments	  are	  explored	  for	  why	   it	  occurs.	  Consequently,	  questions	  
and	   gaps	   identified	   that	   establish	   the	   relevance	   of	   this	   study	   are	   summarized	   in	   the	   final	  
section.	  
	  
2.1	   Efficient	  Markets	  
The	  notion	  of	  efficient	  markets	  extends	  from	  the	  Bachelier-­‐Osborne	  random	  walk	  model,	  which	  
posits	   that	   there	   should	   be	   no	   informational	   value	   in	   historical	   price	   patterns	   (Fama,	   1965).	  
While	   the	   random	  walk	   hypothesis	   (RWH)	   is	   foundational	   to	   the	   efficient	  market	   hypothesis	  
(EMH)	   and	   often	   construed	   to	   have	   similar	   meanings,	   there	   are	   subtle	   but	   significant	  
differences.	   The	   random	  walk	  model	   hypothesizes	   that	   security	   price	   distributions	   should	   be	  
independent	  and	  conform	  to	  some	  probability	  distribution	  (Fama,	  1965).	  That	  is,	  there	  should	  
be	   no	   correlation	   between	   previous	   prices	   of	   a	   security	   and	   its	   future	   price.	   This	   is	   the	  
underpinning	  principle	  behind	  most	  market	  efficiency	  tests.	  When	  some	  statistically	  significant	  
correlation	  is	  observed,	  however,	  it	  only	  becomes	  evidence	  of	  inefficiency	  when	  it	  is	  persistent	  
and	  economically	  significant.	  
	  
Fama	   (1965)	   tests	   the	   empirical	   validity	   of	   the	   random	  walk	  model	   using	   the	   daily	   prices	   of	  
thirty	   constituent	   stocks	   of	   the	   Dow	   Jones	   Industrial	   Average	   (DJIA)	   by,	   in	   addition	   to	   other	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approaches,	  constructing	  normal	  probability	  graphs	  for	  daily	  changes	   in	  the	  natural	   logarithm	  
of	   each	   security	   price.	   Its	   distribution	   of	   price	   changes	   showed	   observable	   departures	   from	  
normality	  where	  ex	  post	  tests	  of	  statistical	  significance	  (serial	  correlation	  and	  runs	  tests)	  were	  
deemed	   mostly	   independent,	   in	   consonance	   with	   the	   first	   assumption	   of	   the	   random	   walk	  
model,	  as	  depicted	  algebraically	  by:	  	  
	  
P	  (xt	  =	  x	  |	  xt-­‐1,	  xt-­‐2,	  …)	  =	  P	  (xt	  =	  x)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (2.1)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
That	   is,	   the	   probability	   that	   a	   stock	   price	   change	  will	   take	   the	   value	   x	   conditional	   upon	   the	  
knowledge	   that	   previous	   price	   changes	   took	   the	   values	   xt-­‐1,	   xt-­‐2,	   et	   cetera;	   is	   equal	   to	   the	  
unconditional	  probability	  that	  the	  price	  change	  during	  time	  t	  will	  take	  the	  value	  x	  (Fama,	  1965).	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  serial	  correlation,	  runs	  and	  filter	  tests,	  Fama	  (1965:85)	  gives	  consideration	  to	  
Mandelbrot’s	   (1963)	   exposition	   that	   “large	   (price)	   changes	  may	   tend	   to	  be	   followed	  by	   large	  
(price)	   changes,	   but	   of	   random	   sign,	   whereas	   small	   changes	   tend	   to	   be	   followed	   by	   small	  
changes”,	  a	  hypothesis	  that	  alters	  the	  independence	  assumption	  of	  the	  random	  walk	  model:	  
	  
P	  (xt	  =	  x	  |	  xt-­‐1,	  xt-­‐2,	  …)	  >	  P	  (xt	  =	  x)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (2.2)	  
	  
Fama	  (1965)	  found	  evidence	  of	  large	  price	  changes	  being	  followed	  by	  large	  price	  changes	  but	  of	  
either	   sign.	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler	   (1985)	   hypothesize	   and	   present	   evidence	   that	   show	   the	  
change	  would	  be	  of	  the	  opposite	  sign.	  Fama’s	  (1965)	  additional	  argument	  is	  that	  even	  when	  the	  
above	   relation	   is	   statistically	   significant,	   it	   may	   not	   be	   economically	   significant.	   That	   is,	  
statistically	  significant	  departures	  from	  normality	  or	  dependence	  of	  price	  change	  distributions	  
may	  still	  not	  be	  strong	  enough	  to	  allow	  an	  investor	  earn	  profits	  after	  accounting	  for	  transaction,	  




The	   evolution	   of	   empirical	   research	   on	   efficient	   markets	   had	   first	   been	   concerned	   with	   the	  
utility	   or	   otherwise,	   of	   historical	   information	   in	  predicting	   stock	   returns:	   “weak-­‐form	   tests	   of	  
the	  EMH”	  –	  autocorrelation,	  runs	  and	  trading	  rule	  tests	  –	  as	  it	  were.	  Evidence	  of	  some	  utility	  of	  
ex	  post	  returns	  in	  predicting	  return	  performance	  (Basu,	  1977;	  French,	  1980;	  Banz,	  1981;	  Keim,	  
1983;	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler,	   1985;	   Jegadeesh,	   1990;	   Schwert,	   1990;	   Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman,	  
1993;	   et	   cetera),	   dubbed	   anomalies,	   thereafter	   shifted	   the	   attention	   of	   researchers	   towards	  
how	  long	  it	  took	  for	  security	  prices	  to	  adjust	  to	  public	  information	  as	  they	  became	  available,	  so-­‐
called	   “semi-­‐strong-­‐form	   tests	   of	   the	   EMH”	   –	   event	   studies.	   Additionally,	   it	   is	   intuitive	   to	  
suppose	   that	   in	   an	   efficient	   market,	   certain	   groups	   of	   investors	   –	   corporate	   insiders,	   stock	  
exchange	   specialists,	   professional	   portfolio	  managers,	   security	   analysts,	   et	   cetera	   –	   shouldn’t	  
have	  monopoly	  access	  to	  information	  that	  could	  influence	  security	  prices	  and	  thus	  consistently	  
earn	  above-­‐average	  risk-­‐adjusted	  returns.	   Investigations	   in	  this	  regard	  –	  “strong-­‐form	  tests	  of	  
the	  EMH”	  –	  have	  been	  mixed,	  however.	  	  
	  
“Return	   prediction	   studies”	   –	   a	   broad	   categorization	   for	  weak-­‐form	   efficiency	   tests	   by	   Fama	  
(1991),	   continue	   to	   be	   challenged	   by	   the	   supposed	   inadequacies	   of	   subsisting	   equilibrium	  
models.	  While	  an	  exhaustive	  pricing	  model	  based	  on	  these	  observations	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  developed,	  
there	   is	   increasing	  evidence	  of	   the	  predictive	  utility	  of	  ex	  post	   returns	   in	  determining	  ex	  ante	  
returns.	   The	   recurring	   question	   remains	   whether	   anomalies	   are	   not	   just	   evidence	   that	   an	  
exhaustive	   model	   of	   factors	   that	   underpin	   return	   remains	   elusive.	   The	   one-­‐factor	   Sharpe-­‐
Lintner-­‐Black	  (SLB)	  asset	  pricing	  model	  (Sharpe,	  1964;	  Lintner,	  1965;	  Black,	  1972)	  remains	  by	  far	  
the	  most	   popular	   equilibrium	  model	   and	   yet	   evidence	   (Banz,	   1981;	   Reinganum,	   1981;	   Basu,	  
1977;	   et	   cetera)	   of	   its	   mis-­‐specification	   of	   risk	   factors	   germane	   to	   asset	   pricing	   is	   quite	  
substantial.	  	  
	  	  
“Event	   studies”,	   a	   broad	   categorization	   for	   semi-­‐strong	   efficiency	   tests	   by	   Fama	   (1991),	  
represent	  much	  more	  robust	  efficiency	  tests	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  not	  beleaguered	  by	  the	  
“joint-­‐hypotheses”	  problem	  of	  market	  efficiency	  and	  asset-­‐pricing	  specification	  (Fama,	  1991).	  In	  
a	   purely	   practical	   sense,	   the	   case	   can	   be	   made	   that	   uneven	   reactions	   of	   investors	   to	   new	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information	   (e.g.,	   stock	   splits,	  earnings	  announcement,	  etc.)	  present	  profit	  opportunities	   that	  
only	   become	   insignificant	   when	   a	   critical	   mass	   of	   market	   participants	   decide	   to	   exploit	   the	  
temporary	   “disequilibrium”	   at	   about	   the	   same	   time;	   since	   it	   pushes	   the	   price	   back	   to	  
equilibrium	  as	   suggested	  by	  market	  efficiency	  empiricists.	  Thus,	  when	   factors	   such	  as	  market	  
microstructure,	   transaction	   costs,	   et	   cetera	   are	   considered	   alongside	   reactions	   to	   company	  
events,	  the	  supposed	  statistically	  significant	  “disequilibria”	  becomes	  economically	  insignificant.	  	  
	  
“Tests	  for	  private	  information”,	  a	  broad	  categorization	  for	  strong-­‐form	  efficiency	  tests	  by	  Fama	  
(1991),	   investigates	   informational	   advantages	   that	   certain	   market	   actors	   supposedly	   have	  
because	   of	   their	   vantage	   positions.	   Fama	   (1991)	   groups	   the	   relevant	   studies	   into	   three:	   (a)	  
“Insider	   Trading”,	   (b)	   “Security	   Analysis”	   and	   (c)	   “Professional	   Portfolio	   Management”,	   and	  
concedes	   that	   they	  point	   to	  statistically	   significant	  evidence	  of	   the	  existence	  of	   informational	  
advantages	  for	  these	  market	  actors.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  market	  makers/specialists	  on	  the	  New	  York	  
Stock	   Exchange	   (“Insider	   Trading”),	   Neiderhoffer	   and	   Osborne	   (1966)	   present	   evidence	   that	  
show	   that	  market	  makers	   do	   possess	   information	   that	   enable	   them	   earn,	   on	   the	   aggregate,	  
positive	  abnormal	  profits	  on	  a	  consistent	  basis.	  	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  Fama	  (1970),	  the	  dependence	  test	  in	  Fama	  (1965)	  fall	  under	  the	  weak-­‐form	  tests	  of	  
the	   EMH	   since	   the	   focus	  was	   on	  whether	   historical	   prices	   of	   securities	   had	   economic	   utility.	  
Fama	   (1965)	   had	   also	   posited	   that	   the	   independence	   of	   security	   prices’	   distributions	   is	  
enhanced	   when	   there	   are:	   (a)	   superior	   technicians	   who	   are	   able	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	  
dependencies	   in	   security	   price	   distributions	   and	   thus	   render	   technical	   analysis	   redundant	   by	  
their	  collective	  action	  and	  (b)	  superior	  fundamental	  analysts	  who	  are	  able	  to	  predict	  economic	  
and	   political	   variables	   that	   have	   price	   impact	   on	   securities.	   It	   also	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   near	  
impossible	   for	  any	  one	   fundamental	   investor	   to	  consistently	  earn	  profits	   in	   this	  way.	  Tests	  of	  
this	  claim	  fall	  under	  strong-­‐form	  EMH	  tests	  where	  institutional	  investors	  –	  who	  fit	  closely	  with	  
the	   description	   of	   the	   fundamental	   analyst	   described	   above	   –	   are	   studied	   to	   see	   if	   they	  




Fama	  (1970)	  examines	  the	  three	  models	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  efficient	  markets:	  (a)	  Expected	  return	  
or	  “fair	  game”	  models,	  (b)	  The	  submartingale	  model	  and	  (c)	  The	  random	  walk	  model.	  Since	  the	  
fair	  game	  model	  seems	  more	  exhaustive	  and	  the	  other	  types	  are	  argued	  to	  be	  its	  variants,	  it	  is	  
presented	  below.	  
	  
E(	  Pj,t+1	  |	  φt)	  =	  Pjt	  [1	  +	  E(	  rj,t+1	  |	  φt)]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (2.3)	  
	  
This	  expression	  simply	  implies	  that	  the	  equilibrium	  or	  expected	  return	  on	  a	  security	  at	  time	  t+1	  
based	  on	  information	  available	  at	  time	  t,	  E(	  Pj,t+1	  |	  φt),	  should	  be	  the	  sum	  of	  the	  purchase	  price	  
of	  the	  security	  Pjt	  and	  the	  expected	  one-­‐period	  percentage	  return	  of	  the	  security	  at	  time	  t+1	  as	  
assessed	  by	  the	  market	  based	  on	  the	  available	  information	  at	  time	  t,	  φt.	  	  
	  
Thus,	  a	  residual	  return,	  Uj,t+1	  would	  be:	  
	  




Uj,t+1	  =	  rj,t+1	  -­‐	  E(	  rj,t+1	  |	  φt)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (2.5)	  
	  
That	  is,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  actual	  price	  (return)	  and	  expected	  price	  (return)	  as	  assessed	  
by	  the	  market	  in	  a	  prior	  period	  based	  on	  information	  available	  to	  it	  at	  that	  time.	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Further	   to	   the	   above,	   the	   expected	   return	   or	   “fair	   game”	   model	   of	   efficient	   market	   theory	  
posits	  that:	  
	  
E	  (	  Uj,t+1	  |	  φt)	  =	  0	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (2.6)	  
	  
That	   is,	   the	   expected	   residual	   return	   at	   time	   t+1	   as	   assessed	   by	   the	   market	   based	   on	  
information	  available	  at	  time	  t,	  should	  be	  zero.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  actual	  return	  should	  be	  no	  
different	   from	   that	   expected	  by	   the	  market	   based	  on	   information	   available	   to	   it	   in	   the	   prior	  
period.	   From	   a	   statistical	   perspective,	   a	   violation	   of	   the	   above	   expression	   is	   evidence	   of	  
inefficiency	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  expected	   return	   (or	  “fair	  game”)	  and	   random	  walk	  models	  of	  
market	  efficiency.	  	  
	  
Fama’s	   (1965,	   1970)	   argument	   is	   that	   statistical	   evidence	   of	   dependence	   in	   security	   price	  
distributions	  does	  not	  suffice	  in	  making	  a	  claim	  of	  market	  inefficiency.	  Instead,	  the	  correlation	  
between	  historical	  prices	  (or	  returns)	  would	  have	  to	  be	  strong	  enough	  to	  leave	  the	  discerning	  
investor	  with	  an	  economic	  profit	  (i.e.,	  ex	  post	  transaction	  and	  ancillary	  costs),	  one	  which	  he	  is	  
consistently	   able	   to	   earn	   by	   taking	   advantage	   of	   the	   supposed	   dependencies.	   Simply	   put,	  
evidence	  of	  dependence	  in	  return	  distributions,	  though	  antithetical	  to	  the	  random	  walk	  model	  
(one	   of	   the	   models	   of	   efficient	   market	   theory),	   may	   not	   necessarily	   contradict	   the	   efficient	  
market	  hypothesis	  since	  it	  requires	  statistically	  significant	  correlations	  to	  also	  be	  economically	  
significant.	  
	  
Fama	  (1970)	  provides	  additional	  conditions	  that	  bolster	  market	  efficiency,	  one	  of	  “frictionless	  
markets”	  where	  information	  is	  readily	  available	  and	  costless	  and	  expectations	  of	  its	  impact	  on	  
security	   prices	   or	   returns	   are	   homogenous.	   While	   it	   posits	   that	   these	   conditions	   are	   not	  
prerequisites	  to	  market	  efficiency	  but	  only	  enhancing	  factors,	   it	  remains	  a	  plausible	  argument	  
that	   the	   non-­‐existence	   of	   such	   market	   conditions	   in	   reality	   are	   antithetical	   to	   the	   efficient	  
market	   hypothesis.	   The	   notion	   that	   investors	   -­‐	   or	   at	   least	   a	   significant	   quantum	   –	   would	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interpret	  available	   information	   in	   the	  same	  manner	   is	  counterintuitive	  and	  antithetical	   to	   the	  
constitution	  of	  human	  beings.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  foundational	  arguments	  of	  behavioural	  finance.	  	  
	  
Surprisingly,	   Fama	   (1965,	   1970)	   does	   concede	   to	   elements	   of	   the	   overreaction	   hypothesis	  
(depicted	  below).	   In	  explaining	   the	  observation	  of	  consecutive	   large	  price	  changes	   in	   random	  
directions	  as	  hypothesized	  by	  Mandelbrot	  (1963),	  the	  paper	  concedes	  that	  information	  may	  not	  
necessarily	  be	  assimilated	   immediately	  and	  that	  adjustment	  of	  prices	  to	  this	  new	  information	  
will	  swing	  between	  two	  extremes	  –	  perhaps	  an	  overreaction	  and	  underreaction	  –	  before	  finally	  
stabilizing	  at	  the	  new	  equilibrium	  price.	  	  
	  
	  
E	  (rj,	  t+1	  |	  rjt	  )	  ≠	  E	  (rj,t+1)	  
	  
E	  (Uw,t+1	  |	  rjt	  )	  <	  0	   	  
	  
E	  (UL,t+1	  |	  rjt	  )	  >	  0	  
	  
	  
In	   light	  of	  above,	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler’s	   	   (1985:795)	  hypothesis	   that	  “extreme	  movements	   in	  
stock	   prices	   will	   be	   followed	   by	   subsequent	   price	   movements	   in	   the	   opposite	   direction”	   is	  
actually	   an	   extension	   of	   the	   observed	   random	   directional	   but	   consecutive	   price	   changes	   in	  
Fama	   (1965,	   1970).	   Except	   for	   perhaps	   Fama’s	   (1965,	   1970)	   intellectual	   entrenchment,	   De	  
Bondt	   and	   Thaler’s	   (1985,	   1987)	   overreaction	   hypothesis	   was	   discernible	   as	   far	   back	   as	  
Mandelbrot	   (1963).	   Subsequent	   behavioural	   models	   (Barberis,	   Shleifer,	   and	   Vishny,	   1998;	  
Daniel,	  Hirshleifer,	  and	  Subrahmanyam,	  1998)	  find	  that	  investors	  do	  overreact	  and	  underreact	  
to	  new	  information	  with	  statistically	  significant	  dependencies	  as	  have	  been	  documented	  by	  De	  
Bondt	  and	  Thaler	  (1985,	  1987)	  and	  the	  other	  numerous	  extensions	  of	  that	  seminal	  study	  (e.g.,	  
Chan,	  1988;	  Chopra,	   Lakonishok,	  and	  Ritter,	  1992).	  Thus,	   the	  major	   contribution	  of	  De	  Bondt	  
and	   Thaler	   (1985,	   1987)	   is	   the	   evidence	   it	   proffered:	   that	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   sequential	  




proportional	   price	   changes	   found	   in	   studies	   such	   as	   Fama	   (1965,	   1970),	   the	   direction	   of	   the	  
change	  is	  non-­‐random.	  	  
	  
The	  EMH	  continues	  to	  be	  tested	  across	  markets	  with	  mixed	  results.	  Karemera,	  Ojah,	  and	  Cole	  
(1999)	   investigate	   15	   emerging	   capital	   markets	   using	   Chow	   and	   Denning’s	   (1993)	   multiple	  
variance	   ratio	   technique	  which	   controls	   for	   some	  of	   the	   observed	  misspecification	  of	   Lo	   and	  
MacKinlay’s	   (1988)	   single	   variance	   ratio	   random	   walk	   hypothesis	   test	   and	   the	   potential	  
erroneous	   inferences	   therefrom.	   	   They	   find	  evidence	   consistent	  with	   the	  weak-­‐form	  EMH.	   In	  
light	   of	   their	   peculiar	   microstructure	   (e.g.,	   exchange	   rate	   controls,	   price	   change	   limits,	  
ownership,	   transaction	   costs,	   information	   costs,	   et	   cetera)	   and	   continually	   evolving	   research	  
methodologies	  for	  efficiency	  and	  (or)	  random	  walk	  studies,	  however,	  the	  supposed	  weak-­‐form	  
efficiency	  in	  emerging	  markets	  and	  indeed	  the	  EMH,	  are	  still	  open	  to	  debate.	  In	  fact,	  Karamera	  
et	  al.	   (1999)	   find	   that	  equity	   return	  dynamics	  are	  differential	  when	  exchange	   rates	  are	   taken	  
into	  consideration,	  especially	  for	  markets	  with	  hitherto	  high	  exchange	  rate	  volatility.	  	  
	  
2.1.1	   Is	  the	  Nigerian	  Stock	  Exchange	  an	  efficient	  market?	  
Olowe	  (1999),	  using	  a	  1981-­‐1992	  monthly	  return	  dataset	   for	  59	  randomly	  selected	  NSE-­‐listed	  
securities,	   finds	   the	   NSE	   weak-­‐form	   efficient	   as	   did	   Samuels	   and	   Yacout	   (1981)	   and	   Ayadi	  
(1983).	   Tijjani,	   Power,	   and	   Fifield	   (2009)	   also	   find	   this	   is	   still	   the	   case.	   A	   critique	   of	   earlier	  
Nigerian	   efficiency	   studies	   (e.g.,	   Samuel	   and	   Yacout,	   1981;	   Ayadi,	   1984)	   borders	   on	   small	  
sample	  sizes	  –	  twenty	  one	  to	  thirty	  quoted	  companies	  –	  and	  use	  of	  weekly	  returns	  that	  made	  
numerous	   securities	   in	   their	   sample	   that	  were	   thinly	   traded	   underestimate	   the	   variability	   of	  
returns	  and	  hence	  bias	  the	  tests	  towards	  efficiency	  (Olowe,	  1999).	   In	  other	   instances,	  Nigeria	  
was	  part	  of	  an	  emerging	  market	  sample	   (Samuel	  and	  Yacout,	  1981;	  Claessens,	  Dasgupta,	  and	  
Glen,	  1995;	  et	  cetera).	  Olowe	  (1999)	  in	  contrast	  to	  these	  earlier	  studies	  uses	  monthly	  returns	  of	  
59	  randomly	  selected	  securities	  listed	  on	  the	  Nigerian	  Stock	  Exchange	  (NSE)	  for	  the	  period	  1981	  
to	  1992	  and	  yet	  still	   finds	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  weak-­‐form	  EMH.	  A	  later	  study	  (Tijjani	  et	  
al.,	  2009)	  uses	  weekly	  closing	  prices	  for	  its	  autocorrelation	  tests,	  however,	  but	  for	  a	  much	  larger	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sample	  of	  69	  NSE-­‐listed	  securities	  for	  the	  11-­‐year	  period	  of	  1995	  –	  2005	  across	  1-­‐,	  5-­‐,	  10-­‐	  and	  
15-­‐week	  lags.	  But	  for	  the	  observed	  sparing	  inefficiency	  observed	  for	  short	  lags,	  the	  findings	  of	  
Tijjani	  et	  al	  (2009)	  are	  consistent	  with	  previous	  Nigerian	  EMH	  studies,	  in	  support	  of	  weak-­‐form	  
efficiency.	  
	  
2.1.2	   Is	  the	  Johannesburg	  Stock	  Exchange	  (JSE)	  an	  efficient	  market?	  
Using	  a	  twenty-­‐four	  share	  sample,	  Roux	  and	  Gilbertson	  (1978)	  find	  statistically	  significant	  price	  
change	  dependencies	  in	  the	  Johannesburg	  Stock	  Exchange,	  with	  a	  preponderance	  of	  the	  price	  
change	  distribution	  being	  leptokurtic.	  Roux	  and	  Gilbertson	  (1978)	  suppose	  the	  concentration	  of	  
price	  changes	  around	  the	  mode	  of	  the	  distribution	  and	  in	  extreme	  tails	  to	  be	  as	  a	  result	  of	  large	  
numbers	  of	  zero	  price	  changes,	  especially	   for	   industrial	  and	  mining	  shares.	  Even	  though	  Roux	  
and	   Gilbertson	   (1978)	   do	   not	   investigate	   the	   economic	   significance	   of	   their	   findings,	   they	  
conjecture	   that	   the	  exploitation	  of	   the	  observed	  price	  change	  dependencies	   relative	   to	  a	  buy	  
and	  hold	  strategy	  wouldn’t	  be	  profitable.	  	  
	  
Page	  and	  Way	  (1992)	  document	  results	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  weak-­‐form	  EMH	  on	  the	  JSE;	  with	  
the	  performance	  of	  the	  shares	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  prior	  return	  data	  being	  predictable	  and	  
on	  average,	  portfolios	  of	  prior	  “losers”	  outperforming	  prior	  “winners”	  by	  about	  20%	  over	  the	  
three	  years	  after	  portfolio	   formation.	  They	  also	   found	  evidence	  of	  a	   January	  effect	   similar	   to	  
that	   evidenced	   on	   the	   New	   York	   Stock	   Exchange	   by	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler	   (1985).	   Other	   JSE	  
studies	   (Cubbin,	  Eidne,	  Firer	  and	  Gilbert,	  2006;	  Venter,	  2009)	  also	   find	  evidence	  of	  anomalies	  
that	  point	  to	  inefficiency.	  
	  
2.1.3	   Gaps	  in	  the	  NSE	  and	  JSE	  efficiency	  literature	  
In	  sum,	  these	  studies	  are	  mostly	  differential	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  some	  statistical	  artefact.	  As	  earlier	  
discussed,	  the	  concept	  of	  efficiency	  extends	  beyond	  statistical	  significance	  and	  it	  would	  indeed	  
be	  rare	   if	  any	  proof	  of	  efficiency	  or	  otherwise	   is	  found	  to	  be	  consistent	  without	  some	  trading	  
rule	   cum	   profitability	   test.	   The	   mixed	   results	   of	   efficiency	   studies	   for	   markets	   like	   Nigeria	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(Olowe,	  1999;	  Appiah-­‐Kusi	  and	  Menyah,	  2003;	  Tijjani	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  etc.)	  and	  South	  Africa	  (Page	  
and	  Way,	  1992;	  Roux	  and	  Gilbertson,	  1978;	  Cubbin	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  etc.)	  –	  especially	  in	  light	  of	  their	  
contrasting	  institutional	  infrastructure	  –	  is	  suggestive	  of	  empirical	  and	  perhaps	  theoretical	  gaps.	  
Relevant	  research	  questions	  in	  this	  regard	  thus	  include	  whether	  the	  observed	  overreaction	  and	  
January	  effects	  on	  the	  Johannesburg	  Stock	  Exchange	  (e.g.,	  Page	  and	  Way,	  1992;	  Bradfied,	  1990;	  
Muller,	  1999;	  Robins	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  Cubbin	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Venter,	  2009;	  Hsieh	  and	  Hodnett,	  2011;	  
etc.)	   are	   persistent.	   For	   the	   Nigerian	   Stock	   Exchange,	   the	   points	   of	   enquiry	   revolve	   around	  
whether	   its	   supposed	   weak-­‐form	   efficiency	   (e.g.,	   Olowe,	   1999;	   Tijjani	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Okpara,	  
2010;	  etc.)	   is	   robust	   to	   the	  overreaction	  and	   January	  effects.	   Furthermore	   there	   is	   a	  need	   to	  
explain	  why	  January	  returns	  were	  differential	  in	  prior	  studies	  (e.g.,	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler,	  1985,	  
1987;	  Jegadeesh,	  1990;	  Page	  and	  Way,	  1992;	  Robins	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  Cubbin	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  et	  cetera).	  
	  
2.2	   Asset	  Pricing	  Models	  
The	   search	   for	   a	   robust	   asset	   pricing	   model	   is	   longstanding	   and	   continuing.	   In	   fact,	   model	  
misspecification	  remains	  a	  recurring	  rebuttal	  to	  purported	  anomalies,	  especially	  those	  observed	  
relative	  to	  the	  Capital	  Asset	  Pricing	  Model	  (CAPM)	  by	  Sharpe	  (1964),	  Lintner	  (1965)	  and	  Black	  
(1972).	   Other	   prominent	  models	   include	  Merton’s	   (1973)	   Intertemporal	   Capital	   Asset	   Pricing	  
Model	  (ICAPM),	  the	  Arbitrage	  Pricing	  Model	  (Ross,	  1976),	  and	  the	  Three-­‐Factor	  Model	  by	  Fama	  
and	  French	  (1993,	  1996).	  
	  
2.2.1	   The	  Capital	  Asset	  Pricing	  Model	  
The	  underlying	  assumptions	  of	  the	  Sharpe-­‐Lintner-­‐Black	  Capital	  Asset	  Pricing	  Model	  (SLB	  CAPM)	  
extend	   from	  Markowitz’	   (1952)	  mean-­‐variance	   portfolio	  model	  which	   essentially	   opines	   that	  
investors	   want	   a	   portfolio	   that	   would	   produce	   the	   best	   return	   for	   the	   least	   risk,	   a	   mean-­‐
variance	   efficient	   portfolio.	   Additional	   assumptions	   by	   Sharpe	   (1964)	   and	   Lintner	   (1965)	   are	  
that	  investors	  have	  homogenous	  expectations	  of	  returns	  and	  can	  borrow	  and	  lend	  freely	  at	  the	  
risk-­‐free	  rate.	  Black	  (1972)	  reckons	  a	  priori	  that	  the	  unrestricted	  risk-­‐free	  borrowing	  and	  lending	  
assumption	  of	  the	  CAPM	  is	  differential	   to	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  CAPM	  and	  wonders	  whether	  the	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model	  would	  still	  hold	  if	   it	  were	  dropped.	  This	  is	  the	  raison	  d’etre	  of	  Black	  (1972).	  Thus,	  Black	  
(1972)	   extends	   these	   assumptions	   to	   a	   scenario	   where	   there	   is	   no	   risk-­‐free	   asset.	   That	   is,	  
borrowing	   and	   lending	   the	   risk-­‐free	   rate	   is	   not	   allowed.	   In	   another	   scenario,	   Black	   (1972)	  
assumes	  there	  is	  a	  riskless	  asset	  in	  which	  investors	  can	  take	  long	  but	  not	  short	  positions.	  These	  
new	  assumptions,	  Black	   (1972)	   finds,	  do	  not	  distort	   the	   linear	   relationship	  between	  beta	  and	  
expected	  return	  expounded	  by	  Sharpe	  (1964)	  and	  Lintner	  (1965).	  
	  
Following	  from	  the	  above	  assumptions,	  the	  SLB	  CAPM	  is	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  
	  
E(Ri)	  =	  Rf	  +	  βi	  [E(Rm)	  –	  Rf]	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (2.7)	  
	  
Where	  βi	  =	  Cov	  (Ri,	  Rm)	  /	  σ2	  (Rm),	  E(Ri)	  is	  the	  expected	  return	  on	  asset	  i,	  Rf	  is	  the	  risk-­‐free	  rate,	  
E(Rm)	   is	   the	  expected	  return	  on	  the	  market	  portfolio	  and	  βi	   is	   the	  slope	  of	   the	  regression	   line	  
relating	  Ri	  and	  Rm.	  	  
The	   thesis	   of	   the	   SLB	  CAPM	   is	   that	  beta	  has	   robust	   explanatory	  power	   for	   expected	   returns.	  
There	  are	  studies	  (Basu,	  1977;	  Banz,	  1981;	  Fama	  and	  French,	  1992,	  1993	  and	  1996;	  et	  cetera),	  
however,	   that	   suggest	   otherwise.	   Factors	   now	   considered	   to	   be	   unexplained	   by	   the	   CAPM	  
include	  size	  (Banz,	  1981),	  ratio	  of	  share	  price	  to	  book	  value	  per	  share	  (P/B)	  (Fama	  and	  French,	  
1992),	   ratio	   of	   share	   price	   to	   earnings	   per	   share	   (P/E)	   (Basu,	   1977),	   return	   persistence	  
(Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman,	  1993	  and	  2001),	  return	  reversal	  (De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler,	  1985	  and	  1987),	  
et	  cetera.	  
Fama	   and	   French	   (2004)	   argue	   that	   the	   major	   flaw	   in	   the	   SLB	   CAPM	   lies	   in	   its	   unrealistic	  
assumptions:	   unrestricted	   risk-­‐free	   lending	   and	   borrowing	   (Sharpe,	   1964;	   Lintner,	   1965)	   or	  
unrestricted	  short-­‐selling	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  riskless	  asset	  (Black,	  1972)	  is	  simply	  impracticable.	  
It	   is	  also	  counterintuitive	   for	   investors	   to	  think	  alike	  and	  have	  similar	  expectations,	  otherwise	  
the	   whole	   essence	   of	   markets	   would	   be	   lost.	   However,	   modelling	   complex	   situations	   often	  
requires	  starting	  from	  an	  idealized	  scenario	  relative	  to	  which	  some	  empiricism	  is	  possible.	  In	  an	  
ideal	   world,	   all	   investors	   would	   like	   to	   borrow	   freely	   at	   the	   risk-­‐free	   rate.	   That	   is	   simply	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impossible,	   however,	   because	   investors	   are	   not	   necessarily	   under	   the	   same	   constraints	   or	  
endowed	  similarly.	  
Black	   (1972)	   theorizes	   that	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   risk-­‐free	   security/asset	   to	   borrow	   or	   lend,	  
investors	  would	  have	  to	  choose	  from	  assets	  in	  the	  risky	  portfolio	  and	  that	  the	  CAPM	  would	  still	  
hold	   if	   there	   is	   “unrestricted	   short	   sales	   of	   risky	   assets.”	   A	   logical	   extension	   of	   the	   Sharpe-­‐
Lintner	  CAPM	  assumptions	  of	  homogeneity	  of	   investor	  expectations	  and	  risk	  aversion	  suggest	  
that	  the	  investor	  would	  either	  hold	  the	  risk-­‐free	  portfolio	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  risk-­‐free	  and	  
risky	  assets.	  The	  difference	  in	  return	  thereof	  might	  only	  then	  be	  in	  how	  much	  of	  the	  risky	  asset	  
they	  hold	  and	  how	  much	  of	   the	   risk-­‐free	  asset	   to	   lend	  or	  borrow	   to	  enhance	   their	   return	  by	  
going	  long	  or	  short	  the	  risky	  asset.	  This	  assumed	  homogeneity	  of	  expectations	  suggests	  that	  all	  
investors	  would	  hold	  the	  same	  portfolio	  of	  risky	  assets	  but	  in	  different	  proportions	  (or	  weights).	  	  
Essentially,	   tests	   of	   the	   CAPM	   seek	   to	   investigate	   whether	   the	   market	   portfolio	   is	   indeed	  
efficient.	   The	   implications	   thereof	   are	   that	   asset	   expected	   returns	   should	   be	   directly	  
proportional	   to	   their	   market	   betas,	   the	   additional	   premium	   over	   the	   return	   of	   the	   risk-­‐free	  
asset	   for	   the	   additional	   risk	   taken	   in	   investing	   in	   the	   risky	   asset	   should	   be	   positive	   and	   the	  
intercept	  of	  the	  linear	  relationship	  between	  expected	  returns	  and	  beta	  should	  be	  the	  risk-­‐free	  
rate	  (Fama	  and	  French,	  2004).	  	  
Early	  tests	  of	  the	  SLB	  CAPM	  fall	  into	  two	  categories:	  Cross-­‐sectional	  and	  time-­‐series	  regression	  
tests.	   Cross-­‐sectional	   tests	   (Friend	   and	   Blume,	   1970;	   Black,	   Jensen,	   and	   Scholes,	   1972;	   Fama	  
and	  MacBeth,	   1973;	   et	   cetera)	   involve	   regressing	   “average	   security	   returns	   on	   estimates	   of	  
their	  market	  betas”	  –	  so	  called	  cross-­‐section	  regression	  tests	  of	  the	  CAPM	  –	  whereby	  a	  positive	  
slope	  and	  intercept	  equal	  to	  the	  risk-­‐free	  rate	  is	  seen	  as	  evidence	  that	  the	  above	  relations	  hold.	  
In	  a	  time-­‐series	  test,	  however,	  the	  intercept	  term	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  zero	  for	  each	  asset.	  	  
Friend	  and	  Blume	   (1970)	  analyze	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  CAPM	  betas	  measure	   the	   risk	   they	  are	  
supposed	   to	   abstract.	   They	   present	   evidence	   that	   show	   that	   beta	   is	   biased	   against	   risky	  
portfolios	   –	   that	   is,	  ex	  post	   returns	   (risk)	   for	   risky	  portfolios	  were	  higher	   (lower)	   than	   the	  ex	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ante	  predictions	  of	   the	  CAPM	  –	  and	  relate	   it	   to	  one	  of	   the	  assumptions	  of	   the	  version	  of	   the	  
CAPM	  –	  equal	  lending	  and	  borrowing	  rates	  –	  by	  Sharpe	  (1964)	  and	  Lintner	  (1965).	  	  
Additionally,	  Black,	  Jensen	  and	  Scholes	  (1972),	  Fama	  and	  MacBeth	  (1973)	  and	  Fama	  and	  French	  
(1992)	  find	  that	  the	  intercept	  term	  in	  their	  cross-­‐sectional	  regression	  tests	   is	  greater	  than	  the	  
one-­‐month	  treasury	  bill	  rate	  –	  the	  typical	  proxy	  for	  the	  risk-­‐free	  asset	  –	  and	  the	  coefficient	  of	  
beta	  is	  less	  than	  the	  excess	  market	  return	  over	  the	  risk-­‐free	  asset.	  Similarly,	  time-­‐series	  tests	  of	  
the	   CAPM	   find	   non-­‐zero	   intercept	   terms	   in	   their	   regressions	   (e.g.,	   Friend	   and	   Blume,	   1970;	  
Black,	  Jensen	  and	  Scholes,	  1972;	  Stambaugh,	  1982).	  	  
Fama	  and	  French	  (2004)	  argue	  that	  cross-­‐section	  and	  time	  series	  regressions	  do	  not	  suffice	  to	  
test	  the	  assertions	  of	  the	  CAPM	  and	  that	  what	  they	  really	  test	  is	  how	  efficient	  a	  specific	  proxy	  
for	  the	  market	  portfolio	  is	  (Jensen,	  1968;	  Friend	  and	  Blume,	  1970;	  et	  cetera).	  In	  fact,	  Roll	  (1977)	  
argues	   that	   the	   CAPM	  has	   not	   been	   tested	   hitherto	   and	   that	   a	  market	   portfolio	   in	   the	   form	  
suggested	  by	  the	  SLB	  CAPM	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  elusive.	  	  
Thus,	  there	  is	  some	  merit	  in	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  purported	  misspecification	  of	  the	  SLB	  CAPM	  
is	  simply	  due	  to	  a	  weak	  proxy	  for	  the	  market	  portfolio	  of	  invested	  wealth.	  Thus	  far,	  this	  proxy	  
has	   typically	   been	   the	   return	   to	   a	   stock	  market	   index.	   However,	   Stambaugh	   (1982)	   provides	  
evidence	  that	  show	  a	  much	  more	  inclusive	  or	  broader	  market	  proxy	  would	  not	  be	  differential	  to	  
the	  robustness	  of	  the	  CAPM;	  as	  stock	  returns	  account	  for	  most	  of	  the	  volatility	  of	  the	  broader	  
market.	   In	  any	  case,	  Fama	  and	  French	   (1997),	  Pastor	  and	  Stambaugh	  (1999),	  et	  cetera,	  argue	  
that	  the	  estimation	  of	  key	  variables	  (β,	  Rm-­‐Rf)	  of	  the	  CAPM	  are	  flawed	  by	  their	  accompanying	  
large	  standard	  errors	  and	  that	  the	  CAPM’s	  chances	  are	  jeopardized	  irrespective	  of	  the	  market	  
proxy	  problem.	  	  
While	   they	   provide	   some	   accommodation	   for	   Black’s	   (1972)	   model,	   being	   as	   it	   is	   that	   it	  
recognizes	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  average	  expected	  returns	  and	  market	  beta	   is	   flatter	  
than	  predicted	  by	  the	  earlier	  version	  of	  the	  CAPM	  by	  Sharpe	  (1964)	  and	  Lintner	  (1965),	  Fama	  
and	   French	   (2004)	  write	   off	   the	   latter	   as	   an	   empirical	   failure.	   Undoubtedly,	   the	   discovery	   of	  
other	  factors	  (e.g.	  size,	  value,	  momentum,	  et	  cetera)	  with	  explanatory	  power	  for	  asset	  returns	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does	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  SLB	  CAPM.	  If	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  empirical	  flaws,	  
however,	   the	   SLB	   CAPM	   has	   become	   the	   preeminent	   rational	   pricing	   benchmark	   (Fama	   and	  
French,	   2004;	  Da,	  Guo,	   and	   Jagannathan,	   2012),	   the	   behaviouralist	   argument	   that	   deviations	  
from	  the	  predictions	  of	   the	  SLB	  CAPM	  is	   irrational	  –	  an	  overreaction	  and/or	  underreaction	  as	  
the	   case	   may	   be	   –	   has	   some	   merit.	   Fama	   and	   French	   (2004)	   adopt	   the	   rationalist	   view,	  
however,	  that	  returns	  in	  excess	  of	  that	  predicted	  by	  the	  SLB	  CAPM	  are	  premia	  for	  risks	  that	  it	  
doesn’t	  capture.	  Incidentally,	  their	  three-­‐factor	  model	  is	  not	  exhaustive	  either.	  The	  momentum	  
effect	  as	  expounded	  by	  Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman	  (1993)	  is	  certainly	  one	  “anomaly”	  it	  has	  not	  been	  
able	  to	  explain.	  
Bottom-­‐line	  is	  that	  there	  are	  elements	  of	  return	  that	  the	  CAPM	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  explain.	  It	  
may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  market	  proxy	  problem	  or	  the	  estimation	  errors	  in	  the	  computation	  of	  beta	  
and	   the	  market	   premium	  or	   indeed	  misspecification	   of	   the	  model	   itself.	   In	   a	   survey	   of	   Chief	  
Financial	  Officers	   by	  Graham	  and	  Harvey	   (2001),	   73.5%	  admitted	   to	   using	   the	  CAPM	   in	   their	  
capital	  budgeting	  process.	  Similarly,	  75%	  of	  finance	  professors	  surveyed	  by	  Welch	  (2008)	  teach	  
and	  recommend	  the	  CAPM	  in	  their	  courses.	  Thus,	  while	  criticisms	  of	  the	  CAPM	  (e.g.,	  Fama	  and	  
French,	  1992,	  1993,	  1996	  and	  2004)	  persist,	   it	   continues	   to	  be	   the	  pre-­‐eminent	  asset	  pricing	  
model	  in	  finance	  (Da,	  Guo,	  and	  Jaganathan,	  2012).	  	  
	  
2.2.2	   The	  3-­‐factor	  model	  
Following	  Merton’s	  (1973)	  Inter-­‐temporal	  Capital	  Asset	  Pricing	  Model	  (ICAPM)	  and	  Ross’	  (1976)	  
Arbitrage	  Pricing	  Model,	  Fama	  and	  French	  (1993	  and	  1996)	  propose	  a	  multifactor	   ICAPM	  that	  
adds	  two	  more	  variables	  to	  the	  classical	  model,	  a	  so-­‐called	  Three-­‐Factor	  Model.	  	  
	  
E(Ri)	  –	  Rf	  =	  bi	  [	  E(Rm)	  –	  Rf	  ]	  +	  Si	  E(SMB)	  +	  hi	  E(HML)	   	   	   	   	   	   (2.8)	  




Essentially,	   it	   posits	   that	   apart	   from	   market	   risk,	   the	   cross-­‐section	   of	   average	   returns	   is	  
explained	   by	   two	   additional	   factors:	   Size	   and	   the	   Book-­‐To-­‐Market	   Equity	   ratio.	   In	   the	   above	  
equation,	  SMB	  is	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  returns	  of	  diversified	  portfolios	  of	  small-­‐firm	  and	  big-­‐firm	  
stocks	  by	  market	  value	  and	  HML	  is	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  returns	  of	  diversified	  portfolios	  of	  high	  
and	  low	  book-­‐to-­‐market	  equity	  stocks.	  	  
In	   Fama	  and	  French	   (1996),	   time-­‐series	   regressions	  of	   stock	   returns	   in	  excess	  of	   the	   risk-­‐free	  
rate	  on	  Rm-­‐Rf,	  SMB	  and	  HML	  produce	   intercepts	  close	  to	  zero,	  a	   feat	  most	  tests	  of	  the	  CAPM	  
(Friend	  and	  Blume,	  1970;	  Black,	  Jensen,	  and	  Scholes,	  1972;	  Stambaugh,	  1982;	  et	  cetera)	  didn’t	  
achieve.	  As	  a	   result,	   Fama	  and	  French	   (1996)	   argue	   that	  while	   SMB	  and	  HML	  are	  proxies	   for	  
“risk	  factors	  or	  state	  variables	  of	  special	  hedging	  concern	  to	  investors”	  as	  opposed	  to	  being	  the	  
state	  variables	  themselves,	  their	  empirical	  success,	  albeit	  Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman	  (1993)	  remain	  
doubters,	  suggest	  it	  is	  the	  closest	  there	  has	  been	  to	  an	  equilibrium	  pricing	  model.	  
There	   is	   some	  distinction,	  however,	   in	  how	   the	  SLB	  CAPM	  and	   the	  3FM	  evolved.	   The	   former	  
evolved	   from	   pre-­‐existing	   theory	   (Markowitz,	   1952)	   and	  was	  motivated	   by	   a	   need	   to	  model	  
portfolio	   return	   under	   uncertainty	   (Friend	   and	   Blume,	   1970).	   However,	   the	   3FM	   was	   an	  
empirical	  discovery	  for	  which	  theoretical	  meaning	  was	  sought	  ex	  post	  and	  this	  remains	  a	  major	  
shortcoming	  of	  the	  model	  (Fama	  and	  French,	  2004).	  	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  is	  not	  exhaustive	  either.	  In	  
fact,	   Fama	   and	   French	   (1996	   and	   2004)	   acknowledge	   that	   their	   model	   doesn’t	   explain	  
Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman’s	  (1993)	  momentum	  effect.	  While	  in	  their	  own	  tests	  (Fama	  and	  French,	  
1993,	  1996	  and	  2004),	  they	  present	  evidence	  showing	  that	  the	  overreaction	  effect	  is	  simply	  the	  
result	  of	  the	  misspecification	  of	  the	  CAPM,	  there	  have	  been	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Assoe	  and	  Sy,	  2003;	  
Chiao	  and	  Hueng,	  2005)	  robust	  to	  the	  3FM	  model.	  	  
Carhart	  (1997)	  proposes	  a	  “momentum	  factor”	  as	  a	  fourth	  factor	  to	  Fama	  and	  French’s	  (1993	  
and	  1996)	   three-­‐factor	  model;	   a	   four-­‐factor	  model.	   Fama	  and	  French	   (2004)	  argue,	  however,	  
that	  constituents	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  equity	  should	  be	  contemporaneous	  with	  the	  long-­‐term	  horizon	  
of	   equity	   investors.	   As	   the	  momentum	   effect	   is	   a	   fleeting	   phenomenon,	   they	   suggest	   that	   a	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“momentum	   factor”	  may	   not	   be	   appropriate;	   at	   least	  with	   respect	   to	   computing	   the	   cost	   of	  
equity.	  	  
	  
2.2.3	   Summary	  insights	  on	  asset	  pricing	  models	  
A	   major	   issue	   of	   interest	   here	   is	   the	   discountenance	   of	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler’s	   (1985)	  
overreaction	  effect	  by	  Fama	  and	  French	  (1996),	  wherein	  they	  argue	  that	  the	  misspecification	  of	  
the	  CAPM	  is	  actually	   responsible	   for	   the	  purported	  anomaly.	   In	   regard	  of	   the	  continuation	  of	  
short-­‐term	   returns,	   that	   is,	   the	  momentum	   effect	   or	   investor	   underreaction	   (Jegadeesh	   and	  
Titman,	  1993),	  Fama	  and	  French	  (1996)	  argue	  that	  the	  inability	  of	  their	  model	  to	  explain	  it	  is	  as	  
much	   a	   challenge	   for	   behavioural	   finance	   as	   it	   is	   for	   conventional	   finance	   theory.	   This	   is	  
because,	   hitherto,	   there	  was	   –	   there	   still	   is	   perhaps	   –	   a	   seeming	   contradiction	   between	   the	  
supposition	  that	  short-­‐term	  return	  continuation	  was	  as	  a	  result	  of	  investors’	  underreaction	  and	  
return	   reversal	  was	  as	  a	   result	  of	   investor	  overreaction	   (see	  Lakonishok,	  Shleifer,	  and	  Vishny,	  
1994).	   Considering	   that	   short-­‐term	   return	   reversals	   have	  been	  evidenced	  as	  well	   (Jegadeesh,	  
1990;	  Lehman,	  1990;	  et	  cetera),	  short-­‐term	  return	  continuation	  (Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman,	  1993)	  
and	   the	   seeming	   contradiction	   highlighted	   above	   raise	   questions	   about	   the	   relationship	  
between	  return	  persistence	  and	  return	  continuation.	  Barberis	  et	  al.	  (1998),	  Daniel	  et	  al.	  (1998),	  
Hong	  and	  Stein	  (1999)	  and	  Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman	  (2001)	  explore	  this	  relationship.	  Additionally,	  
Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman	   (2001)	   verify	   whether	   the	   evidence	   of	   investor	   under-­‐reaction	   in	  
Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman	   (1993)	   could	   be	   refuted	   by	   the	   data-­‐snooping	   argument	   of	   Lo	   and	  
MacKinlay	  (1990);	  a	  discussion	  to	  be	  found	  in	  subsequent	  sections	  on	  investor	  overreaction	  and	  
underreaction.	  
In	  regard	  of	  the	  CAPM,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  a	  true	  market	  portfolio	  would	  be	  reflective	  of	  the	  
factors	  that	  explain	  returns:	  known	  and	  unknown;	  and	  that	  perhaps,	  the	  real	  task	  lies	  in	  finding	  
the	   true	  market	  portfolio	  of	   invested	  wealth	  or	  as	  close	  a	  proxy	  we	  can	   find.	  This	   theoretical	  
and	  (or)	  empirical	  gap	   in	   finding	  a	  robust	  and	  properly	  specified	  asset	  pricing	  model	  provides	  
opportunities	   for	   discovering	   the	   other	   unknown	   factors	   that	   affect	   the	   expected	   return	   of	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assets.	  Further	  work	  in	  this	  regard	  would	  most	  likely	  build	  on	  existing	  models	  as	  the	  discoveries	  
of	  these	  new	  factors	  are	  made.	  	  
In	   simple	   terms,	  an	  anomaly	  only	  exists	   relative	   to	  a	   consensus	  of	  what	   “normal”	   is.	  What	   is	  
“normal”	   would	   continue	   to	   evolve	   as	   additional	   factors	   with	   explanatory	   powers	   for	   asset	  
returns	  are	  discovered.	  From	  an	  investor/practitioner	  lens,	  however,	  these	  supposed	  anomalies	  
would	  present	  alpha	  opportunities	  until	   the	   consensus	  on	  what	   “normal”	   is,	   shifts	   to	   include	  
what	  was	  considered	  an	  anomaly.	  	  
A	  plausible	  alternative	  argument	  could	  also	  be	  that	  as	  anomalies	  are	  discovered	  and	  found	  to	  
be	  enduring,	  they	  would	  evolve	  into	  additional	  factor(s)	  in	  existing	  asset	  pricing	  models	  and	  the	  
beta	   interpreted	  as	  a	   factor	  sensitivity	   for	  a	  portion	  of	  market	   risk	  and	  that	  other	   factors	  are	  
explanatory	  variables	  for	  other	  portions	  of	  market	  risk	  that	  we	  do	  not	  as	  yet	  grasp	  fully.	  
In	  any	  case,	  the	  behaviourialist	  view	  that	  the	  SLB	  CAPM	  is	  the	  rational	  pricing	  benchmark	  and	  
that	   deviations	   from	   its	   predictions	   are	   anomalies	   due	   to	   irrational	   reactions	   to	   information	  
(Fama	  and	  French,	  2004)	  has	  merit	  when	  the	  quantum	  of	  market	  players	  that	  use	  the	  model	  is	  
considered	  (Graham	  and	  Harvey,	  2001;	  Da,	  Guo,	  and	  Jagannathan,	  2012).	  
	  
2.3	   Anomalies	  
Market	  efficiency	  studies	  are	  constantly	  evolving	  as	  some	  earlier	  discovered	  anomalies	  either	  
disappear	  or	  evidence	  is	  found	  suggesting	  them	  to	  be	  spurious.	  Schwert	  (2002)	  investigates	  the	  
persistence	  of	  anomalies	  ex	  post	   their	  popular	  discoveries	  and	   finds	   that	  most	  of	   them	  seem	  
muted	  or	  all	   together	  disappeared	  except	   for	   the	   January	  effect.	  This	   is	  pertinent	  because	  of	  
the	   distinctions	   made	   between	   mispricings	   and	   anomalies;	   the	   latter	   being	   more	   persistent	  
thereby	  qualifies	  as	  plausible	  evidence	  against	  market	  efficiency.	  It	  would	  seem	  now,	  however,	  
that	  the	  January	  effect	  and	  its	  consistency	  thus	  far	  pose	  the	  greatest	  challenge	  to	  the	  validity	  of	  
the	   EMH.	   Some	  of	   the	   prominent	   anomalies	   include	   the	   size	   effect	   (Banz,	   1981;	   Reinganum,	  
1981),	   earnings-­‐yield	   effect	   (Basu,	   1977	   and	   1983),	   January	   effect	   (Rozeff	   and	   Kinney,	   1976;	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Keim,	   1983;	   Reinganum,	   1983),	  Weekend	   or	  Monday	   effect	   (French,	   1980),	  Winner-­‐Loser	   or	  
Overreaction	   effect	   (De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler,	   1985	   and	   1987;	   Jegadeesh,	   1990;	   Chan,	   1988),	  
Underreaction	   effect	   (Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman,	   1993	   and	   2001),	   et	   cetera.	   Some	  are	   discussed	  
below	  and	  the	  ones	  pertinent	  to	  this	  study,	  the	  overreaction	  and	  January	  effects,	  are	  discussed	  
in	  separate	  sections.	  
	  
2.3.1	   Earnings	  yield	  effect	  
Basu	   (1977)	   proposes	   a	   price-­‐ratio	   hypothesis	   that	   posits	   that	   firms	  with	   high	   earnings	   yield	  
(E/P),	  or	  low	  Price-­‐Earnings	  (P/E)	  ratios,	  earn	  higher	  returns	  than	  firms	  with	  low	  earnings	  yield	  
(high	  P/E	  ratios)	  –	  an	  E/P	  effect.	  Ranking	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange	  (NYSE)-­‐listed	  firms	  by	  P/E	  
ratios	   for	   the	  period	   1957	   to	   1971,	   Basu	   (1977)	   finds	   that	   low	  P/E	   (high	   E/P)	   portfolios	   earn	  
higher	   risk-­‐adjusted	  returns	   than	  high	  P/E	   (low	  E/P)	   firms.	  Additionally,	   its	   findings	  show	  that	  
the	   low	  P/E	  portfolios	  earn	  2%	  per	  month	  more	   than	  the	  return	   implied	  by	   their	   level	  of	   risk	  
and	   the	   high	   P/E	   portfolios	   earn	   3%	   per	  month	   less	   than	   that	   implied	   by	   their	   level	   of	   risk.	  
When	  juxtaposed	  with	  the	  intuition	  of	  higher	  systematic	  risk	  (and	  thus	  higher	  returns	  relative	  
to	  low	  P/E	  portfolios)	  for	  the	  high	  P/E	  portfolios,	  it	  is	  counterintuitive	  for	  the	  lower	  P/E	  ratios	  to	  
earn	  statistically	  significant	  higher	  returns	  than	  the	  high	  P/E	  portfolios.	  This	  of	  course	  bolsters	  
the	  argument	  for	  the	  joint	  hypotheses	  problem	  associated	  with	  efficiency	  studies.	  In	  any	  case,	  
Basu’s	  (1977)	  findings	  do	  suggest	  that	  the	  equilibrium	  model	  used	  is	  mis-­‐specified	  and	  as	  such	  
one	  cannot	  conclusively	  posit	  that	  the	  E/P	  effect	  is	  evidence	  of	  inefficiency.	  	  
	  
2.3.2	   Size	  effect	  
The	   “Size	   Effect”	   or	   “Value	   Effect”	   was	   first	   documented	   by	   Banz	   (1981).	   As	   opposed	   to	  
identifying	  it	  as	  another	  anomaly,	  he	  preferred	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  equilibrium	  model	  used	  
in	  the	  study	  was	  mis-­‐specified.	   	   It	  found	  excess	  return	  on	  an	  arbitrage	  portfolio	  that	  was	  long	  
small	   firms	   and	   short	   very	   large	   firms,	   to	   be	   on	   average	   1.52%	   per	   month	   (19.8%	   on	   an	  




Basu	  (1983)	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  supposed	  size	  effect	  (Banz,	  1981;	  Reinganum,	  1981)	  is	  an	  
instance	  of	  the	  earnings	  yield	  (E/P)	  effect.	  Basu’s	  (1983)	  inconclusiveness,	  however,	  means	  the	  
assertions	   of	   Reinganum	   (1981)	   in	   particular,	   cannot	   be	   discountenanced.	   Reinganum	   (1981)	  
had	  used	  a	  2-­‐way	  classification	  scheme	  for	  a	  sample	  that	  had	  exhibited	  the	  size	  and	  E/P	  effects	  
to	  form	  portfolios	  that	  controlled	  for	  the	  E/P	  effect	  in	  its	  investigation	  of	  the	  linkages	  between	  
the	   two	   anomalies.	   In	   each	   E/P	   quintile	   portfolio,	   securities	   in	   each	   of	   the	   market	   value	  
quintiles	   were	   included.	   The	   study’s	   findings	   showed	   that	   in	   each	   E/P	   quintile,	   the	   smallest	  
firms	  outperformed	  the	   largest	  ones	  with	  statistical	   significance.	  This	  highlights	  evidence	  of	  a	  
size	   effect	   irrespective	   of	   a	   security’s	   price-­‐earnings	   ratio	   (P/E).	   The	   foregoing	   shares	   a	  
commonality,	  however.	  That	  is,	  the	  Sharp-­‐Lintner-­‐Black	  (SLB)	  CAPM	  model	  is	  mis-­‐specified	  and	  
the	  size	  or	  E/P	  effect	  (or	  both)	  are	  proxies	  for	  one	  of	  the	  risk	  variables	  germane	  to	  asset	  pricing.	  	  
	  
Siegel	  (2007)	  makes	  the	  case	  for	  a	  time-­‐period	  bias	  in	  prior	  tests	  for	  the	  size	  effect.	  Analysing	  
data	  outside	  of	  the	  nine	  year	  period	  of	  1975	  to	  1983	  –	  a	  period	  for	  which	  the	  small	  cap	  effect	  in	  
U.S	  stock	  returns	  has	  been	  found	  to	  be	  concentrated	  wherein	  as	  a	  group,	  they	  outperformed	  
large	  cap	  stocks	  by	  19.6	  percent	  annually	  –	  the	  study	  found	  that	  a	  given	  investment	  in	  large-­‐cap	  
equities	  for	  the	  period	  1926	  to	  2001	  achieved	  an	  equivalent	  return	  (9.59%)	  as	  an	  investment	  in	  
small	  caps	  (9.61%)	  that	  excluded	  the	  aforementioned	  period.	  	  
	  
2.3.3	   Monday	  or	  weekend	  effect	  
In	   investigating	   the	   seemingly	   consistent	   negative	   returns	   on	   Mondays	   for	   the	   U.S	   equity	  
market	  (i.e.,	  a	  Monday	  or	  Weekend	  effect),	  French	  (1980)	  tests	  two	  prominent	  models	  of	  the	  
return	  generating	  process,	  namely	  the	  calendar	  time	  and	  trading	  time	  hypotheses.	  That	   is,	  he	  
examines	  whether	   returns	   are	   generated	   continuously	   (calendar	   time)	   or	   only	   during	   trading	  
days	   or	   periods	   (trading	   time).	   If	   the	   trading	   time	   hypothesis	   were	   true,	   then	   the	   observed	  
negative	   returns	   associated	   with	   Mondays	   would	   not	   be	   statistically	   different	   from	   those	  




Using	  daily	  returns	  to	  the	  S&P	  composite	  portfolio	  for	  the	  period	  1953	  –	  1977,	  French	  (1980)	  
investigates	  the	  trading	  time	  question	  using	  a	  regression	  model	  that	  deploys	  dummy	  variables	  
to	  indicate	  the	  day	  of	  the	  week,	  with	  a	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  there	  being	  no	  statistically	  significant	  
difference	  in	  the	  regression	  coefficients.	  	  The	  tests	  were	  statistically	  significant	  enough	  to	  reject	  
the	   null	   hypothesis	   of	   non-­‐differential	   returns	   across	   trading	   days,	   thus	   allowing	   for	   the	  
rejection	   of	   the	   trading	   time	   hypothesis	   and	   supporting	   evidence	   of	   a	   Weekend	   effect	   or	  
Monday	  effect.	  	  
	  
Under	  the	  calendar	  time	  model,	  Monday’s	  expected	  return	  should	  be	  three	  times	  that	  of	   the	  
other	   days	   of	   the	   week,	   thereby	   accounting	   for	   the	   two	   non-­‐trading	   days	   –	   Saturday	   and	  
Sunday	  –	  of	  the	  week.	  That	  is,	  if	  expected	  returns	  are	  not	  differential	  across	  each	  day	  (or	  their	  
difference	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant),	  Monday’s	  return	  should	  reflect	  the	  returns	  of	  the	  prior	  
two	  non-­‐trading	  days	  that	  hitherto	  had	  no	  medium	  for	  reflecting	  investors’	  assessment	  of	  share	  
values.	  Except	  for	  the	  sub-­‐period	  of	  1973	  –	  1977,	  French	  (1980)	  finds	  the	  tests	  for	  the	  calendar	  
and	  trading	  time	  hypotheses	  to	  be	  statistically	  significant.	  	  
	  
As	   a	   potential	   explanation,	   French	   (1980)	   highlights	   the	   tendency	   of	   firms	   to	   release	   “bad	  
news”	   over	   the	   weekend	   to	   allow	   investors	   time	   to	   digest	   the	   new	   information	   and	   thus	  
minimize	   its	   price	   impact	   come	   the	   trading	   day.	   As	   a	   potential	   explanation,	   it	   is	   faulty	   and	  
French	   (1980)	   acknowledges	   as	  much.	   This	   is	   because	   it	   is	   unrealistic	   to	   suppose	   that	   there	  
would	  always	  be	  bad	  news	  for	  every	  security	  in	  every	  weekend.	  	  
	  
2.3.4	   The	  unexplained	  anomaly:	  January	  effect	  
	  Out	  of	  all	  the	  anomalies	  that	  Schwert	  (2002)	  investigates,	  the	  January	  effect	  stands	  out	  as	  the	  
only	  one	  that	  has	  not	  been	  overwhelmed	  by	  arbitrage.	  	  In	  a	  regression	  of	  the	  return	  difference	  
between	   small-­‐	   and	   large-­‐firm	   portfolios	   on	   a	   dummy	   variable	   for	   the	   month	   of	   January,	  
Schwert	  (2002)	  finds	  the	  January	  coefficient	  to	  be	  0.8%	  per	  day	  for	  the	  1962-­‐1979	  period	  and	  
about	  half	  that	  amount	  for	  the	  later	  period	  of	  1980-­‐2001.	  While	  the	  results	  suggest	  the	  January	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seasonal	   is	   not	   as	   strong	   as	   it	   is	   used	   to	  be,	   it	   nonetheless	   shows	   that	   the	   anomaly	   remains	  
persistent.	  
	  
2.4	   Investor	  Overreaction	  
Evidence	   of	   price	   reversals	  was	   documented	   before	   any	   of	   the	   efficiency	   arguments.	   In	   fact,	  
Niederhoffer	  and	  Osborne	  (1966)	  observed	  that	  price	  changes	   in	  one	  direction	  were	  followed	  
by	   price	   changes	   in	   the	   other	   direction	   when	   it	   studied	   the	   six	   stocks	   in	   the	   Dow	   Jones	  
Industrial	   Average	   (DJIA)	   for	   the	   twenty-­‐two	   (22)	   trading	   days	   of	   October	   1964.	   With	   the	  
benefit	  of	  hindsight,	  their	  observation	  improved	  upon	  Mandelbrot’s	  (1963:418)	  exposition	  that	  
for	  security	  prices,	  “large	  price	  changes	  tend	  to	  be	  followed	  by	  large	  price	  changes	  –	  of	  either	  
sign	   –	   and	   small	   changes	   tend	   to	   be	   followed	   by	   small	   changes.”	   Perhaps,	   Niederhoffer	   and	  
Osborne’s	  (1966)	  seminal	  evidence	  of	  price	  reversals	  didn’t	  enjoy	  the	  prominence	  that	  a	  similar	  
study	  enjoyed	  nineteen	  years	   later	  because	  of	  the	  very	  small	  sample	  (six	  stocks)	  used	  in	  their	  
study	  and	  the	  less	  than	  sophisticated	  methodologies	  available	  at	  the	  time.	  
	  
De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler	   (1985)	   posit	   that	   stock	   returns	   are	   predictable	   based	   on	   their	   past	  
performance	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  weak-­‐form	  efficient	  market	  hypothesis	  and	  as	  such	  stock	  prices	  
will	   exhibit	   mean	   reversion	   due	   to	   investors’	   overreaction.	   	   They	   premised	   their	   study	   on	  
research	   in	   experimental	   psychology,	   which	   suggested	   that	   in	   violation	   of	   Bayes’	   rule,	   most	  
people	   tend	   to	   overreact	   to	   unexpected	   and	   dramatic	   events	   and	   thus	   wondered	   if	   such	  
behaviour	  affected	  stock	  prices.	  They	  document	  results	  consistent	  with	  the	  predictions	  of	  this	  
overreaction	   hypothesis	   where	   portfolios	   of	   past	   “losers”	   were	   found	   to	   outperform	   past	  
“winners”,	   a	   contrarian	   strategy:	   buying	   stocks	   that	   performed	   poorly	   and	   selling	   those	   that	  
performed	  well,	  in	  this	  case,	  over	  the	  previous	  3	  years	  achieved	  abnormal	  returns	  over	  a	  3-­‐year	  
holding	  period.	  	  
	  
For	   shorter	   investment	   horizons,	   Jegadeesh	   (1990)	   documents	   evidence	   of	   economically	  
significant	  return	  reversals	  when	  investigating	  the	  profitability	  of	  the	  contrarian	  strategy	  over	  a	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one-­‐month	   time	   horizon	   for	   the	   period,	   1934	   –	   1987,	   in	   the	   U.S	   equity	   market.	   The	   study	  
observed	   positive	   difference	   in	   alphas	   of	   the	   extreme	  decile	   portfolios	   ranging	   from	  2.2%	   to	  
4.37%	  per	  month;	  with	  the	  upper	  limit	  of	  4.37%	  attributable	  to	  January	  alone.	  The	  seasonality	  
in	  the	  study’s	  serial	  correlation	  patterns	  was	  very	  obvious.	  	  
	  
A	   plausible	   argument	   against	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler	   (1985)	   would	   be	   that	   though	   it	   found	  
evidence	  of	  dependence	  in	  price	  distributions	  that	  were	  statistically	  significant,	  in	  the	  absence	  
of	  accounting	  for	  transaction	  costs,	  its	  evidence	  could	  not	  be	  said	  to	  be	  economically	  significant	  
and	  the	  EMH	  would	  still	  subsist	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  security	  prices	  behaviour.	  	  
	  
Fama	   and	   French	   (1996)	   provide	   an	   alternative	   explanation	   for	   the	   observed	   positive	   excess	  
return	   performance	   of	   loser	   portfolios	   in	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler’s	   (1985	   and	   1987)	   studies	   by	  
showing	   the	   connection	  of	   the	  anomaly	  with	   size	  when	   their	   three-­‐factor	  model	   Fama	   (1992	  
and	   1993)	   is	   used	   as	   the	   benchmark.	   They	  were	   however	   not	   able	   to	   refute	   Jegadeesh	   and	  
Titman’s	  (1993)	  claims	  about	  the	  momentum	  effect.	  
	  
Chan	  (1988)	  challenges	  the	  interpretation	  of	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler	  (1985	  and	  1987)	  as	  evidence	  
of	  market	  inefficiency	  and	  proffer	  evidence	  of	  supposed	  flaws	  in	  that	  seminal	  study.	  In	  addition	  
to	   replicating	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler’s	   (1985	   and	   1987)	   methodology,	   Chan	   considers	   certain	  
variations	   for	   a	   control	   sample	   that	   allows	   for	   a	   higher	   number	   of	   securities	   in	   the	   extreme	  
portfolios	  over	  and	  above	   the	  maximum	  of	   thirty-­‐five	   (35)	   in	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler	   (1985	  and	  
1987).	  Under	   the	  assumption	   that	  market	   value	  proxies	   for	   risk,	  Chan	   (1988)	   shows	  how	   the	  
market	  value	  of	  losers	  decrease	  by	  almost	  50%	  on	  average	  over	  the	  various	  portfolio	  formation	  
periods	  between	  1932	  –	  1983,	  and	  thus	  argues	  that	  the	  formation	  period	  (“rank	  period”)	  betas	  
in	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler	  (1985)	  underestimate	  the	  holding	  period	  (“test	  period”)	  betas	  of	  losers	  
and	  thus	  ought	  not	  to	  be	  used	  in	  calculating	  risk-­‐adjusted	  returns.	  Chan’s	  (1988)	  modifications	  
to	   the	   research	   design	   responsive	   to	   the	   aforementioned	   reservations	   result	   in	   very	   small	  
abnormal	  returns	  to	  the	  contrarian	  strategy	  which	  in	  turn	  challenges	  the	  findings	  of	  De	  Bondt	  




Chopra,	   Lakonishok	   and	   Ritter	   (1992)	   also	   use	   test	   period	   betas	   for	   risk	   adjustment	   in	   their	  
overreaction	   study	   and	   yet	   the	   contrarian	   portfolios	   earn	   statistically	   and	   economically	  
significant	  abnormal	  returns	   in	  contradiction	  to	  Chan’s	  (1988)	  assertions.	  They	   investigate	  the	  
beta,	   size	  and	  seasonality	  arguments	  with	  respect	   to	   the	  market	  overreaction	  anomaly,	  using	  
NYSE	  returns	  for	  the	  period	  1926	  –	  1986.	  Their	  study	  is	  pertinent	  because	  they	  proffer	  evidence	  
that	  refutes	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  positive	  excess	  returns	  of	   loser	  and	  arbitrage	  loser-­‐winner	  
portfolios	   are	   due	   to	   a	   size	   effect	   or	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   the	   difference	   in	   beta.	   Essentially,	  
Chopra	  et	  al.	  (1992)	  construct	  separate	  portfolios	  on	  the	  bases	  of	  ranking	  period	  returns	  (using	  
betas	  estimated	  via	  a	  60-­‐observation	  regression	  of	  monthly	  returns	  during	  the	  ranking	  period)	  
and	   betas,	   to	   see	  whether	   the	   outcomes	  would	   be	   as	   predicted	   by	   the	   Sharpe-­‐Lintner-­‐Black	  
model.	   It	   follows	  therefore,	   that	   the	  higher	  beta	  portfolio	   (supposedly	  analogous	  to	   the	   loser	  
portfolio)	  would	  earn	  higher	  returns	  than	  the	  lower	  beta	  portfolio	  (supposedly	  analogous	  to	  the	  
winner	   portfolio)	   because	   of	   its	   higher	   risk;	   evidence	   which	   would	   bolster	   the	   argument	   by	  
Chan	   (1988)	   that	   when	   the	   beta	   in	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler’s	   (1985	   and	   1987)	   portfolios	   are	  
properly	  estimated,	  the	  loser	  portfolios	  are	  actually	  riskier	  than	  the	  winner	  portfolios.	  Alpha	  of	  
the	  arbitrage	  portfolio	   long	  losers	  and	  short	  winners	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  beta	   is	  -­‐5.1%	  per	  
year,	  a	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  the	  2.5%	  earned	  by	  that	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  prior	  returns	  (Chopra	  
et	  al.,	  1992,	  Table	  1,	  p.	  241).	  	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  Zarowin’s	  (1990)	  assertion	  that	  on	  average,	  losers	  are	  smaller	  than	  winners	  and	  
allusion	  that	  the	  winner-­‐loser	  effect	  might	  just	  be	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  size	  effect,	  Chopra	  et	  
al.	  (1992)	  construct	  size	  control	  portfolios,	  that	  is,	  prior-­‐return	  loser	  and	  winner	  portfolios	  are	  
constituted	   using	   securities	  with	   an	   even	   spread	   across	   size	   (or	  market	   value)	   quintiles	   such	  
that	   they	  are	  not	  dominated	  by	   small	   firms.	   This	  enables	  one	   to	   see	  whether	   in	   spite	  of	   this	  
type	   of	   constitution,	   there	  would	   still	   be	   an	   overreaction	   effect.	   Their	   evidence	   suggests	   the	  
effect	  is	  accentuated	  and	  economically	  significant	  over	  and	  above	  any	  size	  effect.	  Additionally,	  
Chopra	  et	  al.	  (1992)	  use	  a	  multiple	  regression	  that	  simultaneously	  controls	  for	  size	  and	  beta	  and	  
still	  find	  that	  “extreme	  losers	  outperform	  extreme	  winners	  by	  4.826%	  per	  year	  on	  average	  for	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the	  five	  post-­‐ranking	  years”	  Chopra	  et	  al.	  (1992:253).	  Their	  results	  also	  show	  the	  independence	  
of	   the	   size	   and	   January	   effects:	   for	   when	   the	   5-­‐year	   ranking	   period	   arbitrage	   portfolios	   are	  
controlled	  for	  firm	  size	  and	  correlation	  of	  size	  with	  prior	  returns,	  most	  of	  the	  excess	  returns	  are	  
earned	   in	   the	   month	   of	   January.	   An	   interesting	   dimension,	   however,	   is	   that	   the	   portfolios	  
formed	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   prior	   1-­‐year	   returns	   show	   momentum	   in	   the	   next	   year,	   perhaps	  
underscoring	   the	   varying	   time	   horizons	   for	   price	   reversals	   since	   shorter-­‐term	   price	   reversals	  
have	  also	  been	  documented	  (Jegadeesh,	  1990;	  Lehman,	  1990;	  Venter,	  2009).	  
	  
Using	  a	  U.K.	  dataset	  spanning	  December	  1964	  to	  June	  2005,	  Galariotis,	  Holmes,	  and	  Ma	  (2007)	  
test	   the	   robustness	  of	   some	  of	   the	  varied	  explanations	  –	   risk	   (Chan,	  1988;	  Fama	  and	  French,	  
1996),	   firm	   size	   (Zarowin,	   1990),	   thin-­‐trading	   (Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman,	   1995),	   seasonality	  
(Zarowin,	  1990)	  and	  survivorship	  bias	  (Lo	  and	  MacKinlay,	  1990)	  –	  offered	  for	  the	  overreaction	  
effect	  hitherto	  (some	  of	  these	  have	  been	  discussed	  earlier).	  They	  also	  investigate	  the	  strength	  
of	   the	   explanations	   given	   for	   the	   converse,	   or	   as	   some	   (Barberis,	   Shleifer,	   and	  Vishny,	   1998;	  
Daniel,	   Hirshleifer,	   and	   Subrahmanyam,	   1998;	   Hong	   and	   Stein,	   1999;	   Lee	   and	   Swaminathan,	  
2000)	  argue,	  contiguous	  underreaction	  effect.	  	  
	  
Galariotis	  et	  al.	   (2007)	   find	  the	  January	  seasonal	  to	  be	  non-­‐differential	   to	  both	  the	  contrarian	  
and	  momentum	  strategies;	  albeit	  for	  raw	  returns.	   In	  fact,	  when	  January	  returns	  are	  excluded,	  
they	   find	   more	   statistically	   significant	   and	   profitable	   strategies	   –	   from	   15	   to	   18	   for	   the	  
momentum	   strategies	   and	   9	   to	   14	   for	   contrarian	   strategies	   –	   out	   of	   the	   64	  momentum	   and	  
contrarian	  strategies	  they	  consider.	  Also,	  their	  momentum	  and	  contrarian	  profits	  are	  robust	  to	  
adjustment	   for	  market	   risk	   (proxied	  by	  the	  SLB	  CAPM	  beta).	  When	  Fama	  and	  French’s	   (1993)	  
three-­‐factor	  model	  is	  used	  as	  the	  benchmark,	  however,	  the	  contrarian	  profits	  largely	  disappear;	  
evidence	   consistent	  with	   the	   risk	   argument	   of	   Fama	   and	   French	   (1996).	   For	   the	  momentum	  
profits,	  however,	  Galariotis	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  find	  that	  they	  are	  not	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  three-­‐factor	  
model.	   In	   fact,	   the	   number	   of	  momentum	   portfolios	   that	   record	   statistically	   significant	   risk-­‐
adjusted	   profits	   increases.	   Additionally,	   Galariotis	   et	   al.	   (2007)	   confirm	   that	   sample-­‐period,	  
survivorship,	   non-­‐synchronous	   trading	   and	   bid-­‐ask	   spread	   biases	   are	   differential	   to	   the	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profitability	   of	   contrarian	   and	   momentum	   portfolios	   for	   stocks	   listed	   on	   the	   London	   Stock	  
Exchange.	  	  
	  
Another	   U.K.	   study	   offers	   interesting	   contrasts.	   Spyrou,	   Kassimatis,	   and	   Galariotis	   (2007)	  
analyses	   data	   from	   four	  major	   U.K	   equity	   indices:	   the	   FT30	   (large	   cap),	   FTSE100	   (large	   cap),	  
FTSE250	   (medium	  cap)	  and	  FTSE	  Small	  Cap.	   Spyrou	  et	  al.	   (2007)	   find	   that	   large-­‐cap	   investors	  
react	  efficiently	   to	  new	   information	  about	   their	  holdings	  and	   thus	  didn’t	   find	  any	   statistically	  
significant	  risk-­‐adjusted	  (β,	  SMB	  and	  HML)	  momentum	  and	  contrarian	  profits	  for	  this	  firm-­‐size	  
stratum.	   They	   conjecture	   this	   to	   be	   due	   to	   the	  wider	   analyst	   coverage	   and	   investor	   interest	  
large	  caps	  enjoy	  relative	  to	  medium-­‐	  and	  small	  caps.	  An	  intuition	  that	  is	  plausible	  in	  light	  of	  the	  
underreaction	  of	  medium-­‐	  and	  small-­‐cap	  investors	  to	  market	  shocks	  in	  that	  study.	  Additionally,	  
their	  results	  are	  robust	  to	  seasonal	  and	  bid-­‐ask	  spread	  biases.	  	  	  	  
	  
Another	  rational	  hypothesis	  for	  the	  overreaction	  effect	  is	  related	  to	  taxes.	  George	  and	  Hwang	  
(2007)	   conjecture	   that	   the	   return	   reversals	   in	   U.S.	   stock	   returns	   can	   be	   traced	   to	   locked-­‐in	  
capital	  gains,	  especially	  since	  in	  an	  out-­‐of-­‐sample	  test	  using	  returns	  data	  for	  Hong	  Kong	  where	  
capital	  gains	  are	  not	   taxed,	   they	  do	  not	   find	   reversals.	  George	  and	  Hwang	   (2007)	   rely	  on	   the	  
seasonality	   observed	   in	   previous	   overreaction	   studies	   (e.g.,	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler,	   1987;	  
Grinblatt	  and	  Moskowitz,	  2004)	  to	  conjecture	  that	  long-­‐term	  reversals	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  
tax-­‐loss	   selling	   hypothesis.	   In	   any	   case,	   George	   and	  Hwang	   (2007)	   confirm	   further	   that	   loser	  
reversals	  occur	  mostly	  in	  the	  calendar	  month	  of	  January.	  	  
	  
Kryzanowski	  and	  Zhang	  (1992)	  test	  the	  overreaction	  hypothesis	  using	  monthly	  data	  for	  stocks	  
listed	   on	   the	   Toronto	   Stock	   Exchange	   over	   the	   1950-­‐1988	   period,	   and	   unlike	   De	   Bondt	   and	  
Thaler	   (1985	  and	  1987),	   they	  didn’t	   find	  statistically	  significant	   reversal	  behaviour	   for	  periods	  
beyond	  one	   and	   two	   year(s)	   for	  winners	   and	   losers.	   	  On	   the	   trail	   of	   Kryzanowski	   and	   Zhang,	  
Assoe	   and	   Sy	   (2003)	   examine	   the	   profitability	   of	   the	   short-­‐run	   contrarian	   strategy	   for	   the	  
Canadian	  equity	  market,	  whereby	  “losers”	  and	  “winners”	  of	  the	  previous	  month	  are	  bought	  and	  
sold	   respectively.	   They	   use	   an	   extension	   of	   Fama	   and	   French’s	   (1993)	   three-­‐factor	   model,	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thereby	  taking	  into	  account,	  in	  addition	  to	  market	  risk,	  the	  size	  and	  book-­‐to-­‐market	  risks.	  	  They	  
document	   results	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   Jegadeesh	   (1990)	   in	   the	   U.S	   market	   whereby	   significant	  
abnormal	  returns	  are	  achieved	  by	  purchasing	  losers	  and	  selling	  winners	  of	  the	  previous	  month.	  
They	   recorded	   a	   26.25%	   annual	   average	   excess	   unrestricted	   return	   for	   this	   short-­‐term	  
contrarian	   investment	   strategy,	   a	   disproportionate	   part	   of	   which	   was	   driven	   by	   small	   firms,	  
especially	  in	  January;	  evidence	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler	  (1985	  and	  1987)	  albeit	  for	  
a	  much	  shorter	  time	  horizon.	  Upon	  adjusting	  the	  data	  for	  calendar	  month	  and	  firm	  size,	   they	  
found	   the	   profitability	   of	   the	   short-­‐term	   contrarian	   strategy	   to	   be	   disproportionately	   tilted	  
towards	  small	  firms,	  especially	  in	  the	  January	  calendar	  month.	  	  
	  
Dhouib	   and	   Abaoub	   (2007)	   document	   the	   existence	   of	   mean	   reversion	   and	   momentum	  
behavior	   in	   the	   Tunisian	   stock	   market	   over	   the	   9-­‐year	   period	   between	   January	   1997	   and	  
December	  2005.	   In	   arriving	  at	   this	   conclusion,	   they	  applied	   the	   contrarian	   strategy	  of	  buying	  
the	  previous	   (12-­‐,	  18-­‐,	  24-­‐	  and	  36-­‐month)	   loser	  portfolio	  and	   selling	   the	  past,	   corresponding,	  
winner	  portfolio.	  In	  a	  similar	  study	  conducted	  for	  the	  Istanbul	  stock	  exchange,	  Bildik	  and	  Gulay	  
(2007)	   find,	   for	   data	   over	   the	   10-­‐year	   period	   1991	   to	   2000	   that	   contrarian	   strategies	   earn	  
abnormal	  profits,	  evidence	  consistent	  with	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  overreaction	  hypothesis.	  
	  
2.4.1	   Empirical	  gaps	  in	  the	  overreaction	  literature	  for	  the	  JSE	  and	  NSE	  
For	  the	  South	  African	  equity	  market,	  Page	  and	  Way	  (1992)	  used	  returns	  data	  over	  the	  period	  of	  
July	  1974	  to	  June	  1989	  for	  204	  relatively	  well-­‐traded	  securities	  listed	  on	  the	  Johannesburg	  Stock	  
Exchange	   (JSE)	   to	   investigate	   the	   overreaction	   hypothesis.	   They	   document	   results	   consistent	  
with	  the	  hypothesis	  and	  thus	   inconsistent	  with	  the	  weak-­‐form	  EMH;	  with	  the	  performance	  of	  
the	  shares	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  prior	  return	  data	  being	  predictable	  and	  on	  average,	  portfolios	  
of	   prior	   “losers”	   outperforming	   prior	   “winners”	   by	   about	   20%	   over	   the	   three	   years	   after	  
portfolio	  formation.	  They	  also	  found	  evidence	  of	  a	  January	  effect	  similar	  to	  that	  evidenced	  on	  
the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange	  by	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler	   (1985),	  an	  observation	  which	  calls	   into	  
question	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  this	  is	  due	  to	  tax	  loss	  selling	  by	  investors;	  South	  African	  companies	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are	   free	   to	   choose	   their	   tax	   year	   ends.	   Subsequent	   JSE	   overreaction	   studies	   (Cubbin,	   Eidne,	  
Firer	  and	  Gilbert,	  2006;	  Venter,	  2009)	  confirm	  Page	  and	  Way’s	  (1992)	  findings	  of	  overreaction	  in	  
the	  South	  African	  equity	  market.	   It	   is	  not	  known,	  however,	  whether	  the	  supposed	  weak-­‐form	  
efficient	  Nigerian	  equity	  market	   (Tijjani	  et	  al.,	  2009)	   is	   robust	   to	   the	  overreaction	  effect;	  as	  a	  
survey	  of	  the	  literature	  suggests	  there	  isn’t	  a	  published	  overreaction	  study	  of	  Nigeria.	  
	  
To	  reduce	  stock	  price	  volatility,	  the	  Nigerian	  Stock	  Exchange	  (NSE)	  puts	  a	  cap	  and	  floor	  on	  daily	  
price	  movements	  for	  its	  listed	  stocks.	  Intuitively,	  this	  should	  lead	  to	  a	  delay	  in	  convergence	  of	  
prices	   to	   intrinsic	  values	  or	  perhaps	  overreaction	  at	   the	  next	  opportunity	  as	   investors	   look	  to	  
key	  in	  their	  trades	  before	  the	  daily	  price	  limits	  are	  again	  reached.	  The	  prominent	  explanations	  
for	  the	  consequences	  of	  daily	  price	  limits	  (Lehmann,	  1989;	  Kim	  and	  Rhee,	  1997;	  Huang,	  Fu,	  and	  
Ke,	  2001;	  Cho,	  Russell,	  Tiao,	  and	  Tsay,	  2003)	  suggest	  outcomes	  converse	  to	  market	  efficiency.	  
Yet	  most	  studies	  of	   the	  NSE	  suggest	   it	   is	  weak	   form	  efficient	   (e.g.,	  Olowe,	  1999;	  Tijjani	  et	  al.,	  
2009).	  	  
	  
Lin	  and	  Swanson	  (2010)	  wonder	   if	  price	   limits	  hinder	  the	  profitability	  of	  contrarian	  strategies.	  
Since	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  literature	  suggests	  there	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  an	  overreaction	  study	  for	  the	  Nigerian	  
equity	  market,	   Lin	   and	   Swanson’s	   (2010)	   evidence	   of	   contrarian	   behaviour	   in	   the	   price-­‐limit	  
regulated	   Taiwanese	   equity	   market	   suggest	   inferences	   that	   make	   the	   supposed	   weak-­‐form	  
efficiency	  of	  the	  similarly	  price-­‐limit	  regulated	  Nigerian	  equity	  market	  suspect.	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2.5	   Investor	  Underreaction	  
In	   contrast	   to	   long-­‐term	   return	   reversals	   (De	  Bondt	   and	   Thaler,	   1985)	   and	   short-­‐term	   return	  
reversals	  (Jegadeesh,	  1990;	  Lehman,	  1990),	  Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman	  (1993)	  document	  short-­‐term	  
return	  continuation	  using	  a	  relative	  strength	  trading	  strategy;	   that	   is,	  buying	  stocks	  that	  have	  
performed	  well	  in	  the	  past	  (“winners”)	  and	  selling	  those	  that	  have	  performed	  poorly	  in	  the	  past	  
(“losers”).	   Momentum	   portfolios	   constituted	   by	   selecting	   stocks	   based	   on	   their	   six-­‐month	  
historical	   returns	   and	   holding	   them	   for	   another	   six	   months	   produce	   average	   compounded	  
excess	  return	  of	  12.01%.	  Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman	  (1993)	  attribute	  this	  phenomenon	  to	  “delayed	  
price	  reactions	  to	  firm-­‐specific	  information,”	  –	  investor	  underreaction.	  	  
	  
Interestingly,	   however,	   much	   of	   the	   excess	   momentum	   portfolio	   returns	   in	   Jegadeesh	   and	  
Titman	   (1993)	  begins	   to	  dissipate	   twelve	  months	  after	   the	  portfolio	   formation	  month;	   return	  
reversals	   consistent	  with	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler’s	   (1985)	   investor	   overreaction.	   Barberis	   et	   al.	  
(1998);	  Daniel	  et	  al.	   (1998);	  and	  Hong	  and	  Stein	   (1999)	  present	  models	  of	   investor	  sentiment	  
that	  attempt	  to	  reconcile	  the	  initially	  seeming	  contradiction	  between	  the	  empirical	  findings	  of	  
overreaction	  (De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler,	  1985;	  Jegadeesh,	  1990)	  and	  underreaction	  (Jegadeesh	  and	  
Titman,	   1993).	   These	   behavioural	   models	   suggest	   undereaction	   and	   overreaction	   to	   be	  
elements	  of	  the	  return	  generation	  cycle	  and	  predict	  that	  momentum	  profits	  that	  accrue	  due	  to	  
investor	   underreaction	   should	   turn	   negative	   13	   to	   60	   months	   after	   the	   portfolio	   formation	  
month	   when	   hitherto	   slow-­‐reacting	   investors	   overreact	   to	   long-­‐running	   and	   trending	  
information	  they	  had	  hitherto	  been	  oblivious	  (or	  ambivalent)	  about.	  	  
Lee	   and	   Swaminathan	   (2000)	   present	   evidence	   showing	   underreaction	   and	   overreaction	   are	  
linked	   by	   trading	   volume	   proxied	   by	   the	   turnover	   ratio	   (defined	   as	   the	   daily	   ratio	   of	   traded	  
shares	  to	  the	  number	  of	  shares	  outstanding	  for	  each	  stock).	  They	  create	  momentum	  portfolios	  
based	  on	  historical	  trading	  volume	  that	  exhibit	  intermediate-­‐horizon	  return	  continuation	  along	  
the	  lines	  of	  Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman	  (1993)	  and	  long-­‐horizon	  return	  reversal	  as	  predicted	  by	  De	  	  	  	  
Bondt	  and	  Thaler	  (1985).	  What	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  in	  Lee	  and	  Swaminathan	  (2000)	  is	  their	  
assertion	   about	   the	   utility	   of	   historical	   trading	   volume	   in	   predicting	   the	   timing	   of	   return	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reversals.	  This	  is	  not	  an	  empirical	  artefact,	  however.	  Campbell,	  Grossman	  and	  Wang	  (1993)	  and	  
Blume,	   Easley,	   and	   O’Hara	   (1994)	   provide	   theoretical	   evidence	   that	   show	   strong	   linkages	  
between	  stock	  returns	  and	  trading	  volume.	  
After	   separately	   ranking	   stocks	  based	  on	   their	  historical	   returns	  and	   trading	  volume,	   Lee	  and	  
Swaminathan	   (2000)	   form	   thirty	   “price	  momentum-­‐volume	   portfolios”	   that	   consist	   of	   stocks	  
common	  to	  individual	  strata	  in	  both	  rankings.	  These	  portfolios	  are	  then	  held	  for	  varying	  periods	  
ranging	  from	  three	  months	  to	  five	  years.	  The	  arbitrage	  momentum	  portfolio	  –	  one	  that	  is	  long	  
extreme	   decile	  winners	   and	   short	   extreme	   decile	   losers	   –	   is	   profitable	   in	   the	   first	   year	  with	  
returns	  ranging	  from	  10.62	  percent	  to	  12.70	  percent	  per	  year.	  A	  strong	  reversal	  pattern	  occurs,	  
however,	   in	   the	   fourth	   year	   and	   endures	   to	   the	   fifth;	   with	   the	   portfolio	   recording	   negative	  
returns	   irrespective	   of	   the	   formation	   period.	   Additionally,	   the	   extreme	   winner	   and	   loser	  
portfolios	  share	  a	  commonality:	  they	  are	  characterized	  by	  high	  trading	  volume	  stocks.	  	  
Another	  remarkable	  finding	  in	  Lee	  and	  Swaminathan’s	  (2000)	  study	  is	  the	  better	  holding	  period	  
return	  performance	   recorded	  by	   stocks	  with	   low	   volume	   turnover	   ratios	   during	   the	  portfolio	  
formation	   period	   irrespective	   of	   whether	   they	   are	   winners	   or	   losers.	   For	   portfolios	   formed	  
based	   on	   prior	   nine-­‐month	   historical	   metrics	   and	   held	   for	   another	   six	   months,	   low	   volume	  
losers	  (winners)	  outperformed	  high	  volume	  losers	  (winners)	  by	  1.02	  (0.26)	  percent	  per	  month	  
(Lee	   and	   Swaminathan,	   2000).	   	   	   However,	   this	   is	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   stronger	  momentum	  
effect	  associated	  with	  high	  trading	  volume	  stocks.	  	  
In	   sum,	  when	   the	   views	  of	   Lee,	  Myers,	   and	   Swaminathan	   (1999)	   that	   the	  market	   continually	  
iterates	   towards	   fundamental	   value	   convergence	   is	   considered,	   the	   intuition	   by	   Lee	   and	  
Swaminathan	  (2000)	  that	  undereaction	  and	  overreaction	  are	  simply	  contiguous	  elements	  of	  a	  
continuous	   cycle	   that	   characterize	   how	   investors	   act	   on	   new	   information,	   seem	   a	   plausible	  
reality.	  Incidentally,	  their	  findings	  support	  this	  theory.	  	  
Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman	   (2001)	   present	   evidence	   consistent	   with	   the	   predictions	   of	   the	  
aforementioned	  behavioural	  models.	  They	  form	  relative	  strength	  portfolios	  using	  data	  over	  the	  
1990	   to	   1998	   period,	   and	   confirm	   the	   persistence	   of	   the	   short-­‐term	   return	   continuation	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observed	   in	   Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman	   (1993).	   Additionally,	   they	   confirm	   the	   return	   reversals	   of	  
winner	   and	   loser	   stocks	   13	   to	   60	  months	   after	   the	   portfolio	   formation	  month,	  with	   hitherto	  
positive	  (negative)	  returns	  on	  winner	  (loser)	  stocks	  turning	  negative	  (positive).	  	  
Conrad	  and	  Kaul	  (1998),	  however,	  adopt	  the	  “rational	  view”	  that	  momentum	  profits	  (and	  that	  
of	   other	   return-­‐based	   trading	   strategies)	   are	   premia	   for	   risk	   –	   proxied	   in	   their	   study	   by	  
securities’	  return	  variances.	  Similarly,	  when	  the	  Fama	  and	  French’s	  (1993,	  1996)	  3-­‐factor	  model	  
is	   used	   as	   the	   rational	   pricing	   benchmark,	   Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman	   (2001)	   find	   that	   the	   return	  
reversals	   are	   weak	   for	   large	   firms;	   evidence	   reminiscent	   of	   a	   similar	   characterization	   of	   De	  
Bondt	   and	   Thaler’s	   (1985,	   1987)	   contrarian	   portfolios.	   Another	   shared	   characteristic	   of	  
contrarian	   and	   momentum	   portfolios	   is	   the	   observed	   seasonality	   of	   their	   evidenced	   excess	  
returns;	   albeit	   positive	   for	   contrarian	   portfolios	   and	   negative	   for	   momentum	   portfolios.	   In	  
Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman	   (1993),	   a	   significant	   portion	   of	   the	   lost	   momentum	   profits	   is	   in	   the	  
month	  of	  January	  with	  losses	  averaging	  7	  percent.	  When	  this	  is	  compared	  with	  the	  1.66	  percent	  
average	   return	   recorded	   in	   non-­‐January	  months	   and	   the	   similar	   seasonality	   observed	   (in	   the	  
opposite	  direction)	  for	  contrarian	  portfolios,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  January	  effect	  is	  more	  
than	  a	  passing	  phenomenon.	  
Explanations	   other	   than	   underreaction	   for	   price	  momentum	   have	   also	   been	   suggested	   (e.g.,	  
Lewellen,	   2002).	   As	   opposed	   to	   underreaction	   to	   firm-­‐specific	   news,	   Lewellen	   (2002)	   argues	  
that	   excess	   covariance	   among	   stocks	   explain	   momentum	   effects	   observed	   in	   portfolios	  
constituted	  based	  on	  size	  and	  B/M.	  	  Also,	  Chan,	  Jegadeesh,	  and	  Lakonishok	  (1996)	  attempt	  an	  
explanation	   for	   short-­‐term	   return	   persistence	   observed	   in	   Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman	   (1993)	   and	  
other	  underreaction	  studies;	  especially	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  utility	  of	  six-­‐month	  historical	  returns	  
and	  earnings	  surprises	  (proxied	  by	  among	  others,	  the	  Standardized	  Unexpected	  Earnings	  (SUE))	  
in	  predicting	  ex	  ante	  returns.	  	  Chan	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  find	  an	  underreaction	  effect	  robust	  to	  market,	  
size	  and	  value	  risks.	  
Rouwenhorst	   (1998)	  also	  corroborates	   the	  profitability	  of	   the	  momentum	  strategy	  using	  data	  
from	   12	   European	   countries	   for	   the	   sixteen-­‐year	   period	   of	   1980	   to	   1995	   to	   conduct	   out-­‐of-­‐
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sample	   investigations	   of	   the	   profitability	   of	   relative	   strength	   strategies.	   The	   study	   presents	  
evidence	   consistent	   with	   Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman	   (1993);	   with	   its	   winner	   portfolios	  
outperforming	  the	  loser	  portfolios	  over	  one-­‐year	  horizons	  in	  each	  of	  the	  twelve	  countries.	  The	  
arbitrage	  momentum	  portfolio	  (W-­‐L)	  earns	  an	  average	  1	  percent	  per	  month	  irrespective	  of	  firm	  
size	  and	  market	  risk;	  but	  they	  observe	  stronger	  return	  persistence	  for	  smaller	  firms.	  Similarly,	  
the	  returns	  are	  not	   in	  any	  way	  overwhelmed	  by	  commonly	  used	  asset	  pricing	  models.	   In	  fact,	  
when	   the	   excess	  momentum	   portfolio	   returns	   are	   adjusted	   for	  market	   and	   size	   risk	   factors,	  
they	   record	   alpha	   returns	   that	   are	   highly	   significant.	   For	   instance,	   when	   beta	   risk-­‐adjusted	  
alphas	   of	   0.88	   percent	   and	   -­‐0.27	   percent	   per	   month	   for	   the	   winner	   and	   loser	   portfolios	  
respectively	  are	  further	  adjusted	  for	  risk	  related	  to	  size	  –	  proxied	  by	  Fama	  and	  French’s	  (1996)	  
SMB	  factor,	   the	   risk-­‐adjusted	  return	  actually	   increases	   from	  1.14	  percent	   to	  1.46	  percent	  per	  
month	  (Rouwenhorst,	  1998).	  	  
	  
Moskowitz	   and	   Grinblatt	   (1999)	   highlight	   the	   concentration	   risk	   inherent	   in	   individual	   stock	  
momentum	  portfolios,	  which	  tend	  to	  be	  dominated	  by	  stocks	  from	  similar	  industries.	  Industry	  
momentum	   strategies	   –	   long	   stocks	   from	   industries	   with	   stellar	   historical	   performance	   and	  
short	   those	   from	   poor	   industries	   –	   however,	   outperform	   momentum	   portfolios	   constituted	  
based	  on	  individual	  stock	  performance.	  This	  is	  in	  addition	  to	  diversifying	  away	  firm-­‐specific	  risks	  
that	   persist	   when	   highly	   correlated	   stocks	   from	   similar	   industries	   dominate	   the	   momentum	  
portfolio.	  Moskowitz	  and	  Grinblatt	  (1999)	  argue	  that	  much	  of	  the	  profits	  recorded	  by	  individual	  
stock	  momentum	  portfolios	   can	  be	  accounted	   for	  by	   industry	  momentum.	  Additionally,	   both	  
strategies	   exhibit	   return	   behaviour	   commonalities	   over	   medium	   and	   long-­‐term	   horizons	  
consistent	   with	   return	   reversals	   evidenced	   in	   other	   momentum	   portfolios.	   Over	   short-­‐term	  
horizons,	   however,	   industry	   momentum	   portfolios	   clearly	   outperform	   individual	   stock	   ones,	  
with	  the	  latter	  recording	  negative	  profits	  over	  one-­‐month	  horizons,	  similar	  to	  the	  observation	  




2.6	   Other	  thoughts	  in	  regard	  of	  Investor	  Reaction	  
In	  contrast	  to	  behavioural	  models	  by	  Barberis	  et	  al.	   (1998),	  Daniel	  et	  al.	   (1998)	  and	  Hong	  and	  
Stein	   (1999),	   Grinblatt	   and	   Han	   (2005)	   refute	   the	   supposed	   predictive	   utility	   of	   historical	  
returns.	   Instead,	   they	   attribute	   the	   profitability	   of	   the	   momentum	   strategy	   to	   delayed	  
convergence	   of	   stock	   prices	   to	   fundamental	   values	   owing	   to	   the	   “disposition	   effect”	   –	   the	  
tendency	   of	   investors	   to	   hold	   on	   to	   losers	   too	   long	   and	   sell	   winners	   too	   early	   (Shefrin	   and	  
Statman,	  1985).	  They	  regress	  weekly	  returns	  on	  lagged	  cumulative	  returns,	  logarithm	  of	  market	  
capitalization,	  and	  average	  weekly	  turnover	  for	  stocks	  listed	  on	  the	  NYSE	  and	  AMEX.	  When	  they	  
control	   for	   the	  potential	   capital	  gain,	  by	   including	   their	  capital	  gains	  overhang	  variable	   in	   the	  
Fama	   and	   MacBeth	   (1973)	   type	   regression,	   the	   intermediate-­‐horizon	   momentum	   profits	  
hitherto	   recorded	   largely	   disappear;	   they	   suggest	   this	   evidence	   is	   a	   demonstration	   that	  
historical	   returns	   have	   disutility	   in	   predicting	   Jegadeesh	   and	   Titman	   (1993)	   type	  momentum	  
profits.	  	  
Return	   continuation	   and	   reversal	   persist	   still.	   Another	   attempt	   (McLean,	   2010)	   at	   explaining	  
their	   persistence	   suggests	   idiosyncratic	   risk	   and	   its	   associated	   costs	   might	   be	   what	   deter	  
arbitrageurs	  from	  exploiting	  it	  away.	  Studies	  (e.g.,	  De	  Long,	  Shleifer,	  Summers,	  and	  Waldmann,	  
1990;	   Shleifer	   and	   Vishny,	   1990;	   et	   cetera)	   suggest	   cost-­‐benefit	   trade-­‐offs	   associated	   with	  
exploiting	   some	   deviations	   from	   fundamental	   value	  might	   be	   a	   disincentive	   for	   arbitrageurs.	  
McLean	   (2010)	   presents	   findings	   consistent	   with	   contentions	   that	   return	   reversals	   are	   price	  
corrections	   (De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler,	  1985,	  1987;	  Barberis	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Daniel	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Hong	  
and	  Stein,	  1999;	  et	  cetera).	  	  
Interestingly,	   however,	  McLean	   (2010)	   doesn’t	   find	   evidence	   that	   support	   the	   contention	   by	  
Barberis	  et	  al.	   (1998);	  Daniel	  et	  al.	   (1998);	  and	  Hong	  and	  Stein	  (1999)	  that	  underreaction	  and	  
overreaction	  have	  a	  causal	  relationship.	  Whereas,	  stocks	  that	  exhibit	  the	  strongest	  reversals	  are	  
found	   in	   its	   highest	   idiosyncratic	   risk	   quintiles,	   it	   finds	   momentum	   stocks	   across	   all	   of	   its	  
idiosyncratic	  risk	  quintiles;	  especially	  in	  quintiles	  for	  which	  reversals	  were	  not	  evidenced.	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Other	   studies	   (e.g.,	   Grinblatt	   and	   Moskowitz,	   2004)	   also	   confirm	   the	   classical	   overreaction	  
literature	   (De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler,	   1985)	   of	   the	   link	   between	   return	   reversals	   and	   the	   January	  
effect.	   Grinblatt	   and	   Moskowitz	   (2004)	   find	   their	   3-­‐year	   contrarian	   portfolios	   are	   mostly	  
profitable	   in	   the	   month	   of	   January	   and	   do	   not	   find	   similar	   seasonality	   in	   the	   momentum	  
portfolios;	   evidence	   at	   variance	   with	   contemporary	   views	   (e.g.,	   Barberis	   et	   al.,	   1998;	   Chan,	  
2003)	   that	   underreaction	   and	   overreaction	   are	   sequential	   elements	   of	   the	   price	   discovery	  
process.	   Instead,	   they	   opt	   for	   a	   tax	   avoidance	   explanation	   after	   examining	   the	   relationship	  
between	  tax	  regimes	  and	  return	  autocorrelations.	  	  
Using	   the	   “Dow	   Jones	   Interactive	   Publications	   Library	   of	   past	   newspapers,	   periodicals	   and	  
newswires”,	  Chan	  (2003)	  studies	  the	  reaction	  of	  stock	  prices	  to	  public	  but	  firm-­‐specific	  news.	  In	  
the	   study,	  winner	   and	   loser	   portfolios	   are	   formed	  based	   on	   returns	  ex	   post	   news	   specific	   to	  
each	  stock;	  with	  the	  highest	  (lowest)	  return	  stocks	  put	  in	  the	  winner	  (loser)	  portfolio	  and	  held	  
for	   a	   36-­‐month	   period.	   The	   study	   supports	   the	   classical	   (De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler,	   1985,	   1987;	  
Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman,	  1993,	  2001)	  and	  contemporary	  (Barberis	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Daniel	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  
Hong	  and	  Stein,	  1999)	  literature	  on	  overreaction	  and	  underreaction	  being	  contiguous	  elements	  
of	   investor	   behaviour:	   Winners	   outperform	   losers	   over	   short	   to	   intermediate	   time	   horizons	  
(typically	  1	  to	  12	  months)	  with	  reversals	  occurring	  over	   long-­‐time	  horizons	  (typically	  from	  the	  
thirteenth	  month	  post-­‐portfolio	  formation).	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  EMH	  that	   investors	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  earn	  abnormal	  
profits	  based	  on	  public	  news,	  Chan	  (2003)	  finds	  that	  stock	  prices	  are	  not	  precipitously	  reflective	  
of	   new	   public	   information;	   evidence	   that	   confirm	   that	   investors	   respond	   slowly	   to	   new	  
information.	  In	  fact,	  the	  momentum	  portfolios	  do	  not	  experience	  any	  price	  drift	  without	  public	  
news.	  	  Whereas	  winner	  and	  loser	  portfolios	  formed	  based	  on	  historical	  price	  movements	  alone	  
(so-­‐called	   “no-­‐news	   stocks”)	   exhibit	   reversals	   in	   consonance	   with	   the	   negative	   time-­‐series	  
autocorrelation	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  overreaction.	  	  
Furthermore,	  Chiao	  and	  Hueng	   (2005)	   find	   the	  overreaction	  effect	   robust	   to	   the	   three-­‐factor	  
model	   in	   the	   Japanese	  equity	  market.	   Similar	   to	  Carhart’s	   (1997)	  proposition	  of	   a	   fourth	   risk	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factor	   to	   account	   for	   the	   empirical	   regularity	   observed	   for	   the	  momentum	  effect,	   Chiao	   and	  
Hueng	   (2005)	   propose	   a	   “Loser	  Minus	  Winner”	   (LNW)	   factor	   for	   inclusion	   among	   the	   factors	  
that	  explain	  the	  cross-­‐section	  of	  returns;	  a	  “four-­‐factor	  model.”	  They	  present	  evidence	  showing	  
the	  model	  is	  robust	  to	  both	  Japanese	  and	  U.S	  data.	  	  
Much	  of	  the	  extant	  literature	  is	  dominated	  by	  U.S	  studies.	  There	  is	  increasing	  interest,	  however,	  
in	  understanding	  how	  investors	  behave	  in	  other	  markets	  as	  hitherto	  closed	  but	  huge	  economies	  
have	  opened	  up.	  A	  case	  in	  point	  is	  China.	  Kang,	  Liu,	  and	  Ni	  (2002)	  investigate	  the	  contrarian	  and	  
momentum	  strategies	  in	  the	  Chinese	  equity	  market	  over	  the	  period:	  1993	  –	  2000.	  They	  provide	  
interesting	   insights	   on	   investor	   behaviour	   under	   regulatory	   and	   informational	   constraints.	  
While	  both	  strategies	  are	  evidenced,	  the	  typical	  long-­‐horizon	  contrarian	  strategy	  is	  a	  short-­‐term	  
phenomenon	  in	  the	  Chinese	  equity	  market.	  Kang	  et	  al.	  (2002)	  attribute	  this	  to	  the	  dominance	  
of	   that	  market	  by	   individual	   investors	  who	  are	   forced	   to	   rely	  on	   rumours	  and	  historical	  price	  
data	   to	  make	   investment	   decisions	   owing	   from	   the	   dearth	   of	   reliable	   information	   on	   stocks;	  
circumstances	  that	  amplify	  the	  overreaction	  effect	  in	  the	  Chinese	  equity	  market.	  	  
	  
2.7	   Stock	  Market	  Seasonality	  
The	  January	  effect	  remains	  a	  conundrum.	  Using	  an	  equal-­‐weighted	  index	  of	  NYSE	  prices,	  Rozeff	  
and	  Kinney	   (1976)	  observe	   return	  outperformance	   for	   the	  calendar	  month	  of	   January	   for	   the	  
period	   1904	   to	   1974.	   On	   average,	   January	   returns	   outperform	   the	   other	   eleven	   months	   by	  
728.6%.	   That	   is,	   January	   average	   return	   was	   3.48%	   and	   the	   other	   months	   averaged	   0.42%.	  
While	  Rozeff	  and	  Kinney	  (1976)	  do	  not	  seek	  to	  prove	  the	  observed	  seasonality,	  they	  proffer	  the	  
tax-­‐loss	   selling,	   accounting	   information	   and	   stochastic	   cash	   demand	   hypotheses	   as	   potential	  
explanations.	  	  
	  
Schultz	   (1985)	   juxtaposes	  pre-­‐1917	   returns	  data	  –	   the	  period	  prior	   to	   the	   introduction	  of	   the	  
personal	  income	  tax	  in	  the	  United	  States	  –	  with	  those	  for	  the	  period	  1918	  –	  1929.	  He	  didn’t	  find	  
any	  evidence	  supporting	  a	  “January	  effect”	  in	  returns	  for	  the	  pre-­‐1917	  period,	  thereby	  showing	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empirical	   support	   for	   the	   tax-­‐loss	   selling	   hypothesis.	   This	   has	   not	   been	   consistent	   across	  
markets	   (e.g.,	   Page	   and	   Way,	   1992),	   however,	   and	   has	   since	   been	   refuted	   for	   U.S	   bourses	  
(Reinganum,	  1983).	  The	  tax-­‐loss	  selling	  explanation	  for	  the	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐year	  effect	  has	  probably	  
enjoyed	  prominence	  because	  of	  the	  dominance	  of	  tax	  concerns	  in	  investment	  decision-­‐making	  
in	  such	  countries	  as	  the	  U.S	  and	  other	  highly	  integrated	  markets.	  The	  discovery	  of	  the	  effect	  in	  
markets	  where	  tax	  considerations	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  differential	  (Kato	  and	  Schallheim,	  1985;	  
Berges,	   McConnell,	   and	   Schlarbaum,	   1984),	   however,	   challenges	   the	   consistency	   of	   this	  
prospective	  explanation.	  
	  
Past	  attempts	  at	  explaining	  the	  seasonal	  anomaly	  include	  the	  tax-­‐loss	  selling	  hypothesis	  (Chan,	  
1986;	   D’Mello,	   Fernis,	   and	   Hwang,	   2003),	   “window-­‐dressing”	   by	   institutional	   investors	  
(Lakonishok,	   Shleifer,	   Thaler,	   and	   Vishny,	   1991),	   “data-­‐snooping”	   (Lo	   and	   Mackinlay,	   1990;	  
Sullivan,	  Timmerman,	  and	  White,	  1999)	  and	  “parking	  the	  proceeds”	  (Ritter,	  1988)	  explanations.	  
Additionally,	   the	   supposition	   that	   the	   January	   effect	   is	   largely	   a	   small-­‐firm	   phenomenon	  
(Lakonishok	   and	   Smidt,	   1988;	   Ritter,	   1988;	  Haug	   and	  Hirschey,	   2006)	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   popular	  
view.	  	  
	  
Reinganum	   (1983)	   makes	   a	   good	   attempt	   at	   bringing	   about	   some	   clarity	   on	   the	   linkages	  
between	   tax-­‐loss	   selling	   (candidate	   stocks	   for	  which	   are	  prior	   losers),	   the	   size	   effect	   and	   the	  
January	  effect.	  After	  sorting	  stocks	  in	  ascending	  order	  of	  their	  prior	  6-­‐month	  performance,	  the	  
worst	  performers	  (“losers”)	  being	  the	  best	  tax-­‐loss	  selling	  candidates	  and	  the	  best	  performers	  
(“winners”)	  being	  the	  worst	  tax-­‐loss	  selling	  candidates,	  Reinganum	  (1983)	  forms	  market-­‐value	  
quintile	  portfolios,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  constituted	  of	  both	  losers	  and	  winners.	  Superior	  returns	  in	  
January	  are	  still	  observed	  in	  the	  lowest	  market	  value	  quintile	  portfolios	  for	  winners	  (the	  worst	  
potential	  tax-­‐loss	  selling	  candidates);	  evidence	  suggestive	  of	  a	  size	  effect	  in	  January	  irrespective	  
of	  tax-­‐loss	  selling.	  	  
	  
Additionally,	   Haug	   and	  Hirschey	   (2006)	   present	   evidence	   suggesting	   the	   January	   effect	   could	  
still	  be	  considered	  a	  small	  cap	  phenomenon.	  They	  used	  value-­‐weighted	  returns	  for	  the	  period	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1802-­‐2004	   and	   equal-­‐weighted	   returns	   for	   1927-­‐2004	   and	   found	   the	   January	   effect	   to	   be	  
prevalent	   in	   equal-­‐weighted	   returns	   even	   after	   the	   passage	   of	   the	   Tax	   Reform	   Act	   of	   1986	  
thereby	   also	   confirming	   earlier	   works	   (e.g.,	   Chan,	   1986)	   that	   the	   January	   effect	   cannot	   be	  
explained	  by	  tax-­‐loss	  selling.	  They	  also	  suggest	  a	  negative	  January	  effect	  for	  momentum	  stocks.	  
	  
Using	   daily	   buy/sell	   orders	   of	   individual	   investors’	   accounts	   at	   a	  major	   U.S	   brokerage,	   Ritter	  
(1988)	  finds	  that	  individual	  investors	  buy	  more	  securities	  than	  they	  sell	  in	  January	  and	  sell	  more	  
than	  they	  buy	  in	  the	  prior	  December.	  Ritter	  (1988)	  generalizes	  that	  variations	   in	  this	  seasonal	  
investor	   behaviour	   grossly	   explains	   the	   turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐year	   effect.	   It	   thus	   discounts	   the	   trading	  
activities	  of	  institutional	  investors.	  	  
	  
In	   contrast	   to	   Reinganum	   (1983),	   D’Mello,	   Fernis,	   and	   Hwang	   (2003)	   investigate	   the	   tax-­‐loss	  
selling	  hypothesis	  using	  6-­‐year	  data	  for	  firms	  across	  all	  sizes	  and	  control	  for	  factors	  (e.g.,	  size)	  
that	  have	  been	  found	  to	  explain	  the	  January	  seasonal	  in	  earlier	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Banz,	  1981).	  They	  
discountenance	   the	   size	   and	   share	   price	   effects	   explanations	   for	   the	   January	   effect.	   Instead,	  
they	  opine	  that	  the	  seasonal	  anomaly	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  individual	  tax-­‐loss	  selling	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  year	  and	  deferral	  of	  capital	  gains	  recognition	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  New	  Year.	  D’Mello	  
et	  al.	   (2003)	  conclude	   thus	   following	  evidence	  of	  abnormal	   selling	  pressures	   in	  December	   for	  
stocks	  that	  record	  significant	   losses	  during	  the	  year,	  selling	  activity	  that	  disappear	   in	  the	  next	  
January	   and	   are	   replaced	   by	   abnormal	   selling	   of	   stocks	   with	   significant	   capital	   gains.	   They	  
associate	  this	  behaviour	  with	  “capital-­‐constrained”	  investors:	  individuals.	  	  
	  
A	   comparison	   of	   trading	   patterns	   of	   individuals	   and	   institutions	   around	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   year	  
suggests	  the	  January	  effect	  is	  primarily	  because	  of	  the	  trading	  patterns	  of	  individual	  investors;	  
evidence	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  earlier	  studies	  by	  Ritter	  (1988)	  and	  Sias	  and	  Starks	  (1997).	  Thus,	  while	  
institutional	  window	  dressing	   (Lakonishok	  et	  al.,	   1991)	   is	  plausible	  and	  probably	  accounts	   for	  
some	  of	   the	   turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐year	   effect,	   it	   pales	   in	   comparison	   to	   individual	   trading	  behaviour	   in	  




Lakonishok	   et	   al.	   (1991)	   investigate	   the	   intuition	   that	   abnormal	   selling	   of	   loser	   stocks	   by	  
institutional	   investors	   (e.g.	   pension	  managers)	   toward	   the	   end	   of	   the	   year	   is	  motivated	   by	   a	  
desire	   to	   embellish	   year-­‐end	   results	   and	   impress	   fund	   sponsors	   even	   when	   their	   rational	  
thinking	  suggest	  otherwise.	  	  They	  look	  at	  the	  trading	  patterns	  of	  769	  equity	  pension	  funds	  and	  
find	  behaviour	  that	  accentuate	  the	  momentum	  effect	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  year	  when	  most	  of	  the	  
funds	   dump	   loser	   stocks	   for	   winning	   ones.	   Lakonishok	   et	   al	   (1991)	   also	   observe	   that	   while	  
institutional	   investors	   in	   general	   are	   contrarian,	   this	   behaviour	   is	   disproportionately	  
pronounced	   around	   the	   turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐year	   as	   enhanced	   buying	   of	   long-­‐trending	   loser	   stocks	   is	  
also	  observed.	  
	  
The	  tax-­‐loss	  selling	  argument	  subsists	  still.	  Kang,	  Pekkala,	  Polk,	  and	  Ribeiro	   (2011)	  suggest	  an	  
additional	  explanatory	  variable:	  interest	  rates.	  They	  argue	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  tax	  credit	  
or	   savings	   between	   a	   tax-­‐loss	   sale	   on	   the	   last	   trading	   day	   in	   a	   prior	   December	   and	   the	   first	  
trading	  day	  in	  the	  subsequent	  January	   is	  differential	  by	  the	  interest	  rate	  –	  since	  the	  latter	  tax	  
credit	  would	  not	  be	  got	   in	  another	   twelve	  months	  and	   thus	  a	  discounted	  value	  becomes	   the	  
proxy	  for	  the	  potential	  gain	  to	  be	  had.	  This	   is	  counterintuitive,	  however,	   for	   it	   is	  unlikely	  that	  
rationality	  would	  suggest	  delaying	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  benefit	  today,	  for	  one	  lesser	  –	  at	  least	  in	  
real	  terms	  –	  one	  year	  thence.	  Moreover,	  the	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  positive	  abnormal	  return	  
of	  losers	  (or	  high	  tax-­‐selling	  premium	  stocks)	  in	  January	  is	  due	  to	  tax-­‐loss	  selling.	  Delaying	  the	  
sale	   of	   such	   stocks	   –	   which	   is	   the	   only	   basis	   for	   the	   utility	   of	   interest	   rates	   in	   determining	  
seasonality	   in	   the	   argument	   espoused	   in	   Kang	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   –	   does	   not	   explain	   the	  
preponderance	  of	  purchase	  of	  such	  stocks	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year.	  	  
	  
The	   utility	   of	   interest	   rates	   is	   lost	   in	   deciding	   on	   loser	   stock	   purchases	   in	   January	   for	   the	  
potential	   tax	   credit	   benefit	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   year	  when	   stock	   price	   volatility	   and	   prediction	  
limitations	   are	   considered.	   It	   certainly	   cannot	   be	   supposed	   that	   a	   high	   tax-­‐selling	   premium	  
stock	  would	  remain	  static	  until	  the	  investor	  decides	  to	  sell	  it	  one	  year	  after	  the	  initial	  discovery	  
of	  the	  tax-­‐selling	  premium.	  In	  fact,	  top-­‐percentile	  loser	  stocks	  (or	  very	  high	  tax-­‐selling	  premium	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stocks)	   have	  been	   consistently	   found	   to	   reverse	   and	   rise	   to	   record	  highs	   as	   early	   as	   the	   first	  
trading	  week	  of	  January	  (De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler,	  1985	  and	  1987;	  Reinganum,	  1983;	  et	  cetera).	  	  
	  
However,	   Robins,	   E.M.,	   Sandler,	   M.,	   and	   Durand,	   F.	   (1999)	   find	   the	   January	   effect	   in	   the	  
Johannesburg	  Stock	  Exchange	  value-­‐weighted	  industrial	  index.	  In	  addition	  to	  a	  value-­‐weighted	  
index	   being	   biased	   towards	   large-­‐caps,	   the	   JSE	   industrial	   index	   consists	  mostly	   of	   them.	   The	  
findings	   by	   Robins	   et	   al	   (1999)	   contradict	   numerous	   studies	   (e.g.,	   Keim,	   1983;	   Blume	   and	  
Stambaugh,	   1983;	   Ritter,	   1988)	   that	   link	   the	   January	   effect	   to	   small	   firms	   and	   the	   trading	  
activities	  of	  individual	  investors,	  being	  as	  it	  is	  that	  the	  JSE	  is	  dominated	  by	  institutional	  investors	  
(Robins	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  This	  January-­‐Size	  effect	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  popular	  view,	  however.	  
	  
Heston	  and	  Sadka	  (2010)	  consider	  data	  from	  14	  countries	  outside	  the	  U.S.	  in	  their	  investigation	  
of	  seasonality	  in	  the	  cross-­‐section	  of	  stock	  returns.	  They	  form	  momentum	  portfolios	  based	  on	  
past	  excess	  market	  returns	  and	  find	  seasonality	  that	  is	  not	  peculiar	  to	  the	  month	  of	  January,	  in	  
contrast	  to	  earlier	  momentum	  effect	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman,	  1993).	  Similarly,	  their	  
findings	  are	  robust	  to	  size,	  β	  and	  value	  risks,	  suggesting	  some	  other	  factor	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  
regularity.	   	   Since	   the	   observed	  momentum	   and	   seasonal	   effects	   are	   not	   found	   to	   be	   highly	  
correlated	  across	  countries,	  it	  also	  eliminates	  global	  systematic	  risk	  as	  a	  potential	  explanation.	  
They	   conjecture	   that	   potential	   explanations	   would	   probably	   be	   related	   to	   behavioural	   or	  
institutional	  factors.	  	  
	  
Ng	  and	  Wang	  (2004)	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  institutional	  trading	  and	  the	  turn-­‐of-­‐
the-­‐year	   effect.	   Firstly,	   however,	   they	   confirm	   the	   turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐year	   effect	   using	   data	   from	  
December	   1986	   to	   January	   1999	   and	   find	   evidence	   consistent	   with	   earlier	   findings	   (e.g.,	   De	  
Bondt	  and	  Thaler,	  1985,	  1987;	  Schwert,	  2001;	  et	  cetera):	  the	  January	  effect	  is	  more	  pronounced	  
in	  small	  stocks	  relative	  to	  large	  stocks	  (3.7%	  for	  the	  small	  stocks	  and	  -­‐1.3%	  for	  the	  large	  stocks),	  
with	  the	  extreme	  losers	   in	  the	  stratum	  outperforming	  the	  winner	  types	  on	  a	  consistent	  basis.	  
While	  the	  winner	  small	  stocks	  also	  display	  some	  marginal	  seasonality,	  Ng	  and	  Wang	  (2004)	  do	  
not	   find	   this	   to	   be	   persistent	   across	   all	   sub-­‐periods,	   however.	   Additionally,	   the	   difference	  
59	  
	  
between	  the	  returns	  earned	  by	  the	  small-­‐size	  stock	  portfolios	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  days	  of	  December	  
of	  the	  prior	  year	  and	  that	  earned	  in	  the	  first	  ten	  days	  of	  January	  of	  the	  subsequent	  year	  were	  
positive	   and	   statistically	   significant	   throughout	   the	   period	   investigated,	  with	   average	   returns	  
ranging	  from	  5.9%	  to	  9.2%.	  	  
	  
The	   focus	   on	   institutional	   investors	   by	   Ng	   and	   Wang	   (2004)	   is	   premised	   on	   evidence	   (by	  
Gompers	  and	  Metrick,	  2001)	  that	  their	  ownership	  of	  U.S	  equities	  had	  risen	  from	  27.6%	  in	  1980	  
to	  more	  than	  50%	  in	  1998.	  Studies	  of	  the	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐year	  effect	  have	  sought	  to	  investigate	  the	  
investing	  behavior	  of	   individuals	  (e.g.,	  Ritter,	  1988;	  D’Mello	  et	  al.,	  2003)	  and	  institutions	  (e.g.,	  
Lakonishok	  et	  al.,	  1991)	  with	  the	  reckoning	  that	  they	  might	  provide	  insights	  on	  the	  underlying	  
determinants	  of	  the	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐year	  effect.	  Ng	  and	  Wang	  (2004)	  find	  that	  institutions	  sell	  (buy)	  
loser	  (winner)	  stocks	  across	  all	  size	  quintiles	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year,	  an	  activity	  that	  could	  
be	   interpreted	   as	   a	   momentum	   strategy	   or	   window-­‐dressing	   in	   anticipation	   of	   statutory	  
disclosures.	   While	   they	   opt	   for	   the	   window-­‐dressing	   interpretation,	   they	   do	   not	   present	  
evidence	  that	  suggest	  that	  it	  couldn’t	  be	  a	  deliberate	  momentum	  strategy	  as	  well.	  	  	  
	  
Cooper,	  McConnel	  and	  Ovtchinnikov	  (2006)	  examine	  whether	  January	  returns	  have	  predictive	  
utility	   for	   returns	   to	   be	   expected	   in	   the	   remaining	   months	   of	   the	   year,	   a	   so-­‐called	   “Other	  
January	  effect.”	  Using	  data	  spanning	  the	  period	  1940	  to	  2003,	  they	  present	  evidence	  in	  support	  
of	   their	   intuition	   (or	   “financial	  market	   street-­‐lore”	  as	   they	  put	   it).	   For	  years	   in	  which	   January	  
returns	  were	  positive,	  Cooper	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  find	  that	  returns	  average	  a	  positive	  14.8	  percent	  for	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  year.	  Conversely,	  for	  negative	  January	  returns,	  they	  find	  the	  next	  eleven	  months	  
for	   the	   period	   considered	   averaged	   2.92%.	   They	   also	   find	   the	   effect	   robust	   to	   Fama	   and	  
French’s	  (1993	  and	  1996)	  three-­‐factor	  model,	  especially	  with	  respect	  to	  SMB	  and	  HML.	  In	  any	  
case,	   the	   issue	   of	   relevance	   here	   is	   that	   investor	   behaviour	   is	   distinctive	   in	   the	   month	   of	  
January.	  	  
	  
Return	  has	  also	  been	  found	  to	  be	  differential	  in	  other	  months	  for	  some	  markets.	  For	  example,	  
Claessens,	  Dasgupta,	  and	  Glen	   (1995)	   found	  the	  months	  of	  March	  and	  June	  to	  be	  statistically	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differential	  with	  respect	   to	  return	  behaviour	  on	  the	  Nigerian	  bourse.	  A	   later	  study,	  Alagidede	  
(2008),	  found	  returns	  in	  the	  months	  of	  February	  and	  June	  to	  be	  statistically	  different	  from	  those	  
of	  other	  months	  of	  the	  year	  as	  well;	  with	  June	  recording	  the	  highest	  return	  of	  all	  the	  months.	  
The	   February	   effect	   has	   also	   been	   documented	   for	   China	   as	  well	   (Wang,	   Ojiako,	   and	  Wang,	  
2013).	  	  	  
	  
2.8	   Summary	  Insights	  from	  the	  literature	  
Thus	   far,	   it	   has	   been	   established	   that	   both	   short-­‐term	   return	   persistence	   and	   long-­‐term	  
reversals	   share	   a	   commonality:	   they	   are	   more	   pronounced	   in	   the	   month	   of	   January.	  
Additionally,	   behavioural	   models	   (Barberis	   et	   al.,	   1998;	   Daniel	   et	   al.,	   1998;	   Hong	   and	   Stein,	  
1999)	  show	  both	  phenomena	  are	  not	  disparate,	  albeit	   relying	  on	  different	  concepts	   from	  the	  
psychology	  literature	  ranging	  from	  conservatism	  (Edwards,	  1968)	  and	  self-­‐attribution	  (De	  Long,	  
Shleifer,	  Summers,	  and	  Waldmann,	  1991)	  for	  underreaction,	  to	  representativeness	  (Tversky	  and	  
Kahneman,	  1974)	  and	  overconfidence	  (Odean,	  1998)	  for	  overreaction.	  	  	  
	  
Most	  attempts	  at	  explaining	  the	  seasonality	  of	  investor	  overreaction	  since	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler	  
(1987)	   are	   related	   to	   taxes	   (e.g.,	   Grinblatt	   and	  Moskowitz,	   2004;	   George	   and	  Hwang,	   2007).	  
However,	   other	   studies	   (e.g.,	   Page	   and	   Way,	   1992;	   Cubbin	   et	   al.,	   2006)	   find	   the	   January	  
seasonal	  in	  markets	  (e.g.,	  South	  Africa)	  where	  tax	  considerations	  are	  not	  differential,	  evidence	  
that	  the	  tax	  explanation	  is	  not	  a	  robust	  one.	  Thus,	  the	  reason	  why	  return	  reversals	  occur	  mostly	  
in	  the	  calendar	  month	  of	  January	  remains	  an	  open	  question.	  	  
What	   seems	   to	   be	   consistent	   in	   the	   literature	   are	   as	   follows.	   Buying	   pressure	   in	   January	   is	  
biased	   towards	   undervalued	   stocks	   in	   the	   prior	   December,	   tax-­‐loss	   selling	   (though	   not	   an	  
exhaustive	  explanation)	  seem	  a	  motivation	  for	  some	  investors	  to	  sell	  losing	  stocks	  in	  December	  
in	  markets	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  (Schultz,	  1985;	  D’Mello	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Ng	  and	  Wang,	  2004;	  
Kang	  et	  al.,	   2011),	  even	   though	  Reinganum	   (1983)	  and	  Haug	  and	  Hirschey	   (2006)	   refute	   this,	  
and	  for	  other	  reasons	  in	  some	  (Kato	  and	  Schallheim,	  1985;	  Berges	  et	  al.,	  1984).	  Tax-­‐loss	  selling	  
doesn’t	  explain,	  however,	  the	  subsequent	  buying	  activity	  in	  January.	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Other	  alternative	  explanations	  (Lakonishok	  et	  al.,	  1991;	  Lo	  and	  MacKinlay,	  1990;	  Sullivan	  et	  al.,	  
1999;	  D’Mello	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Ng	  and	  Wang,	  2004;	  et	  cetera)	  have	  not	  been	  found	  to	  be	  exhaustive	  
either	   since	   the	   January	   effect	   continues	   to	   persist	   irrespective	   of	   investor	   type	   or	   any	  
supposed	  statistical	  bias.	  Additionally,	  the	  observed	  seasonality	  in	  winner-­‐loser	  portfolios,	  with	  
loser	  stocks	  or	  hitherto	  undervalued	  stocks	  earning	  significant	  positive	  risk-­‐adjusted	  returns	  in	  
January	  (De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler,	  1985;	  Jegadeesh,	  1990;	  et	  cetera)	  continues	  to	  be	  unexplained	  
by	  existing	  theory	  (De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler,	  1987).	  The	  subsequent	  overreaction	  literature	  (Chan,	  
2003;	  Grinblatt	  and	  Moskowitz,	  2004;	  George	  and	  Hwang,	  2007;	  Lin	  and	  Swanson,	  2010)	  do	  not	  




3.	   METHODOLOGY	  
	  
The	  philosophical	  underpinning	  of	  this	  study	  is	  post-­‐positivist.	  A	  claim	  is	  made	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  
hypothesis,	  data	  is	  collected	  and	  analysed,	  and	  conclusion(s)	  are	  made	  to	  reject	  or	  fail	  to	  reject	  
the	   hypothesis.	   Post-­‐positivism	   represents	   new	   thinking	   about	   the	   scientific	   method	   and	   is	  
based	   on	   the	   recognition	   that	   while	   inquiry	   should	   be	   objective	   and	   based	   on	   evidence,	  
conclusions	  thereof	  should	  by	  no	  means	  be	  considered	  absolute.	  It	  recognizes	  that	  knowledge	  
continually	  evolves	  and	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  orthodoxy	  is	  a	  fallacy.	  Thus,	  extant	  theory	  in	  regard	  of	  
investor	  overreaction	  is	  first	  established	  using	  out-­‐of-­‐sample	  data.	  Thereafter,	  a	  claim	  is	  made	  
in	  regard	  of	  some	  of	  the	  unanswered	  questions	  raised	  in	  past	  studies	  (Creswell,	  2009).	  
	  
This	  quantitative	  research	  approach	  relies	  on	  data	  from	  markets	  outside	  of	  the	  U.S	  to	  control	  
for	  the	  potential	  sample	  bias	  that	  perhaps	  dominate	  the	  finance	  literature.	  It	  is	  recognized	  here	  
that	   new	   thinking	   evidenced	   in	   this	   study	  would	   be	   greatly	   impaired	   if	   it	   is	   not	   found	   to	   be	  
consistent.	  This	  recognition	  informs	  the	  adoption	  by	  this	  study,	  of	  the	  quantitative	  method	  for	  
its	  high	  standards	  with	  respect	  to	  validity	  and	  reliability	  of	  research	  work.	  	  
	  
The	  research	  design	  relies	  on	  the	  past	  works	  of	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler	  (1985,	  1987),	  Ritter	  (1988),	  
Conrad	   and	   Kaul	   (1993)	   and	   Lee	   and	   Swaminathan	   (2000).	   However,	   nuances	   that	   allow	   the	  
specific	   question(s)	   of	   interest	   to	   be	   investigated	   are	   also	   introduced;	   as	   the	   objective	   is	   to	  
understand	   the	   role	   of	   investor	   sentiments	   in	   explaining	   the	   seasonality	   and	   intensity	   of	  
investor	  reaction.	  The	  intuitive	  congruity	  of	  return	  and	  investor	  sentiments	  is	  also	  investigated	  
especially	   as	   the	   literature	   (e.g.,	   Lee	  and	  Swaminathan,	  2000)	   suggests	   they	  are	  governed	  by	  
the	  same	  market	  dynamics.	  Thus,	  the	  design	  uses	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler’s	  (1985)	  type	  loser	  and	  
winner	  portfolios	  to	  investigate	  whether	  share	  turnover	  ratio	  –	  the	  proxy	  for	  investor	  sentiment	  
used	  –	  follows	  a	  similar	  post-­‐formation	  pattern	  as	  the	  return	  from	  these	  portfolios.	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3.1	   Research	  design	  
It	  is	  conjectured	  that	  investor	  sentiments	  have	  explanatory	  power	  for	  the	  cross-­‐section	  of	  stock	  
returns	   and	   are	   differential	   at	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   year.	   The	   intuition	   is	   that	   these	   sentiments	  
explain	   January	   loser	   reversals	   documented	   in	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler	   (1985,	   1987).	   If	   this	  
intuition	   is	   to	  be	  vindicated,	   then	   investor	   sentiment	  would	  behave	   similarly	  as	   return	   in	   the	  
event	  of	  an	  overreaction	  effect	  and	  accompanying	  January	  effect.	  
	  
Conrad	  and	  Kaul	  (1993:39)	  aptly	  posit	  the	  overreaction	  hypothesis	  as	  follows:	  “stock	  prices	  take	  
temporary	   swings	   from	   their	   fundamental	   values	  due	   to	  waves	  of	  optimism	  and	  pessimism.”	  
Additionally,	   Baker	   and	   Wurgler	   (2006:1649)	   define	   investor	   sentiment	   as	   “optimism	   and	  
pessimism	  about	  stocks	   in	  general”	  and	  use	  share	  turnover	  as	  one	  of	  the	  proxies	   for	   investor	  
sentiment.	  Other	  proxies	  that	  have	  been	  used	  are	  the	  “closed-­‐end	  fund	  discount,	  the	  number	  
and	   average	   first-­‐day	   returns	   on	   IPOs,	   the	   equity	   shares	   in	   new	   issues,	   and	   the	   dividend	  
premium”	  (Baker	  and	  Wurgler	  2006:1655).	  
	  
Ritter	   (1988)	   uses	   daily	   buy/sell	   orders	   of	   individual	   investors’	   accounts	   at	   a	   major	   U.S	  
brokerage	   firm	   to	   test	   its	   “parking-­‐the-­‐proceeds”	   hypothesis	   for	   the	   January	   effect1.	   In	   this	  
research,	  share	  turnover	  ratio	  (ST)	  –	  defined	  as	  the	  ratio	  of	  daily	  trading	  volume	  for	  a	  stock	  to	  
its	   number	   of	   shares	   outstanding	   –	   is	   used	   as	   the	   proxy	   for	   investor	   sentiment;	   and	  
nonparametric	  ANOVA	  models	  are	  used	  to	  determine	  whether	  they	  are	  differential	  separately	  
across	  loser/winner	  quintile	  portfolios	  and	  months	  of	  the	  year,	  especially	  the	  month	  of	  January.	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  at	  this	  point	  that	  other	  proxies	  of	  investor	  sentiment	  could	  not	  be	  used	  in	  this	  
study	  because	  of	  unavailability	  of	  rich	  data	  needed	  to	  compute	  them.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Ritter	  (1988)	  finds	  that	  individual	  investors	  buy	  more	  securities	  than	  they	  sell	  in	  January	  and	  sell	  more	  than	  they	  
buy	  in	  the	  prior	  December.	  The	  paper	  generalizes	  that	  variations	  in	  this	  seasonal	  investor	  behaviour	  grossly	  
explains	  the	  turn-­‐of-­‐the-­‐year	  effect.	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Share	   turnover	   has	   been	   found	   to	   be	   seasonal.	   Eleswarapu	   and	   Reinganum	   (1993:385)	   use	  
share	   turnover	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   liquidity	   and	   present	   evidence	   showing	   that	   the	   “liquidity	  
premium	  is	  reliably	  positive	  only	  during	  the	  month	  of	  January.”	  However,	  they	  do	  not	  explain	  
why	  the	  liquidity	  effect	   is	   limited	  to	  January.	  Lee	  and	  Swaminathan	  (2000)	  refute	  the	  liquidity	  
hypothesis	  for	  the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  share	  turnover	  for	  the	  momentum	  effect	  observed	  in	  
their	   study.	   They	   find	   minimal	   correlation	   between	   share	   turnover	   and	   common	   liquidity	  
proxies	   like	  firm	  size,	  stock	  price	  and	  relative	  spread.	  They	  insist	  their	  finding	  is	  evidence	  that	  
share	  turnover	  proxies	  for	  something	  more	  than	  just	  liquidity.	  This	  study	  conjectures	  that	  it	  is	  a	  
proxy	  for	  investor	  sentiment.	  
	  
This	  study	  draws	  on	  the	  pioneering	  work	   in	  regard	  of	  stock	  market	  overreaction	  by	  De	  Bondt	  
and	  Thaler	  (1985)	  for	  constructing	  winner	  and	  loser	  portfolios.	  	  
	  
De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler’s	  (1985)	  overreaction	  hypothesis	  predicts	  that:	  
	  
ACARW	  (k)	  <	  0	  
ACARL	  (k)	  >	  0	  
DACAR	  (k)	  >	  0	  
	  
Where	  	  
k	  =	  12,	  24,	  and	  36	  months	  
L	  =	  Loser	  portfolio	  
W	  =	  Winner	  portfolio	  
ACAR	  =	  Average	  cumulative	  abnormal	  Return	  
DACAR	  =	  Difference	  in	  average	  cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  of	  loser	  and	  winner	  portfolios	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Conrad	  and	  Kaul	  (1993)	  raise	  methodological	  questions	  about	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler’s	  (1985	  and	  
1987)	  return	  calculation	  approach	  and	  suggest	  bias(es)	  that	  potentially	  weaken	  generalizations	  
in	  past	  studies	  based	  on	  the	  overreaction	  hypothesis	  hitherto.	  Their	  methodological	  variation	  
necessitates	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler’s	  (1985)	  overreaction	  hypothesis	  to	  be	  restated	  as	  follows:	  
	  
AHPARW	  (k)	  <	  0	  
AHPARL	  (k)	  >	  0	  
DAHPAR	  (k)	  >	  0	  
	  
Where	  	  
AHPAR	  =	  Average	  holding	  period	  abnormal	  return	  
DACAR	  =	  Difference	  in	  average	  holding	  period	  abnormal	  return	  for	  loser	  and	  winner	  portfolios	  
And	  k,	  L	  and	  W	  are	  the	  same	  as	  defined	  in	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler’s	  (1985)	  model.	  
	  
In	   this	   study,	   average	   holding	   period	   returns	   for	   securities	   listed	   on	   the	   NSE	   and	   JSE	   are	  
separately	   ranked	   in	   descending	   order	   and	   put	   in	   loser/winner	   quintile	   portfolios.	   These	   are	  
then	  evaluated	  over	  12-­‐,	  24-­‐	  and	  36-­‐month	  holding	  periods.	  
	  
Lee	   and	   Swaminathan	   (2000)	   present	   evidence	   showing	   underreaction	   and	   overreaction	   are	  
linked	   by	   trading	   volume	   proxied	   by	   the	   share	   turnover	   ratio.	   They	   create	   momentum	  
portfolios	   based	   on	   historical	   trading	   volume	   that	   exhibit	   intermediate-­‐horizon	   return	  
continuation	  along	  the	   lines	  of	  Jegadeesh	  and	  Titman	  (1993)	  and	   long-­‐horizon	  return	  reversal	  
as	   predicted	   by	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler	   (1985).	   What	   is	   particularly	   interesting	   in	   Lee	   and	  
Swaminathan	  (2000)	  is	  their	  assertion	  about	  the	  utility	  of	  historical	  trading	  volume	  in	  predicting	  
the	  timing	  of	  return	  reversals.	   Incidentally,	  Campbell,	  Grossman	  and	  Wang	  (1993)	  and	  Blume,	  
Easley	  and	  O’Hara	  (1994)	  provide	  theoretical	  evidence	  that	  show	  strong	  linkages	  between	  stock	  




After	   separately	   ranking	   stocks	  based	  on	   their	  historical	   returns	  and	   trading	  volume,	   Lee	  and	  
Swaminathan	   (2000)	   form	   thirty	   “price	  momentum-­‐volume	   portfolios”	   that	   consist	   of	   stocks	  
common	  to	  strata	  in	  both	  rankings.	  These	  portfolios	  are	  then	  held	  for	  varying	  periods	  ranging	  
from	  three	  months	  to	  five	  years.	  The	  arbitrage	  momentum	  portfolio,	  one	  that	  is	  long	  extreme	  
decile	   winners	   and	   short	   extreme	   decile	   losers,	   is	   profitable	   in	   the	   first	   year	   with	   returns	  
ranging	   from	   10.62	   percent	   to	   12.70	   percent	   per	   year.	   The	   strong	   performance	   unravels,	  
however,	   in	   the	   fourth	   year	   and	  endures	   to	   the	   fifth	  whereby	   the	  portfolio	   records	  negative	  
returns	  irrespective	  of	  the	  formation	  period.	  This	  is	  evidence	  consistent	  with	  the	  predictions	  of	  
De	  Bondt	   and	   Thaler’s	   (1985)	   overreaction	   hypothesis.	   Additionally,	   the	   extreme	  winner	   and	  
loser	  portfolios	  share	  a	  commonality:	  they	  are	  characterized	  by	  high	  trading	  volume	  stocks.	  This	  
is	  at	  variance	  with	   the	   liquidity	  effect	  argument.	  This	   study	  draws	  on	  methodological	   insights	  
from	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler	  (1985)	  and	  Lee	  and	  Swaminathan	  (2000).	  
	  
Ritter	  (1988)	  regress	  small-­‐firm	  excess	  stock	  returns	  on	  daily	  buy/sell	  ratios	  (BSRs)	  of	  individual	  
investors	   during	   the	   first	   two	   trading	   weeks	   of	   the	   year	   in	   January	   and	   finds	   that	   it	   has	  
explanatory	  power	  for	  the	  January	  effect.	  While	  it	  doesn’t	  investigate	  the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  
such	   investor	   behaviour,	   it	   attributes	   the	   anomaly	   to	   tax-­‐loss	   selling	   in	  December.	   The	   study	  
conjectures	  that	  individual	  investors	  use	  the	  proceeds	  to	  procure	  small-­‐firm	  stocks	  in	  January.	  
Ritter’s	   study	   comes	   close	   to	   the	   contemplation	   in	   this	   study	   about	   the	   intuitive	   appeal	   of	   a	  
relationship	  between	  return	  and	  investor	  sentiments.	  
	  
The	  JSE	  and	  NSE	  are	  the	  two	  largest	  equity	  markets	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.	  This	  study	  focuses	  on	  
the	   two	   bourses	   because	   they	   are	   the	   largest	   by	   market	   capitalization	   and	   yet	   have	   sharp	  
differences	   in	   infrastructure,	  microstructure	  and	   investor	  characteristics.	   In	   regard	  of	   the	   JSE,	  
an	   obviously	   more	   developed	   equity	   market	   relative	   to	   the	   NSE,	   its	   flexible	   tax	   year	   and	  
dominance	   by	   institutional	   investors	   (Robins	   et	   al.,	   1999)	   provide	   opportunities	   to	   explore	  
unresolved	  questions	  raised	  in	  U.S	  studies	  (discussed	  earlier)	  as	  to	  whether	  tax-­‐loss	  selling	  and	  
individual	  investor	  behaviour	  explain	  investor	  overreaction	  and	  the	  January	  effect.	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Incidentally,	   Page	   and	   Way	   (1992)	   document	   results	   consistent	   with	   the	   overreaction	  
hypothesis	  and	  thus	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  weak-­‐form	  EMH	  for	  the	  South	  African	  equity	  market.	  
They	  observe	  a	  January	  effect	  similar	  to	  that	  evidenced	  on	  the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange	  by	  De	  
Bondt	   and	   Thaler	   (1985).	   Their	   findings	   call	   into	   question	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   positive	   loser	  
excess	  returns	  in	  January	  is	  due	  to	  tax	  loss	  selling	  as	  South	  African	  companies	  are	  free	  to	  choose	  
their	   tax	   year	   ends.	   While	   other	   JSE	   overreaction	   studies	   (Cubbin,	   Eidne,	   Firer,	   and	   Gilbert,	  
2006;	   Venter,	   2009)	   confirm	   Page	   and	   Way’s	   (1992)	   findings	   of	   overreaction	   in	   the	   South	  
African	  equity	  market	  albeit	  using	  different	  methodologies	  –	  e.g.,	  Cubbin	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  use	  P/E	  
ratios	  to	  rank	  portfolios	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Venter	  (2009)	  focus	  on	  intra-­‐day	  trading	  behaviour	  –	  
they	  are	  not	  exactly	  comparable	  with	  that	  pioneer	  South	  African	  overreaction	  study.	  Thus,	  one	  
such	   study	   that	   adopts	   a	   methodology	   consistent	   with	   the	   De	   Bondt	   and	   Thaler	   (1985)	  
methodology	  used	  in	  Page	  and	  Way	  (1992)	  is	  apt.	  
	  
Furthermore,	  existing	  evidence	  for	  the	  Nigerian	  equity	  market	  (Olowe,	  1999;	  Tijjani	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  
et	   cetera)	   suggests	   it	   is	   weak-­‐form	   efficient.	   Most	   of	   these	   studies,	   however,	   were	  
autocorrelation	  tests.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  a	  dearth	  of	  studies	  of	  trading-­‐rule	  efficiency	  tests	  like	  in	  this	  
study.	   Other	   drawbacks	   in	   these	   prior	   studies	   include	   small	   sample	   sizes:	   Olowe	   (1999)	   use	  
fifty-­‐nine	  (59)	  randomly	  selected	  securities	  as	  its	  sample	  and	  Tijjani	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  use	  sixty-­‐nine	  
(69).	  Additionally,	  they	  do	  not	   include	  observations	  beyond	  the	  year	  2005,	  a	  period	  for	  which	  
the	  Nigerian	   bourse	   experienced	  marked	   activity.	   Also,	   studies	   of	   other	   price-­‐limit	   regulated	  
equity	  markets	  (e.g.,	  Lin	  and	  Swanson,	  2010)	  show	  contrarian	  strategies	  earn	  superior	  returns,	  
evidence	   in	   support	   of	   overreaction	   and	   converse	   to	   the	   efficient	   market	   argument.	   The	  
intuition	  of	  this	  study,	  therefore,	  is	  that	  the	  Nigerian	  equity	  market	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  efficient	  as	  
suggested	  by	  the	  existing	  Nigerian	  efficiency	  literature	  (e.g.,	  Tijjani	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Okpara,	  2010).	  
	  
In	  Nigeria,	   individuals	   and	   firms	   could	   hitherto	   file	   their	   tax	   returns	   at	   any	   time	   of	   the	   year.	  
However,	  Nigerian	  banks	  adopted	  a	  common	  year-­‐end	  of	  December	  in	  2011	  as	  per	  regulations.	  
Although	  this	  study	  includes	  2011	  data	  for	  Nigeria,	  it	  is	  not	  considered	  material	  enough	  to	  alter	  
the	  results.	  In	  South	  Africa,	  most	  listed	  firms	  are	  large-­‐caps,	  individual	  investors’	  tax	  year	  ends	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in	  February	  and	  there	  is	  no	  statutory	  financial	  year-­‐end	  for	  firms	  (Page	  and	  Way,	  1992).	  A	  study	  
of	   both	   bourses	   thus	   helps	   control	   for	   the	   size	   and	   tax-­‐loss	   selling	   effects.	   These	   are	  
characteristics,	  which	  in	  tandem	  with	  the	  research	  design	  help	  control	  for	  potential	  biases.	  
	  
3.2	   Portfolio	  formation	  
Using	  the	  methodology	  of	  De	  Bondt	  and	  Thaler	  (1985),	  loser	  (winner)	  portfolios	  are	  formed	  by	  
using	  stocks	  that	  record	  the	   lowest	   (highest)	   returns	  over	  1-­‐,	  2-­‐,	  and	  3-­‐year	  horizons.	  Trading	  
volume	   by	   itself	   does	   not	   give	   an	   indication	   on	   the	   direction	   of	   returns.	   It	   only	   becomes	  
meaningful	  when	  juxtaposed	  with	  return	  performance	  as	  “stock	  returns	  and	  trading	  volume	  are	  
jointly	  determined	  by	  the	  same	  market	  dynamics	  and	  are	  inextricably	  linked	  in	  theory”	  (Lee	  and	  
Swaminathan,	  2000:2017).	  That	  juxtaposition	  is	  a	  major	  thrust	  of	  this	  study.	  	  
	  
While	  mean	  reversion	  has	  been	  evidenced	  on	  the	  JSE	  over	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  horizons	  (Page	  
and	  Way,	   1992;	   Venter,	   2009;	   Cubbin	   et	   al.,	   2006),	   it	   is	   not	   the	   case	   for	   the	   Nigerian	   Stock	  
Exchange.	  Thus,	   the	  existence	  of	   the	  phenomenon	  on	   the	  NSE	  would	  have	   to	  be	  established.	  
Having	   already	   been	   observed	   to	   occur	   on	   the	   JSE,	   investor	   overreaction	   would	   again	   be	  
investigated	  using	  now	  available	  data	   for	  periods	  not	   included	   in	  prior	  studies	  –	  Cubbin	  et	  al.	  
(2006)	  use	  a	  1983	  to	  2005	  dataset.	  It	  would	  also	  provide	  insights	  on	  whether	  it	  persists	  in	  the	  
South	  African	  equity	  market.	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To	  form	  the	  loser	  and	  winner	  portfolios	  and	  thereafter	  measure	  their	  performance,	  returns	  are	  
computed	  for	  each	  security	  (or	  portfolio)	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  
Rj,t	  =	  (Pj,t	  	  –	  	  Pj,t-­‐1)/(Pj,t-­‐1)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (3.1)	   	  
Uj,t	  =	  Rj,t	  –Rm,t	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (3.2)	  
ARp,t	  =	  1/n	  ∑	  Uj,t	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (3.3)	  
AHPARp	  =	  1/m	  ∑	  ARp,t	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (3.4)	  
	  
Where:	  
Rj,t	  	  =	  monthly	  return	  for	  stock	  j	  
Uj,t	  =	  monthly	  residual	  return	  for	  stock	  j	  
ARp,t	  =	  abnormal	  return	  of	  portfolio	  p	  over	  month	  t	  
AHPARp	  =	  average	  holding	  period	  abnormal	  return	  of	  portfolio	  p	  over	  period	  k	  
Rm,t	  	  =	  market	  return	  over	  month	  t	  	  
Pj,t	  	  	  =	  closing	  price	  of	  stock	  j	  in	  month	  t	  	  
Pj,t-­‐1	  	  =	  closing	  price	  of	  stock	  j	  in	  month	  t-­‐1	  
t	  =	  1,2,…,m	  
n	  =	  number	  of	  securities	  in	  the	  loser	  (or	  winner)	  portfolio,	  and	  
m	  =	  number	  of	  months	  in	  holding	  period	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Share	  turnover	  ratios	  are	  computed	  for	  each	  security	  (or	  portfolio)	  as	  follows:	  
	  
STj,t	  	  =	  V	  j,t	  /	  N	  j,t	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (3.5)	  
STp,t	  =	  1/n	  ∑	  STj,t	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (3.6)	  
AHPSTp	  =	  1/m	  ∑	  STp,t	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (3.7)	  
	  
Where:	  
STj,t	  	  =	  share	  turnover	  ratio	  for	  security	  j	  over	  month	  t	  
STp,t	  =	  share	  turnover	  ratio	  of	  portfolio	  p	  over	  month	  t	  
AHPSTp	  =	  average	  holding	  period	  share	  turnover	  ratio	  of	  portfolio	  p	  
V	  j,t	  	  =	  average	  trading	  volume	  of	  security	  j	  over	  month	  t	  
N	  j,t	  	  =	  average	  number	  of	  shares	  outstanding	  of	  security	  j	  over	  month	  t	  
n	  =	  number	  of	  securities	  in	  the	  loser	  (or	  winner)	  portfolio	  
m	  =	  number	  of	  months	  in	  holding	  period	  
	  
Thus,	  relevant	  variables	  for	  which	  data	  are	  collected	  are	  as	  follows:	  
• Daily	  closing	  value	  of	  the	  JSE	  and	  NSE	  All	  Share	  Index	  at	  closing	  for	  each	  day	  
• Daily	  closing	  price	  for	  each	  security	  
• Daily	  volume	  traded	  for	  each	  security	  
• Number	  of	  shares	  outstanding	  
	  
JSE	   data	   was	   sourced	   from	   the	  McGregorBFA	   database	   via	   the	   Library	   at	   the	  Wits	   Business	  
School	   and	   NSE	   data	   from	   a	   member	   firm	   of	   the	   Nigerian	   Stock	   Exchange.	   Data	   was	   also	  
sourced	   from	   Thomson	   Reuters	   Datastream	   to	   check	   for	   accuracy	   and	   ensure	   consistency.	  
Securities	   in	  each	  of	   the	   JSE	  and	  NSE	  samples	  had	   their	  monthly	  excess	  market	   returns	   (ARs)	  
averaged	   for	   the	   pre-­‐formation	   period,	  which	   ranged	   from	  one	   to	   three	   years,	   to	   determine	  
whether	  it	  was	  a	  loser	  or	  winner	  security.	  They	  were	  thereafter	  ranked	  and	  divided	  into	  five	  (5)	  
quintiles	  with	  the	  top	  quintile	  performers	  put	  into	  the	  extreme	  winner	  portfolio,	  P1,	  the	  lowest	  
quintile	  performers	  put	  into	  the	  extreme	  loser	  portfolio,	  P5,	  and	  the	  remainder	  put	  in	  the	  other	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three	  portfolios:	   P2,	   the	   second	  winner	  portfolio,	   P3,	   the	   intermediate	  portfolio,	   and	  P4,	   the	  
second	   loser	   portfolio.	   Since	   the	   goal	   is	   also	   to	   investigate	   whether	   investor	   sentiment	   is	  
congruous	  with	  return,	  the	  share	  turnover	  ratios	  (STs)	  of	  the	  securities	  are	  also	  observed	  over	  
these	  post-­‐formation	  periods.	  	  
	  
As	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2011,	  there	  were	  about	  140	  securities	  listed	  on	  the	  JSE,	  a	  much	  lower	  figure	  to	  
the	  186	  listed	  securities	  on	  the	  bourse	  in	  2002.	  The	  sample	  criterion	  adopted	  is	  that	  securities	  
be	   listed	  on	   the	  bourse	   for	   the	  entire	  period	  of	  2002-­‐2011.	  Consequently,	  75	   securities	  were	  
adopted	  for	  the	  study.	  From	  this	  75-­‐listed	  securities’	  sample,	  nine	  1-­‐year,	  seven	  2-­‐year,	  and	  five	  
3-­‐year	  overlapping	  quintile	   loser-­‐winner	  portfolios	  were	   formed	  with	  each	  one	  having	   fifteen	  
securities.	  For	  the	  NSE	  sample,	  nine	  1-­‐year,	  seven	  2-­‐year,	  and	  five	  3-­‐year	  overlapping	  quintile	  
loser-­‐winner	   portfolios	  were	   formed	  with	   each	   one	   having	   16	   securities	   except	   the	   extreme	  
loser	  portfolio,	  P5	  which	  had	  14	  constituent	  securities.	  	  
	  
3.3	   Comments	  on	  data	  analysis	  method	  
The	  datasets	  are	  largely	  nonstationary	  and	  not	  normally	  distributed	  (see	  Tables	  1	  and	  2).	  This	  is	  
not	   entirely	   surprising	   as	   the	   normality	   assumption	   “in	   reality	   does	   not	   hold.”	   (Al-­‐Khazali	  
2014:159).	  Thus,	  the	  non-­‐parametric	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  One-­‐Way	  Analysis	  of	  Variance	  (ANOVA)	  on	  
Ranks	  test	  is	  used	  as	  the	  primary	  analytical	  tool	  in	  deciding	  whether	  to	  reject	  or	  not	  reject	  the	  
null	  hypotheses.	  The	  distribution-­‐free	  multiple	  comparison	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  Z	  (Dunn’s)	  test	  is	  used	  
to	   determine	   which	   of	   the	   portfolios	   (or	   months)	   have	   residual	   returns	   (or	   share	   turnover	  
ratios)	  that	  are	  differential.	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Table	  1:	  Results	  of	  normality	  and	  stationarity	  tests	  for	  the	  JSE	  datasets	  

















Skewness	  normality	  of	  residuals	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	  
Kurtosis	  normality	  of	  residuals	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	  
Omnibus	  normality	  of	  residuals	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	  
Modified-­‐Levene	  Equal	  Variance	  Test	   Reject	   Reject	   Accept	   Accept	  
Source:	  NCSS	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Results	  of	  normality	  and	  stationarity	  tests	  for	  the	  NSE	  datasets	  
















Skewness	  normality	  of	  residuals	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	  
Kurtosis	  normality	  of	  residuals	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	  
Omnibus	  normality	  of	  residuals	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	   Reject	  
Modified-­‐Levene	  Equal	  Variance	  Test	   Accept	   Reject	   Reject	   Accept	  
Source:	  NCSS	  
	  
The	   use	   of	   the	   nonparametric	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   One-­‐Way	   ANOVA	   on	   Ranks	   test	   to	   determine	  
whether	   the	   differences	   in	   the	   values	   of	   the	   variables	   of	   interest	   for	   the	   study’s	   quintile	  
portfolios	   (or	   calendar	  months)	   are	   significant	   is	   consistent	   with	   earlier	   overreaction	   and/or	  
seasonality	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Lee,	  1992;	  Alford	  and	  Guffey,	  1996;	  Ko,	  1998;	  Kunkel	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  et	  
cetera).	  Kunkel	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  used	  the	  nonparametric	  Wilcoxon	  Signed	  Rank	  test,	  which	  like	  the	  
Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   One-­‐Way	   ANOVA	   on	   Ranks,	   tests	   for	   differences	   in	   the	  median	   values	   of	   the	  
relevant	   group	   variable(s).	   The	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   ANOVA	   test	   has	   also	   been	   argued	   to	   be	  more	  
robust	  than	  the	  One-­‐Way	  ANOVA	  in	  events	  of	  parametric	  assumption	  violations	  (Sprent,	  1989).	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To	  ensure	  consistency,	  the	  non-­‐parametric	  multiple	  comparison	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  Z	  (Dunn’s)	  test	  is	  
used	   to	   determine	  whether	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   residual	   returns	   (or	   share	   turnover	  
ratios)	   of	   the	   arbitrage	   loser-­‐winner	   portfolios	   are	   significant.	   The	   Dunn’s	   test	   is	   a	   multiple	  
comparison	  procedure	  that	  does	  not	  require	  the	  datasets	  to	  be	  normally	  distributed.	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4.	   RESULTS	  AND	  FINDINGS	  
4.1	   Overview	  
As	   a	   guide	   to	   this	   important	   chapter,	   the	   reader	   is	   given	   a	   quick	   overview	   of	   key	   results	  
documented	  from	  the	  analyses.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  intuition	  that	  motivated	  the	  study,	  evidence	  of	  
overreaction	   and	   seasonality	   are	   found	   on	   the	   Nigerian	   Stock	   Exchange	   (NSE).	   For	   the	  
Johannesburg	   Stock	   Exchange	   (JSE),	   no	   evidence	   of	   overreaction	   is	   found.	   Seasonality	   is	  
observed	   on	   the	   JSE,	   however.	   Thus,	   inefficiencies	   occur	   in	   both	   markets.	   In	   subsequent	  
sections,	  the	  results	  are	  discussed	  in	  greater	  detail.	  	  
	  
4.2	   Findings	  of	  tests	  for	  investor	  overreaction	  and	  seasonality	  on	  the	  NSE	  
Test	  results	  for	  the	  NSE	  residual	  return	  dataset	  suggests	  there	  is	  an	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  the	  
Nigerian	   Stock	   Exchange.	   The	   extreme	   loser	   portfolio,	   P5	   had	   the	   highest	   average	   holding	  
period	   abnormal	   return	   (AHPAR)	  of	   7.1%,	  outperforming	   the	   corresponding	  winner	  portfolio,	  



























The	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   One-­‐Way	   ANOVA	   on	   Ranks	   test	   finds	   that	   at	   least	   two	   of	   the	   quintile	  
portfolios	  have	  median	  AHPARs	  that	  are	  statistically	  different.	  It	  finds	  this	  to	  be	  case	  when	  the	  
test	  is	  corrected	  for	  ties	  and	  otherwise.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  3	  below,	  the	  probability	  levels	  
of	   the	   Chi-­‐Square	   (H)	   values	   were	   lower	   than	   the	   alpha	   level	   of	   0.05,	   pointing	   to	   statistical	  
significance.	   Thus,	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   that	   there	   are	   no	   statistically	   significant	   return	  
differences	  between	  the	  NSE	  loser-­‐winner	  portfolios	  is	  rejected.	  	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  One-­‐Way	  ANOVA	  on	  Ranks	  Test	  Results	  for	  NSE	  AHPARs	  







Not	  Corrected	  for	  
Ties	   4	   13.32	   0.01	   Reject	  H0	  
Corrected	  for	  Ties	   4	   13.32	   0.01	   Reject	  H0	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  Number	  Sets	  of	  Ties	  =	  180,	  Multiplicity	  Factor	  =	  1,080	  
	  
To	  determine	  which	  of	  the	  NSE	  quintile	  portfolios	  are	  statistically	  different	  from	  each	  other,	  the	  
similarly	   nonparametric	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   Multiple	   Comparison	   Z-­‐Value	   test	   (Dunn’s	   test)	   was	  
employed.	   As	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   Table	   4	   below,	   the	   z-­‐value	   of	   2.02	   when	   the	   AHPARs	   of	   the	  
extreme	   loser	   (P5)	   and	  winner	   portfolios	   (P1)	   are	   compared	   is	   greater	   than	   the	   threshold	   z-­‐
value	   of	   1.96	   for	   statistical	   significance	   at	   a	   95%	   confidence	   level.	   This	   confirms	   the	   positive	  
difference	   (3.4%)	   in	   the	   residual	   returns	   of	   the	   loser-­‐winner	   arbitrage	   (P5-­‐P1)	   portfolios	   as	  
statistically	  significant	  and	  evidence	  of	  overreaction	  on	  the	  NSE.	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Table	   4:	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   Multiple-­‐Comparison	   Test	   (Dunn’s	   Test)	   Z-­‐Values	   for	   NSE	   portfolios’	  
average	  holding	  period	  abnormal	  returns	  (AHPARs)	  
AHPAR	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
1	   0.00	   1.48	   0.63	   0.13	   2.02*	  
2	   1.48	   0.00	   0.86	   1.61	   3.50**	  
3	   0.63	   0.86	   0.00	   0.75	   2.64**	  
4	   0.13	   1.61	   0.75	   0.00	   1.89	  
5	   2.02*	   3.50**	   2.64**	   1.89	   0.00	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  *Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  1.96	  at	  95%	  confidence	  level;	  	  
**Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  2.58	  at	  99%	  confidence	  level	  
	  
Additionally,	   the	   study	   investigates	   whether	   investor	   sentiment	   is	   differential	   between	   the	  
quintile	  portfolios;	  especially	  the	  extreme	  loser	  and	  winner	  portfolios,	  P5	  and	  P1.	  This	  is	  found	  
to	  be	  the	  case.	  The	  positive	  difference	  between	  the	  AHPSTs	  for	  P5	  and	  P1	  (0.013%)	  is	  found	  to	  
be	   statistically	   significant,	   based	   on	   the	   study’s	   findings.	   This	   supports	   the	   observed	  
overreaction	  effect	  found	  with	  respect	  to	  return	  residuals	  (AHPARs).	  
	  
	  
Figure	  6:	  Means	  Plot	  of	  Average	  Holding	  Period	  Share	  Turnover	  Ratios	  (AHPSTs)	  for	  NSE	  Portfolios	  	  
	  
As	   can	  be	   seen	   in	   Table	   5,	   the	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  H-­‐statistic	   has	   a	   value	  of	   63.95	   and	  probability	  






















two	   of	   the	   quintile	   portfolios	   have	   median	   AHPSTs	   that	   are	   different	   and	   rejects	   the	   null	  
hypothesis	  that	  all	  the	  NSE	  quintile	  portfolios	  have	  equal	  median	  AHPSTs.	  
	  
Table	  5:	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  One-­‐Way	  ANOVA	  on	  Ranks	  Test	  Results	  for	  NSE	  Portfolios’	  AHPSTs	  







Not	  Corrected	  for	  Ties	   4	   63.95	   0.00	   Reject	  H0	  
Corrected	  for	  Ties	   4	   63.95	   0.00	   Reject	  H0	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  Number	  Sets	  of	  Ties	  =	  240,	  Multiplicity	  Factor	  =	  1,440	  
	  
With	   a	   Dunn’s	   test	   Z-­‐value	   of	   7.95,	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   investor	   sentiment	  measure	  
(AHPST)	  of	  the	  extreme	  loser	  and	  winner	  NSE	  portfolios	  (P5-­‐P1)	  is	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  
95%	  and	  99%	  confidence	  levels	  (see	  Table	  6).	  	  
	  
Table	  6:	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  Multiple-­‐Comparison	  Test	  (Dunn’s	  Test)	  Z-­‐Values	  for	  NSE	  Portfolios’	  AHPSTs	  
AHPST	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
1	   0.00	   3.83**	   4.56**	   4.44**	   7.95**	  
2	   3.83**	   0.00	   0.73	   0.61	   4.11**	  
3	   4.56**	   0.73	   0.00	   0.12	   3.39**	  
4	   4.44**	   0.61	   0.12	   0.00	   3.51**	  
5	   7.95**	   4.11**	   3.39**	   3.51**	   0.00	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  *Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  1.96	  at	  95%	  confidence	  level;	  	  
**Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  2.58	  at	  99%	  confidence	  level	  
	  
The	  observed	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  the	  NSE	  is	  accompanied	  by	  seasonality.	  When	  the	  monthly	  
portfolio	  abnormal	  returns	  (ARs)	  are	  analysed,	  at	  least	  two	  calendar	  months	  are	  found	  to	  have	  
median	  ARs	  that	  are	  statistically	  different.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  Table	  7	  below,	  the	  H	  statistic	  
has	  a	  value	  of	  241.02	  with	  a	  probability	  level	  of	  zero.	  As	  the	  probability	  level	  of	  the	  statistic	  is	  
lower	  than	  the	  alpha	  level	  of	  0.05,	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  all	  the	  portfolios’	  median	  monthly	  





Figure	  7:	  Means	  Plot	  of	  monthly	  abnormal	  returns	  (ARs)	  for	  NSE	  Portfolios	  
	  
	  
Table	  7:	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  One-­‐Way	  ANOVA	  on	  Ranks	  Test	  Results	  for	  NSE	  Portfolios’	  Monthly	  Abnormal	  
Returns	  (ARs)	  
Method	   DF	   Chi-­‐Square	  (H)	   Prob	  Level	   Decision	  (0.05)	  
Not	  Corrected	  for	  Ties	   11	   241.02	   0	   Reject	  H0	  
Corrected	  for	  Ties	   11	   241.02	   0	   Reject	  H0	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  Number	  Sets	  of	  Ties	  =	  180,	  Multiplicity	  Factor	  =	  1,080	  
	  
	  
Judging	  from	  Figure	  7,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  distinctive	  increase	  in	  the	  return	  performance	  of	  
the	  study’s	  quintile	  portfolios	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  year.	  Monthly	  ARs	  for	  NSE	   loser-­‐winner	  
portfolios	   rise	   significantly	   in	   January	   (5.6%)	   relative	   to	   December	   (0.2%).	   The	   differences	  
between	   the	   months	   are	   also	   statistically	   significant.	   Although	   NSE	   monthly	   ARs	   rise	   even	  
higher	  in	  February	  to	  20.6%	  (the	  highest	  point	  of	  all	  the	  calendar	  months),	  the	  Dunn’s	  test	  does	  
not	  find	  the	  returns	  of	  the	  months	  of	  January	  and	  February	  to	  be	  any	  different	  from	  each	  other	  
(see	  Table	  8).	  This	  study	  thus	  finds	  a	  January	  effect	  associated	  with	  the	  observed	  overreaction	  
effect	  on	  the	  NSE.	  	  
	  


















































































Table	   8:	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   Multiple-­‐Comparison	   Test	   (Dunn’s	   Test)	   Z-­‐Values	   for	   NSE	   Portfolios’	   Monthly	  
Abnormal	  Returns	  (ARs)	  
AHPAR	   Jan	   Feb	   Mar	   Apr	   May	   Jun	   Jul	   Aug	   Sep	   Oct	   Nov	   Dec	  
Jan	   0.00	   0.99	   2.43*	   7.44**	   10.10**	   4.65**	   8.51**	   2.70**	   1.38	   3.55**	   2.28*	   7.54**	  
Feb	   0.99	   0.00	   1.44	   6.45**	   9.11**	   3.67**	   7.52**	   1.72	   0.39	   2.56*	   1.30	   6.55**	  
Mar	   2.43*	   1.44	   0.00	   5.01**	   7.67**	   2.23*	   6.08**	   0.28	   1.05	   1.12	   0.14	   5.11**	  
Apr	   7.44**	   6.45**	   5.01**	   0.00	   2.66**	   2.78**	   1.07	   4.73**	   6.06**	   3.89**	   5.15**	   0.10	  
May	   10.10**	   9.11**	   7.67**	   2.66**	   0.00	   5.45**	   1.59	   7.40**	   8.72**	   6.55**	   7.82**	   2.56*	  
Jun	   4.65**	   3.67**	   2.23*	   2.78**	   5.45**	   0.00	   3.85**	   1.95	   3.28**	   1.11	   2.37*	   2.89**	  
Jul	   8.51**	   7.52**	   6.08**	   1.07	   1.59	   3.85**	   0.00	   5.80**	   7.13**	   4.96**	   6.22**	   0.97	  
Aug	   2.70**	   1.72	   0.28	   4.73**	   7.40**	   1.95	   5.80**	   0.00	   1.33	   0.85	   0.42	   4.84**	  
Sep	   1.38	   0.39	   1.05	   6.06**	   8.72**	   3.28**	   7.13**	   1.33	   0.00	   2.17*	   0.91	   6.16**	  
Oct	   3.55**	   2.56*	   1.12	   3.89**	   6.55**	   1.11	   4.96**	   0.85	   2.17*	   0.00	   1.27	   3.99**	  
Nov	   2.28*	   1.30	   0.14	   5.15**	   7.82**	   2.37*	   6.22**	   0.42	   0.91	   1.27	   0.00	   5.26**	  
Dec	   7.54**	   6.55**	   5.11**	   0.10	   2.56*	   2.89**	   0.97	   4.84**	   6.16**	   3.99**	   5.26**	   0.00	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  *Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  1.96	  at	  95%	  confidence	  level;	  	  
**Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  2.58	  at	  99%	  confidence	  level	  
	  
Apart	   from	   January,	   the	   months	   of	   April,	   May,	   and	   June	   are	   also	   found	   to	   be	   distinctive.	  
Negative	   returns	   on	   average	   are	   observed	   in	   the	   Easter	  month	   of	   April	   (AR	   of	   -­‐0.61%).	   Two	  
months	   thereafter	   (May	   and	   June),	   an	   upward	   trend	   is	   observed	   as	   the	   portfolios	   return	   to	  
profitability	  with	  AR	  of	  13.8%	  in	  June.	  This	   is	   interpreted	  as	  a	  June	  Effect.	  A	  similar	  pattern	   is	  
seen	  in	  December.	  Monthly	  AR	  that	  declines	  in	  December	  to	  0.23%	  (from	  5.2%	  in	  the	  preceding	  
month)	   recovers	   in	   January	   (5.6%)	   before	   peaking	   in	   February.	   Thus,	   there	   are	   statistically	  
significant	   positive	   return	   behaviours	   in	   the	   months	   of	   January	   and	   June	   on	   the	   NSE.	   The	  
observed	  calendar	  effects	  are	  observed	  to	  be	  return	  recoveries	  over	  the	  course	  of	  one	  to	  two	  
months	  after	  declines	  around	  epochs	  with	  public	  holidays.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  January	  effect,	  the	  
preceding	   epoch	   is	   Christmas	   (December	   25).	   The	   June	   effect	   comes	   two	   months	   after	   the	  
Easter	  celebrations	  (April	  5).	  
	  
To	   further	   investigate	   this	   phenomenon,	   the	   study	   looks	   at	   investor	   sentiment	   around	   these	  
periods.	  For	  whether	  investor	  sentiment	  (ST)	  is	  differential	  across	  months	  on	  the	  NSE,	  the	  chi-­‐
square	  (H)	  has	  a	  value	  of	  20.98	  and	  probability	  level	  of	  0.03;	  thus	  enabling	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  
of	   equal	   medians	   to	   be	   rejected	   at	   the	   95%	   confidence	   level.	   Investor	   sentiments	   between	  
80	  
	  
January	   and	   December	   are	   distinctively	   different.	   The	   quintile	   NSE	   portfolios’	   return	  
underperformance	  in	  December	  and	  stellar	  return	  performance	  in	  January	  is	  vindicated	  by	  the	  
statistically	  significant	  differences	  in	  investor	  sentiments	  (STs)	  for	  the	  same	  months.	  	  When	  the	  
NSE	   monthly	   share	   turnover	   ratios	   (STs)	   and	   abnormal	   returns	   (ARs)	   between	   January	   and	  
February	  are	  contrasted,	  some	  congruity	  is	  observed.	  The	  observed	  increase	  in	  NSE	  portfolios’	  
AR	   in	  February	   to	  20.6%	  from	  5.5%	   in	   January	  –	  albeit	  not	  statistically	  different	  –	  happens	   in	  
tandem	  with	  a	  similar	  but	  statistically	  significant	   increase	   in	  monthly	  ST	  to	  0.06%	   in	  February	  
from	  0.04%	  in	  the	  preceding	  month	  of	  January.	  
	  
While	   both	  AR	   and	   ST	   trends	   are	   congruous	   for	   the	   subsequent	  months	   of	  March,	   April	   and	  
May,	   the	   significant	   increase	   in	   excess	   return	   performance	   in	   June	   (“June	   effect”)	   is	   not	  
reflected	   by	   the	   investment	   sentiment	   measure	   as	   the	   monthly	   ST	   effectively	   continued	   to	  
decline	   till	   July	  before	  picking	  up	   in	  August.	   Incidentally,	  NSE	  monthly	  AR	   trended	   in	   tandem	  
with	  ST	  subsequently,	  between	  August	  and	  November.	  Thus,	  except	  for	  the	  months	  of	  June	  and	  
December,	  return	  was	  largely	  congruous	  with	  investor	  sentiment	  on	  the	  NSE.	  
	  





















































































Table	   9:	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   One-­‐Way	   ANOVA	   on	   Ranks	   Test	   Results	   for	   NSE	   Portfolios’	   Monthly	   Share	  
Turnover	  Ratios	  (STs)	  




Level	   Decision(0.05)	  
Not	  Corrected	  for	  Ties	   11	   20.98	   0.03	   Reject	  H0	  
Corrected	  for	  Ties	   11	   20.98	   0.03	   Reject	  H0	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  Number	  Sets	  of	  Ties	  =	  240,	  Multiplicity	  Factor	  =	  1,440	  
	  
Table	   10:	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  Multiple-­‐Comparison	   Test	   (Dunn’s	   Test)	   Z-­‐Values	   for	   NSE	   Portfolios’	  Monthly	  
Share	  Turnover	  Ratios	  (STs)	  
AHPST	   Jan	   Feb	   Mar	   Apr	   May	   Jun	   Jul	   Aug	   Sep	   Oct	   Nov	   Dec	  
Jan	   0.00	   3.15**	   2.05*	   2.99**	   2.27*	   3.03**	   2.32*	   2.21*	   3.90**	   2.92**	   3.41**	   2.67**	  
Feb	   3.15**	   0.00	   1.10	   0.16	   0.88	   0.12	   0.83	   0.93	   0.75	   0.23	   0.27	   0.47	  
Mar	   2.05*	   1.10	   0.00	   0.94	   0.22	   0.98	   0.28	   0.17	   1.85	   0.87	   1.37	   0.63	  
Apr	   2.99**	   0.16	   0.94	   0.00	   0.72	   0.04	   0.67	   0.77	   0.91	   0.07	   0.43	   0.31	  
May	   2.27**	   0.88	   0.22	   0.72	   0.00	   0.76	   0.05	   0.05	   1.63	   0.65	   1.15	   0.41	  
Jun	   3.03**	   0.12	   0.98	   0.04	   0.76	   0.00	   0.71	   0.81	   0.87	   0.11	   0.39	   0.35	  
Jul	   2.32**	   0.83	   0.28	   0.67	   0.05	   0.71	   0.00	   0.11	   1.58	   0.60	   1.10	   0.35	  
Aug	   2.21**	   0.93	   0.17	   0.77	   0.05	   0.81	   0.11	   0.00	   1.69	   0.71	   1.20	   0.46	  
Sep	   3.90**	   0.75	   1.85	   0.91	   1.63	   0.87	   1.58	   1.69	   0.00	   0.98	   0.49	   1.23	  
Oct	   2.92**	   0.23	   0.87	   0.07	   0.65	   0.11	   0.60	   0.71	   0.98	   0.00	   0.49	   0.25	  
Nov	   3.41**	   0.27	   1.37	   0.43	   1.15	   0.39	   1.10	   1.20	   0.49	   0.49	   0.00	   0.74	  
Dec	   2.67**	   0.47	   0.63	   0.31	   0.41	   0.35	   0.35	   0.46	   1.23	   0.25	   0.74	   0.00	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  *Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  1.96	  at	  95%	  confidence	  level;	  	  
**Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  2.58	  at	  99%	  confidence	  level	  
	  
An	   increase	   in	   the	   investor	   sentiment	  measure	   (ST)	   in	   December	   –	   highest	   for	   the	   year	   –	   in	  
tandem	  with	   a	   decline	   in	   the	   residual	   return	   (AR)	   of	   the	   NSE	   portfolios	   in	   the	   same	  month	  
suggest	   STs	   should	  be	   interpreted	   in	   absolute	   terms.	   Thus,	   an	   increase	   in	   investor	   sentiment	  
could	  mean	   intense	   sell-­‐off	  of	   losers	  by	   investors	   to	  meet	  varied	  year-­‐end	  needs	   (as	  was	   the	  
case	  in	  December)	  or	  preponderant	  buying	  of	  losers	  due	  to	  optimism	  associated	  with	  the	  turn	  
of	  the	  year	  (as	  was	  the	  case	   in	  the	  month	  of	  January).	  As	  the	  observed	  June	  effect	  (based	  on	  
AR)	   is	   not	   reflected	   in	   the	   investor	   sentiment	   measure,	   this	   interpretation	   is	   potentially	  
constrained.	  The	  alternative	  view	  could	  be	  that	  one	  such	  calendar	  effect	  not	  corroborated	  by	  
investor	  sentiment	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  fleeting.	  If	  this	  later	  view	  is	  taken,	  the	  January	  effect	  




4.3	   Findings	  of	  tests	  for	  investor	  overreaction	  and	  seasonality	  on	  the	  JSE	  	  
Evidence	  of	  overreaction	  was	  not	  found	  on	  the	  JSE.	  There	  were	  no	  statistically	  significant	  return	  
differences	   between	   the	   study’s	   JSE	   loser	   and	  winner	   portfolios.	   As	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   Table	   11	  
below,	   the	  probability	   levels	   of	   the	  Chi-­‐Square	   (H)	   values	   are	   greater	   than	   the	   alpha	   level	   of	  
0.05.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   for	   both	  when	   the	   test	   is	   corrected	   and	   uncorrected	   for	   ties.	   Average	  
holding	  period	  abnormal	  return	  (AHPAR)	  for	  the	  extreme	  loser	  portfolio,	  P5,	  came	  out	  at	  1.92%	  
and	   is	  not	   found	  to	  be	  statistically	  different	   from	  those	  of	   the	  corresponding	  extreme	  winner	  
portfolio,	   P1	   with	   AHPAR	   of	   1.36%.	   Specifically,	   when	   both	   the	   extreme	   loser	   and	   winner	  
portfolios	   (P5	   and	  P1	   respectively)	   are	   compared	  using	   the	  Dunn’s	  multiple	   comparison	   test,	  
the	   z-­‐value	   (1.07)	   is	   below	   the	   1.96	   threshold	   z-­‐value	   for	   statistical	   significance	   at	   the	   95%	  
confidence	  level.	  Thus,	  the	  study	  finds	  there	  is	  no	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  the	  JSE.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  9:	  Means	  Plot	  of	  Average	  Holding	  Period	  Abnormal	  Returns	  (AHPARs)	  for	  JSE	  portfolios	  
	  




































Table	   11:	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   One-­‐Way	   ANOVA	   on	   Ranks	   Test	   Results	   for	   JSE	   Portfolios’	   Average	  
Holding	  Period	  Abnormal	  Returns	  (AHPARs)	  
Method	   DF	   Chi-­‐Square	  (H)	   Prob	  Level	   Decision	  (0.05)	  
Not	  Corrected	  for	  Ties	   4	   3.61	   0.46	   Accept	  H0	  
Corrected	  for	  Ties	   4	   3.61	   0.46	   Accept	  H0	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  Number	  Sets	  of	  Ties	  =	  0,	  Multiplicity	  Factor	  =	  0	  
	  
Table	   12:	   Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   Multiple	   Comparison	   Test	   (Dunn’s	   Test)	   Z-­‐Values	   for	   JSE	   Portfolios’	  
Average	  Holding	  Period	  Abnormal	  Returns	  (AHPARs)	  
AHPAR	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
1	   0.00	   1.05	   1.61	   1.67	   1.07	  
2	   1.05	   0.00	   0.56	   0.63	   0.02	  
3	   1.61	   0.56	   0.00	   0.06	   0.54	  
4	   1.67	   0.63	   0.06	   0.00	   0.61	  
5	   1.07	   0.02	   0.54	   0.61	   0.00	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  *Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  1.96	  at	  95%	  confidence	  level;	  	  
**Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  2.58	  at	  99%	  confidence	  level	  
	  
In	  regard	  of	  investor	  sentiment	  (measured	  by	  AHPST)	  associated	  with	  securities	  that	  constitute	  
the	   JSE	  quintile	  portfolios,	   the	  Kruskal	  Wallis	  One-­‐Way	  ANOVA	  on	  Ranks	   test	   rejects	   the	  null	  
hypothesis	   that	   the	  portfolios’	  AHPSTs	  have	  equal	  medians.	  However,	   apart	   from	   the	   second	  
winner	   portfolio	   (P2),	   AHPST	   was	   largely	   the	   same	   for	   all	   the	   other	   four	   portfolios	   at	   circa	  
0.15%.	  Thus,	  although	  the	  Dunn’s	  test	  finds	  that	  investor	  sentiment	  associated	  with	  most	  of	  the	  
quintile	  portfolios	  are	  different	  from	  one	  another,	  there	  is	  not	  much	  difference	  between	  them	  
in	   absolute	   terms.	   This	   supports	   the	  evidence	  of	  no	  overreaction	  effect	  on	   the	   JSE	  discussed	  
earlier.	  Additionally,	  it	  suggests	  that	  when	  there	  is	  an	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  a	  bourse,	  there	  is	  
likely	   to	   be	   a	   similar	   trend	   (albeit	   in	   absolute	   terms)	   observed	   with	   respect	   to	   investor	  
sentiment.	  This	  was	  observed	  to	  be	  case	   in	   regard	  of	   the	  NSE.	  As	   the	  overreaction	  effect	  has	  
been	   evidenced	   in	   past	   JSE	   studies,	   the	   relatively	   small	   portfolio	  AHPST	   differentials	   (though	  
statistically	  significant)	  corroborate	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  overreaction	  effect	  in	  this	  study.	  The	  results	  




Figure	  10:	  Means	  Plot	  of	  Average	  Holding	  Period	  Share	  Turnover	  Ratios	  (AHPSTs)	  for	  JSE	  Portfolios	  
	  
Table	  13:	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  One-­‐Way	  ANOVA	  on	  Ranks	  Test	  Results	  for	  JSE	  Portfolios’	  AHPSTs	  
Method	   DF	   Chi-­‐Square	  (H)	   Prob	  Level	   Decision	  (0.05)	  
Not	  Corrected	  for	  Ties	   4	   209.14	   0	   Reject	  H0	  
Corrected	  for	  Ties	   4	   209.14	   0	   Reject	  H0	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  Number	  Sets	  of	  Ties	  =	  0,	  Multiplicity	  Factor	  =	  0	  
Table	  14:	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  Multiple-­‐Comparison	  Test	  (Dunn’s	  Test)	  Z-­‐Values	  for	  JSE	  Portfolios’	  AHPSTs	  
AHPST	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
1	   0.00	   10.10**	   13.22**	   10.32**	   6.10**	  
2	   10.10**	   0.00	   3.12**	   0.22	   4.00**	  
3	   13.22**	   3.12**	   0.00	   2.90**	   7.12**	  
4	   10.32**	   0.22	   2.90**	   0.00	   4.22**	  
5	   6.10**	   4.00**	   7.12**	   4.22**	   0.00	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  *Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  1.96	  at	  95%	  confidence	  level;	  	  
**Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  2.58	  at	  99%	  confidence	  level	  
	  
However,	  some	  seasonality	  was	  still	  observed	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  
the	  JSE.	  As	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  table	  below,	  the	  Chi-­‐Square	  (H)	  value	  for	  both	  when	  the	  test	  is	  
corrected	   for	   ties	   and	   otherwise	   is	   90.80	  with	   a	   probability	   level	   of	   zero,	   less	   than	   the	   0.05	  
threshold	   probability	   level	   and	   thus	   allowing	   the	   rejection	   of	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   that	   all	   the	  
median	  monthly	  residual	  returns	  are	  equal.	  January	  abnormal	  returns	  (ARs)	  are	  only	  statistically	  











































the	   absence	   of	   an	   overreaction	   effect.	   This	   suggests	   the	   calendar	   anomaly	   is	   weak	   in	   the	  
absence	   of	   an	   overreaction	   effect	   on	   the	   South	   African	   bourse.	   Alternatively,	   it	   means	   the	  
January	  effect	  –	  irrespective	  of	  its	  association	  with	  other	  anomalies	  –	  has	  become	  weak	  on	  the	  
JSE	  due	  to	  arbitrage.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  11:	  Means	  Plot	  of	  monthly	  abnormal	  returns	  (ARs)	  for	  JSE	  Portfolios	  
	  
Table	  15:	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  One-­‐Way	  ANOVA	  on	  Ranks	  Test	  Results	  for	  JSE	  Portfolios’	  Monthly	  ARs	  
Method	   DF	   Chi-­‐Square	  Prob	  (H)	   Prob	  Level	   Decision(0.05)	  
Not	  Corrected	  for	  Ties	   11	   90.80	   0.00	   Reject	  H0	  
Corrected	  for	  Ties	   11	   90.80	   0.00	   Reject	  H0	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  Number	  Sets	  of	  Ties	  =	  0,	  Multiplicity	  Factor	  =	  0	  
The	  decline	   in	  AR	   in	  March	   (-­‐0.6%)	  –	   the	   lowest	  of	  all	   the	  calendar	  months	  –	   is	  quite	   strong,	  
however,	   as	   it	   is	   found	   to	   be	   statistically	   different	   from	   nine	   other	  months.	   This	   suggests	   a	  
negative	  March	  effect	  on	  the	  JSE.	  Similarly,	  the	  Dunn’s	  multiple	  comparison	  test	  shows	  October	  
returns	  (AR	  of	  2.7%)	  for	  JSE	  quintile	  portfolios	  are	  statistically	  higher	  than	  at	   least	  eight	  other	  
months	  of	  the	  year,	  pointing	  to	  an	  October	  effect.	  



















































































Table	  16:	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  Multiple-­‐Comparison	  Test	  (Dunn’s	  Test)	  Z-­‐Values	  for	  JSE	  Portfolios’	  Monthly	  ARs	  
AHPAR	   Jan	   Feb	   Mar	   Apr	   May	   Jun	   Jul	   Aug	   Sep	   Oct	   Nov	   Dec	  
Jan	   0.00	   0.62	   5.33**	   0.72	   0.64	   0.25	   2.90**	   2.09*	   1.14	   4.74**	   3.90**	   2.48*	  
Feb	   0.62	   0.00	   4.71**	   0.11	   0.03	   0.37	   2.29*	   1.47	   1.76	   4.13**	   3.28**	   1.86	  
Mar	   5.33**	   4.71**	   0.00	   4.60**	   4.68**	   5.08**	   2.42*	   3.24**	   6.47**	   0.58	   1.43	   2.85**	  
Apr	   0.72	   0.11	   4.60**	   0.00	   0.08	   0.47	   2.18*	   1.37	   1.86	   4.02**	   3.18**	   1.76	  
May	   0.64	   0.03	   4.68**	   0.08	   0.00	   0.39	   2.26*	   1.45	   1.78	   4.10**	   3.26**	   1.84	  
Jun	   0.25	   0.37	   5.08**	   0.47	   0.39	   0.00	   2.66**	   1.84	   1.39	   4.50**	   3.65**	   2.23*	  
Jul	   2.90**	   2.29*	   2.42*	   2.18*	   2.26*	   2.66**	   0.00	   0.81	   4.05**	   1.84	   1.00	   0.42	  
Aug	   2.09*	   1.47	   3.24**	   1.37	   1.45	   1.84	   0.81	   0.00	   3.23**	   2.65**	   1.81	   0.39	  
Sep	   1.14	   1.76	   6.47**	   1.86	   1.78	   1.39	   4.05**	   3.23**	   0.00	   5.89**	   5.04**	   3.62**	  
Oct	   4.74**	   4.13**	   0.58	   4.02**	   4.10**	   4.50**	   1.84	   2.65**	   5.89**	   0.00	   0.85	   2.26*	  
Nov	   3.90**	   3.28**	   1.43	   3.18**	   3.26**	   3.65**	   1.00	   1.81	   5.04**	   0.85	   0.00	   1.42	  
Dec	   2.48*	   1.86	   2.85**	   1.76	   1.84	   2.23*	   0.42	   0.39	   3.62**	   2.26*	   1.42	   0.00	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  *Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  1.96	  at	  95%	  confidence	  level;	  	  
**Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  2.58	  at	  99%	  confidence	  level	  
	  
Judging	   from	   figure	  12,	   it	   could	  be	  discerned	   that	   investor	   sentiment	  was	  particularly	  high	   in	  
June	  on	  the	  JSE	  with	  ST	  of	  0.41%.	  However,	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  presaged	  (or	  
was	  in	  tandem)	  with	  heightened	  return	  activity,	  as	  the	  corresponding	  monthly	  AR	  (0.98%)	  was	  
relatively	   lacklustre	   and	   not	   significantly	   different	   from	   the	   preceding	  month’s	   AR	   of	   0.82%.	  
There	   is	   the	   possibility	   though	   that	   heightened	   investor	   sentiment	   is	   a	   leading	   indicator	   of	  
return	   activity.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   relatively	   heightened	   JSE	   investor	   sentiment	   in	   June	  
presaged	  a	  significant	  portfolio	  return	  decline	  in	  the	  subsequent	  month	  of	  July	  to	  -­‐0.08%	  from	  
0.98%	  in	  the	  preceding	  month.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  isolated	  case,	  however,	  as	  a	  similar	  ST	  trend	  
is	  not	  observed	  prior	  to	  the	  sharp	  return	  contraction	  in	  November	  to	  -­‐0.05%	  from	  an	  October	  




Figure	  12:	  Means	  Plot	  of	  monthly	  share	  turnover	  ratios	  (STs)	  for	  JSE	  Portfolios	  
	  
	  
Table	  17:	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  One-­‐Way	  ANOVA	  on	  Ranks	  Test	  Results	  for	  JSE	  Portfolios’	  Monthly	  STs	  




Level	   Decision(0.05)	  
Not	  Corrected	  for	  Ties	   11	   91.28	   0	   Reject	  H0	  
Corrected	  for	  Ties	   11	   91.28	   0	   Reject	  H0	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  Number	  Sets	  of	  Ties	  =	  0,	  Multiplicity	  Factor	  =	  0	  
Table	  18:	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis	  Multiple-­‐Comparison	  Test	  (Dunn’s	  Test)	  Z-­‐Values	  for	  JSE	  Portfolios’	  Monthly	  STs	  
AHPAR	   Jan	   Feb	   Mar	   Apr	   May	   Jun	   Jul	   Aug	   Sep	   Oct	   Nov	   Dec	  
Jan	   0.00	   4.76**	   5.24**	   4.27**	   4.91**	   3.60**	   1.65	   2.34*	   5.96**	   3.36**	   4.06**	   0.44	  
Feb	   4.76**	   0.00	   0.48	   0.50	   0.15	   1.16	   3.11**	   2.42*	   1.20	   1.40	   0.71	   5.20**	  
Mar	   5.24**	   0.48	   0.00	   0.64	   0.33	   1.64	   3.59**	   2.90**	   0.72	   1.88	   1.18	   5.68**	  
Apr	   4.27**	   0.50	   0.64	   0.00	   0.64	   0.67	   2.61*	   1.92	   1.70	   0.91	   0.21	   4.70**	  
May	   4.91**	   0.15	   0.33	   0.64	   0.00	   1.31	   3.26**	   2.57*	   1.05	   1.55	   0.85	   5.35**	  
Jun	   3.60**	   1.16	   1.64	   0.67	   1.31	   0.00	   1.94	   1.26	   2.36*	   0.24	   0.46	   4.03**	  
Jul	   1.65	   3.11**	   3.59**	   2.61*	   3.26**	   1.94	   0.00	   0.69	   4.31**	   1.70	   2.40*	   2.09*	  
Aug	   2.34*	   2.42*	   2.90**	   1.92	   2.57*	   1.26	   0.69	   0.00	   3.62**	   1.02	   1.71	   2.78**	  
Sep	   5.96**	   1.20	   0.72	   1.70	   1.05	   2.36*	   4.31**	   3.62**	   0.00	   2.60**	   1.91	   6.40**	  
Oct	   3.36**	   1.40	   1.88	   0.91	   1.55	   0.24	   1.70	   1.02	   2.60**	   0.00	   0.70	   3.80**	  
Nov	   4.06**	   0.71	   1.18	   0.21	   0.85	   0.46	   2.40*	   1.71	   1.91	   0.70	   0.00	   4.49**	  
Dec	   0.44	   5.20**	   5.68**	   4.70**	   5.35**	   4.03**	   2.09*	   2.78**	   6.40**	   3.80**	   4.49**	   0.00	  
Source:	  NCSS;	  *Statistically	  significant	  if	  z-­‐value	  >	  1.96	  at	  95%	  confidence	  level;	  	  

















































































5.	   SUMMARY	  AND	  CONCLUSION	  
5.1	   Overview	  
The	  study	  finds	  evidence	  of	  overreaction	  and	  seasonality	  on	  the	  Nigerian	  Stock	  Exchange	  (NSE).	  
These	  findings	  are	  in	  contrast	  to	  past	  studies	  of	  weak-­‐form	  efficiency	  on	  the	  NSE	  (e.g.,	  Olowe,	  
1999;	  Tijjani	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Okpara,	  2010;	  et	  cetera).	  The	  observed	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  the	  NSE	  
was	  accompanied	  by	  a	   January	  effect.	  Monthly	   seasonality	  was	  also	   found	  on	   the	  NSE	   in	   the	  
calendar	  month	  of	  June	  –	  a	  “June	  Effect”;	  confirming	  earlier	  findings	  by	  Claessens	  et	  al.	  (1995)	  
and	  Alagidede	   (2008).	   In	   regard	  of	   the	   supposed	   congruity	  of	   return	  and	   investor	   sentiment,	  
only	   the	   NSE	   shows	   evidence	   of	   this.	   For	   the	   JSE,	   the	   study	   does	   not	   find	   evidence	   of	  
overreaction.	  	  
	  
Although,	   a	  mild	   January	   effect	   is	   evidenced,	   it	   is	   only	  marginally	   significant	   statistically.	   An	  
“October	  effect”	  was	  found	  on	  the	  JSE,	  however.	  Prior	  studies	  (e.g.,	  Robins	  et	  al.,	  1999)	  found	  a	  
January	  effect	  and	  not	  an	  October	  effect	  on	  the	  JSE.	  The	  study’s	  findings	  imply	  the	  overreaction	  
effect	  may	  have	  been	  arbitraged	  away	  over	  time	  as	  is	  the	  case	  for	  the	  JSE	  where	  overreaction	  
was	  evidenced	  in	  the	  past	  (e.g.,	  Page	  and	  Way,	  1992;	  Robins	  et	  al.,	  1999;	  Cubbin	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  
Thus,	  once	  market	  players	  become	  aware	  of	  an	  anomaly,	  it	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  become	  a	  source	  of	  
consistent	  profit	  over	  time	  (Schwert,	  2002).	  As	  this	  is	  the	  first	  documented	  overreaction	  effect	  
on	  the	  NSE,	   it	   is	   likely	  to	  be	  arbitraged	  away	   in	  the	  Nigerian	  equity	  market	  over	  time	  as	  well.	  
This	  would	  be	  an	  area	  for	  future	  research.	  
	  
5.2	   Summary	  of	  major	  findings	  relative	  to	  tested	  hypotheses	  
Hypothesis	  1	   (Ho1):	  As	  markets	  are	  efficient,	   there	   is	  no	   investor	  overreaction	  effect	  on	   the	  
NSE.	  Thus,	  Loser	  portfolios	  do	  not	  outperform	  winner	  portfolios	  on	  the	  NSE.	  
For	   the	   NSE,	   this	   is	   a	   pioneer	   overreaction	   study	   as	   a	   survey	   of	   the	   literature	   showed	   that	  
hitherto	   there	   was	   yet	   to	   be	   an	   endeavor	   in	   this	   regard.	   Also,	   most	   of	   the	   prior	   efficiency	  
studies	   for	   the	   bourse	   (e.g.,	   Olowe,	   1999;	   Tijjani	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Okpara,	   2010)	   were	   almost	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unanimous	  in	  their	  findings	  of	  weak-­‐form	  efficiency	  for	  the	  Nigerian	  stock	  exchange.	  As	  the	  NSE	  
had	   characteristics	   similar	   to	   those	   in	   markets	   (e.g.,	   Taiwan)	   where	   overreaction	   and	   the	  
January	  effect	  had	  been	  evidenced	  (see	  Lin	  and	  Swanson,	  2010),	  questions	  were	  raised	  about	  
its	  supposed	  weak-­‐form	  efficiency.	  This	  study	  finds	  the	  NSE	  is	  not	  weak-­‐form	  efficient	  after	  all;	  
as	  an	  overreaction	  effect	  is	  found	  on	  the	  bourse.	  The	  average	  holding	  period	  abnormal	  return	  
(AHPAR)	   for	   the	   extreme	   loser	   portfolio,	   P5,	   is	   7.08%,	   and	   that	   attributable	   to	   the	   extreme	  
winner	   portfolio,	   P1,	   is	   3.66%.	   And	   the	   difference	   is	   found	   to	   be	   statistically	   significant.	   This	  
study	   thus	   rejects	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   NSE	   is	   efficient	   and	   asserts	   the	   bourse	  
overreacts.	  
	  
Hypothesis	  2	  (Ho2):	  As	  markets	  are	  efficient,	  there	  is	  no	  investor	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  the	  
JSE.	  Thus,	  loser	  portfolios	  do	  not	  outperform	  winner	  portfolios	  on	  the	  JSE.	  
The	   overreaction	   effect	   had	   hitherto	   been	   evidenced	   on	   the	   JSE	   (e.g.,	   Page	   and	  Way,	   1992;	  
Cubbin	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Hsieh	  and	  Hodnett,	  2011).	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  study	  was	  to	  investigate	  whether	  
the	  anomaly	  still	  persists	  on	  the	  bourse.	  It	  does	  not,	  based	  on	  the	  study’s	  findings.	  There	  were	  
no	  statistically	  significant	  AHPAR	  differences	  between	  the	  study’s	  JSE	  extreme	  loser	  and	  winner	  
portfolios	   (P5	   and	   P1),	   based	   on	   the	   Dunn’s	   test.	   Thus,	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   that	   there	   is	   no	  
investor	  overreaction	  effect	  on	  the	  JSE	  cannot	  be	  rejected.	  There	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  overreaction	  
effect	  on	  the	  JSE.	  
	  
Hypothesis	  3	  (Ho3):	  As	  markets	  are	  efficient,	  there	  is	  no	  January	  effect	  or	  other	  seasonality	  on	  
the	  NSE.	  Thus,	  portfolio	  returns	  for	  the	  month	  of	  January	  (or	  any	  other	  calendar	  month)	  are	  
not	  different	  from	  those	  of	  other	  calendar	  months	  on	  the	  NSE.	  
The	   study	   finds	  evidence	  of	   a	   January	  effect	  on	   the	  Nigerian	   Stock	  Exchange,	   an	  observation	  
that	  is	  consistent	  with	  similar	  associations	  of	  seasonality	  with	  the	  overreaction	  effect	  evidenced	  
in	  other	  markets.	  	  A	  “June”	  effect	  was	  also	  found,	  consistent	  with	  findings	  of	  earlier	  NSE	  studies	  
(e.g.,	   Claessens	   et	   al.,	   1995;	   Alagidede,	   2008);	   albeit	   not	   related	   to	   the	   overreaction	   effect.	  
Abnormal	   Returns	   (ARs)	   for	   the	   calendar	  months	   of	   January	   and	   June	  were	   each	   statistically	  
different	  from	  those	  of	  nine	  other	  months,	  based	  on	  the	  Dunn’s	  test.	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Hypothesis	  4	  (Ho4):	  As	  markets	  are	  efficient,	  there	  is	  no	  January	  effect	  or	  other	  seasonality	  on	  
the	  JSE.	  Thus,	  portfolio	  returns	  for	  the	  month	  of	  January	  (or	  any	  other	  calendar	  month)	  are	  
not	  different	  from	  those	  of	  other	  calendar	  months	  on	  the	  JSE.	  	  	   	  
	  
January	  returns	  were	  found	  to	  be	  statistically	  different	  from	  those	  of	  six	  other	  months	  including	  
December.	   Although	   this	   could	   be	   interpreted	   as	   a	  mild	   January	   effect,	   it	   is	   not	   considered	  
strong	  enough	  to	  warrant	  generalization.	  October	  returns	  –	  which	  were	  the	  highest	  with	  AR	  of	  
2.7%	   –	   were	   found	   to	   be	   statistically	   different	   from	   those	   of	   eight	   other	   months,	   however.	  
Thus,	   there	   is	   an	   “October	   effect”	   on	   the	   Johannesburg	   Stock	   Exchange.	   The	   weak	   (or	  
weakening)	  January	  effect	  on	  the	  JSE	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  overreaction	  effect	  gives	  credence	  to	  
studies	   that	   show	   an	   association	   between	   the	   two	   anomalies.	   This	   is	   especially	   as	   a	   strong	  
January	  effect	  happens	  in	  tandem	  with	  the	  overreaction	  effect	  observed	  on	  the	  Nigerian	  bourse	  
in	  this	  study.	  	  	  	  
	  
Hypothesis	   5	   (Ho5):	   As	   markets	   are	   efficient	   and	   investor	   sentiment	   behaves	   similarly	   as	  
return,	  investor	  sentiment	  is	  the	  same	  irrespective	  of	  portfolio	  or	  calendar	  month.	  	  
This	  study	  finds	  investor	  sentiment	  varies	  per	  month	  and	  portfolio	  on	  both	  the	  NSE	  and	  JSE.	  On	  
the	  NSE,	  investor	  sentiment	  (ST)	  is	  differential	  only	  in	  the	  calendar	  month	  of	  January.	  Also,	  the	  
study	  finds	  January	  and	  December	  investor	  sentiments	  differ	  significantly	  on	  the	  NSE.	  In	  regard	  
of	  congruity	  of	  return	  and	  investor	  sentiment,	  the	  study	  finds	  evidence	  of	  this	  on	  the	  NSE	  but	  
not	   on	   the	   JSE.	   ARs	   for	  NSE	   portfolios	  moved	   in	   sync	  with	   the	   corresponding	   STs	   for	   all	   the	  
months	  in	  the	  year	  except	  June	  and	  December.	  When	  NSE	  portfolios’	  AR	  increases	  to	  20.6%	  in	  
February	  from	  5.5%	  in	  January,	  the	  corresponding	  investor	  sentiment	  measure	  almost	  doubles	  
to	  0.06%	  from	  0.04%	  in	  the	  preceding	  month.	  A	  divergent	  pattern	  is	  observed	  for	  the	  observed	  
June	  effect	  however.	  An	  increase	  in	  NSE	  portfolios’	  monthly	  AR	  to	  13.8%	  in	  June	  from	  -­‐2.8%	  in	  
May	   happens	   in	   tandem	   with	   ST	   declining	   to	   0.033%	   from	   0.036%	   previously.	   Similarly,	  
although	  ST	  was	  highest	  in	  December	  for	  the	  NSE	  quintile	  portfolios,	  AR	  declined	  in	  December	  
to	   0.2%	   from	   5.2%	   in	   the	   preceding	   month.	   Thus,	   to	   determine	   the	   direction	   of	   investor	  




5.3	   Contribution	  
5.3.1	   Theoretical	  contribution	  
	  “Stock	   returns	  and	   trading	  volume	  are	   jointly	  determined	  by	   the	  same	  market	  dynamics	  and	  
are	   inextricably	   linked	   in	   theory”	   (Lee	   and	   Swaminathan,	   2000:2017).	   As	   the	   EMH	   asserts	   it	  
shouldn’t	   be	   possible	   to	   consistently	   earn	   positive	  ex	   post	   abnormal	   returns	   using	   portfolios	  
constituted	  based	  on	  ex	  ante	  returns,	  investor	  sentiment	  should	  similarly	  reflect	  this.	  Thus	  in	  an	  
efficient	   market,	   ex	   post	   investor	   sentiment	   around	   the	   securities	   that	   constitute	   such	  
portfolios	  should	  not	  be	  statistically	  different	  from	  their	  ex	  ante	  investor	  sentiment.	  This	  study	  
finds	   that	  when	   portfolios	   are	   constituted	   in	   such	   a	  manner	   –	   in	   this	   instance	   based	   on	   the	  
overreaction	   effect	   –	   investor	   sentiment	   does	   vary	   and	   with	   statistical	   significance	   if	   an	  
overreaction	  effect	  is	  evidenced.	  	  
	  
This	  study	  sought	  to	  increase	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  January	  effect	  
and	   mean	   reversion	   of	   loser-­‐winner	   portfolio	   returns	   and	   perhaps	   offer	   an	   alternative	  
explanation.	   It	   conjectured	   that	   investor	   sentiment	   behaved	   in	   tandem	  with	   return	   and	   that	  
optimism	   around	   the	   New	   Year	   could	   perhaps	   be	   responsible	   for	   the	   January	   effect.	   When	  
investor	  overreaction	  was	  evidenced	  (like	  on	  the	  NSE),	  AHPAR	  and	  AHPST	  did	  trend	  together,	  
particularly	   around	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   year.	   Both	   variables	   were	   statistically	   different	   for	   the	  
extreme	   loser	   and	   winner	   portfolios	   (P5	   and	   P1)	   and	   their	   January	   values	   were	   statistically	  
different	   from	   at	   least	   eight	   other	   calendar	   months.	   When	   their	   outcomes	   are	   considered	  
together,	  they	  point	  to	  a	  positive	  change	  in	  the	  mood	  of	  investors	  around	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  year.	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  arguments	  proffered	  for	  the	  January	  effect	  conjectures	  year-­‐end	  tax	  accounting	  and	  
a	  desire	  by	  investors	  to	  earn	  tax	  credits	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  anomaly.	   In	  this	  respect,	  both	  
the	  NSE	  and	  JSE	  offered	  the	  opportunity	  to	  investigate	  if	  that	  were	  the	  case	  as	  there	  wasn’t	  a	  
December	  tax	  year-­‐end	  requirement	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  Nigeria	  for	  the	  period	  of	  the	  dataset.	  	  
A	  January	  effect	  is	  found	  to	  happen	  in	  tandem	  with	  overreaction	  on	  the	  NSE.	  Similarly,	  a	  weak	  
(or	  diminishing)	  January	  effect	  is	  found	  on	  the	  JSE	  (even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  overreaction).	  Clearly	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the	  tax	  loss	  selling	  explanation	  for	  the	  January	  seasonal	  is	  not	  robust.	  Since	  if	  the	  January	  effect	  
has	  been	  observed	  in	  markets	  where	  there	  is	  a	  December	  tax	  year-­‐end	  and	  yet	  in	  this	  study	  –	  
using	  JSE	  and	  NSE	  data	  to	  control	  for	  the	  tax	  explanation	  –	  the	  January	  seasonal	  is	  found,	  the	  
argument	   could	   be	  made	   then	   that	   the	   anomaly	   is	   not	   peculiar	   to	  markets	  where	   there	   is	   a	  
December	  tax	  year-­‐end.	  As	  a	  stronger	  January	  effect	  has	  been	  observed	  on	  the	  JSE	  in	  the	  past	  
(e.g.,	   Page	   and	   Way,	   1992;	   Robins	   et	   al.,	   1999)	   –	   often	   in	   tandem	   with	   similarly	   oriented	  
anomalies	   like	   the	   overreaction	   effect,	   size	   effect,	   etc.	   –	   a	   plausible	   argument	   that	   could	   be	  
made	  is	  that	  the	  January	  effect	  has	  begun	  to	  be	  arbitraged	  away	  on	  the	  JSE.	  
	  
5.3.2	   Empirical	  contribution	  
This	  is	  the	  first	  overreaction	  study	  of	  the	  Nigerian	  Stock	  Exchange.	  Prior	  evidence	  (Olowe,	  1999;	  
Tijjani	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Okpara,	   2010;	   et	   cetera)	   suggested	   it	  was	  weak-­‐form	   efficient.	   However,	  
there	  was	   a	   dearth	   of	   studies	   that	   used	   trading-­‐rule	   based	  methodologies	   to	   investigate	   the	  
efficiency	  of	   the	  bourse.	  Other	  drawbacks	   in	   these	  prior	   studies	   included	   small	   sample	   sizes:	  
Olowe	   (1999)	   used	   fifty-­‐nine	   (59)	   randomly	   selected	   securities	   and	   Tijjani	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   used	  
sixty-­‐nine	  (69).	  This	  study	  uses	  seventy-­‐eight	  (78).	  Additionally,	  they	  didn’t	  include	  observations	  
beyond	  the	  year	  2005-­‐06,	  a	  period	  for	  which	  the	  Nigerian	  bourse	  experienced	  marked	  activity.	  
Also,	   studies	   of	   other	   price-­‐limit	   regulated	   equity	   markets	   (e.g.,	   Taiwan)	   showed	   contrarian	  
strategies	   earned	   superior	   returns,	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	   overreaction	   and	   converse	   to	   the	  
efficient	  market	  argument	  (Lin	  and	  Swanson,	  2010).	  	  
	  
The	   intuition	  of	   this	  study,	   therefore,	  was	   that	   the	  Nigerian	  equity	  market	  wasn’t	   likely	   to	  be	  
efficient	   as	   suggested	  by	   the	   existing	  Nigerian	   efficiency	   literature.	   The	   findings	  of	   this	   study	  
vindicate	   this	   intuition	   as	   Overreaction	   and	   January	   effects	   are	   evidenced	   on	   the	   NSE.	   The	  
empirical	  contribution	  emanates	  from	  the	  pioneering	  status	  of	  this	  overreaction	  study	  for	  the	  
Nigerian	  Stock	  Exchange.	  This	  is	  the	  first	  study	  that	  finds	  both	  overreaction	  and	  January	  effects	  




5.4	   Implications	  for	  Practice	  
The	  investment	  profession	  continually	  seeks	  ways	  to	  beat	  the	  market	  to	  earn	  higher	  returns	  on	  
the	  assets	   it	  manages.	  As	   the	  overreaction	  and	   the	   seasonal	   anomalies	   are	   amongst	   the	   few	  
observed	   return	   dependencies	   that	   have	   endured,	   it	   enjoys	   keen	   interest	   in	   practice.	   Also,	  
there	   is	  now	  significant	   interest	   in	  emerging	  markets	   like	  Nigeria	  and	  South	  Africa.	  However,	  
global	  portfolio	  managers	  face	  informational	  challenges	  in	  these	  markets	  as	  there	  is	  a	  dearth	  of	  
anomaly	   studies	   on	   the	   scale	   available	   in	   more	   developed	   markets.	   Thus,	   emerging-­‐market	  
focused	  fund	  managers	  should	  find	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  useful.	  
	  
Would	  investors	  be	  able	  to	  consistently	  earn	  superior	  returns	  using	  an	  investment	  strategy	  that	  
leverages	   on	   the	   overreaction	   and	   seasonal	   anomalies?	   As	   the	   findings	   show,	   the	   anomalies	  
dissipate	   over	   time	   (like	   was	   the	   case	   on	   the	   JSE).	   It	   remains	   to	   be	   seen	   how	   long	   both	  
anomalies	  would	  endure	  on	  the	  NSE.	  That	  said,	  the	  study	  finds	  –	  up	  until	  2011	  –	  alpha	  returns	  
could	   be	   consistently	   earned	   based	   on	   the	   overreaction	   and	   January	   effects	   in	   the	   Nigerian	  
equity	  market.	  	  	  
	  
The	   consistency	   in	   the	   finding	   of	   a	   June	   effect	   on	   the	   Nigerian	   Stock	   Exchange	   across	   two	  
previous	  studies	  (Claessens	  et	  al.,	  1995;	  Alagidede,	  2008)	  and	  now	  this	  one,	  suggests	  investors	  
could	  build	  loser/winner	  portfolios	  to	  profit	  from	  the	  June	  seasonal	  on	  the	  Nigerian	  bourse	  as	  
well.	  Can	  investors	  profit	  similarly	  from	  the	  observed	  “October	  Effect”	  on	  the	  JSE?	  Especially	  as	  
this	  is	  a	  month	  characterized	  by	  declines	  in	  international	  stock	  markets	  owing	  to	  its	  notoriety	  as	  
the	   month	   in	   which	   the	   great	   stock	   market	   crashes	   of	   1929	   and	   1987	   occurred.	   For	  
practitioners,	   this	   should	   be	   worth	   exploring.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   South	   African	   financial	  
markets	  are	  significantly	  linked	  with	  global	  markets.	  
	  
5.5	   Future	  research	  
The	  study	  shows	  share	  turnover	  ratio	  does	  qualify	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  investor	  sentiment	  as	  –	  judging	  
from	   the	   study’s	   findings	  –	   it	   indicates	   the	   intensity	  of	   views	  about	   securities	   that	   constitute	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loser-­‐winner	   portfolios.	   It	   does	   not	   however	   indicate	   by	   itself	   the	   direction	   of	   return	  
performance.	  That	   is,	  when	  portfolios	  have	  a	  high	   investor	  sentiment	  measure,	   it	  could	   imply	  
positive	   or	   negative	   abnormal	   returns.	   To	   determine	   the	   direction,	   a	   juxtaposition	   of	   the	  
sentiment	  measure	  with	   return	   is	  necessary.	  This	   is	   in	   line	  with	  Lee	  and	  Swaminathan	   (2000)	  
that	   suggest	   stock	   returns	   and	   trading	   volume	   are	   jointly	   determined	   by	   the	   same	   market	  
dynamics.	   It	   would	   thus	   be	   interesting	   to	   know	   if	   this	   is	   also	   the	   case	   with	   other	   market	  
anomalies.	  There	  would	  also	  be	  a	  need	  to	  test	  for	  persistence	  of	  the	  overreaction	  and	  January	  
effects	   on	   the	   NSE	   in	   the	   future	   when	   more	   significant	   time-­‐series	   on	   the	   market	   become	  
available.	  	  
	  




Appendix	  1	   Sample	  of	  Nigerian	  Stock	  Exchange	  –	  Listed	  Securities	  
	  	   Ticker	   Description	  
1	   7UP	   7-­‐Up	  Bottling	  Company	  Plc	  
2	   ACADEMY	   Academy	  Press	  
3	   ACCESS	   Access	  Bank	  Nigeria	  Plc	  
4	   AGLEVENT	   A.	  G.	  Leventis	  Nigeria	  
5	   AIICO	   Aiico	  Insurance	  
6	   ALUMACO	   Aluminium	  Manufacturer	  Of	  Nigeria	  
7	   ASHAKACEM	   Ashaka	  Cement	  
8	   AVONCROWN	   Avon	  Crowncaps	  And	  Containers	  
9	   BERGER	   Berger	  Paints	  
10	   BETAGLAS	   Beta	  Glass	  Company	  Plc	  
11	   BOCGAS	   Boc	  Gases	  Nigeria	  
12	   CADBURY	   Cadbury	  Nigeria	  Plc	  
13	   CAP	   Chemical	  And	  Allied	  Products	  Ltd	  
14	   CCNN	   Cement	  Company	  Of	  Northern	  Nigeria	  
15	   CHAMPION	   Champion	  Breweries	  
16	   CHELLARAM	   Chellarams	  
17	   CHEVRON	   Chevron	  Oil	  Nigeria	  Plc	  
18	   CILEASING	   C&I	  Leasing	  
19	   CORNERST	   Cornerstone	  Insurance	  
20	   COSTAIN	   Costain	  West	  Africa	  Plc	  
21	   CRUSADER	   Crusader	  Insurance	  
22	   CUTIX	   CUTIX	  
23	   DNMEYER	   D.	  N.	  Meyer	  
24	   EKOCORP	   Ekocorp	  
25	   ENAMELWA	   Nigerian	  Enamelware	  Plc	  
26	   EVANSMED	   Evans	  Medical	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27	   FIRSTALUM	   First	  Aluminium	  Nigeria	  
28	   FIRSTBANK	   First	  Bank	  Nigeria	  
29	   FLOURMILL	   Flour	  Mills	  Of	  Nigeria	  Plc	  
30	   FO	   Forte	  Oil	  Plc	  
31	   GLAXOSMITH	   Glaxo	  Smithkline	  Beecham	  Nigeria	  
32	   GUARANTY	   Guaranty	  Trust	  Bank	  
33	   GUINNESS	   Guinness	  Nigeria	  Plc	  
34	   JBERGER	   Julius	  Berger	  (Nigeria)	  Plc	  
35	   JOHNHOLT	   John	  Holt	  
36	   LASACO	   Lasaco	  Assurance	  
37	   LAWUNION	   Law	  Union	  And	  Rock	  Insurance	  
38	   LIVESTOCK	   Livestocks	  Feeds	  
39	   LONGMAN	   Longman	  Nigeria	  
40	   MAYBAKER	   May	  And	  Baker	  Nigeria	  
41	   MOBIL	   Mobil	  Oil	  Nigeria	  
42	   MORISON	   Morison	  Industries	  
43	   NB	   Nigerian	  Breweries	  
44	   NBC	   Nigerian	  Bottling	  Company	  
45	   NCR	   Ncr	  (Nigeria)	  
46	   NEIMETH	   Neimeth	  International	  Pharmaceuticals	  Plc	  
47	   NEM	   Nem	  Insurance	  Plc	  
48	   NESTLE	   Nestle	  Nigeria	  Plc	  
49	   NIG-­‐GERMAN	   Nigerian	  German	  Chemicals	  
50	   NIGERINS	   Niger	  Insurance	  
51	   NIGROPES	   Nigerian	  Ropes	  
52	   NIWICABLE	   Nigerian	  Wire	  And	  Cable	  Plc	  
53	   NNFM	   Northern	  Nigeria	  Flour	  Mills	  
54	   OKOMUOIL	   Okomu	  Oil	  
55	   PHARMDEKO	   Pharma	  Deko	  
56	   POLYPROD	   Poly	  Products	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57	   PRESTIGE	   Prestige	  Insurance	  
58	   PZ	   Pz	  Industries	  
59	   ROYALEX	   Royal	  Exchange	  Assurance	  
60	   RTBRISCOE	   Rt	  Briscoe	  
61	   SCOA	   Scoa	  Nigeria	  
62	   THOMASWY	   Thomas	  Wyatt	  Nigeria.	  
63	   TOTAL	   Total	  Nigeria	  
64	   TRIPPLEG	   Tripple	  Gee	  And	  Company.	  
65	   UAC-­‐PROP	   Uacn	  Property	  Development	  
66	   UACN	   Uacn	  Plc	  
67	   UBA	   United	  Bank	  For	  Africa	  
68	   UBN	   Union	  Bank	  Of	  Nigeria	  Plc	  
69	   UNIC	   Unic	  Insurance	  
70	   UNILEVER	   Unilever	  Nigeria	  
71	   UNTL	   United	  Nigeria	  Textile	  Plc	  
72	   UPL	   University	  Press	  
73	   UTC	   Utc	  Nigeria	  
74	   VITAFOAM	   Vitafoam	  Nigeria.	  
75	   VONO	   Vono	  Products	  
76	   WAPCO	   Lafarge	  Wapco	  Nigeria	  Plc	  
77	   WAPIC	   Wapic	  Insurance	  
78	   WEMABANK	   Wema	  Bank	  
Source:	  Nigerian	  Stock	  Exchange	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Appendix	  2	   Sample	  of	  Johannesburg	  Stock	  Exchange	  –	  Listed	  Securities	  
	  	   Ticker	   Description	  
1	   ABL	   African	  Bank	  Inv	  Ltd	  
2	   ACL	   Arcelormittal	  Sa	  Limited	  
3	   ADH	   Advtech	  Ltd	  
4	   ADI	   Adaptit	  Holdings	  Limited	  
5	   ADR	   Adcorp	  Holdings	  Limited	  
6	   ADW	   African	  Dawn	  Capital	  Ltd	  
7	   AEG	   Aveng	  Group	  Limited	  
8	   AFE	   Aeci	  Limited	  
9	   AFEP	   Aeci	  Limited	  5,5%	  Pref	  
10	   AFR	   Afgri	  Limited	  
11	   AFX	  	   African	  Oxygen	  Limited	  
12	   AGI	  	   Ag	  Industries	  Limited	  
13	   AGL	   Anglo	  American	  Plc	  
14	   AHL	   Ah-­‐Vest	  Limited	  
15	   ALT	  	   Allied	  Technologies	  Ltd	  
16	   AMA	  	   Amalgamated	  App	  Hldgs	  Lt	  
17	   AME	   African	  Media	  Ent	  Ltd	  
18	   AMS	   Anglo	  American	  Plat	  Ltd	  
19	   ANA	  	   Adrenna	  Property	  Grp	  Ltd	  
20	   ANG	   Anglogold	  Ashanti	  Ltd	  
21	   AON	  	   African	  &	  Over	  Ent	  Ltd	  -­‐	  
22	   AOO	  	   African	  &	  Over	  Ent	  Ltd	  
23	   AOVP	   African	  &	  Over	  Ent	  Ltd	  P	  
24	   APK	   Astrapak	  Limited	  
25	   APN	   Aspen	  Pharmacare	  Hldgs	  L	  
26	   ARD	   Ardor	  Sa	  Ltd	  
27	   ARI	  	   African	  Rainbow	  Min	  Ltd	  
28	   ARL	  	   Astral	  Foods	  Ltd	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29	   ASR	   Assore	  Ltd	  
30	   ATN	  	   Allied	  Electronics	  Corp	  
31	   AWT	   Awethu	  Breweries	  Ltd	  
32	   BAT	   Brait	  Se	  
33	   BAU	  	   Bauba	  Platinum	  Limited	  
34	   BAW	   Barloworld	  Ltd	  
35	   BAWP	   Barworld	  Ltd	  6%Pref	  
36	   BCF	   Bowler	  Metcalf	  Ltd	  
37	   BEG	   Beige	  Holdings	  Limited	  
38	   BEL	   Bell	  Equipment	  Ltd	  
39	   BIL	   Bhp	  Billiton	  Plc	  
40	   BNT	  	   Bonatla	  Property	  Hldgs	  
41	   BRN	   Brimstone	  Inv	  Corp	  Ltd-­‐N	  
42	   BSR	   Basil	  Read	  Holdings	  Ltd	  
43	   CCL	   Compu	  Clearing	  Outs	  Ltd	  
44	   CDZ	  	   Cadiz	  Hldgs	  Ltd	  
45	   CKS	   Crookes	  Brothers	  Ltd	  
46	   CMH	  	   Combined	  Motor	  Hldgs	  Ltd	  
47	   CND	   Conduit	  Capital	  Ltd	  
48	   COM	   Comair	  Limited	  
49	   CRG	  	   Cargo	  Carriers	  Ltd	  
50	   CSO	  	   Capital	  Shop	  Cent	  Grp	  Pl	  
51	   DAW	   Distr	  And	  Warehousing	  
52	   DGC	   Digicore	  Holdings	  Limite	  
53	   EHS	  	   Evraz	  Highveld	  Steel	  &	  V	  
54	   FSR	   Firstrand	  Ltd	  
55	   GDO	  	   Gold	  One	  Int	  Ltd	  
56	   GND	  	   Grindrod	  Ltd	  
57	   HAR	   Harmony	  Gm	  Co	  Ltd	  
58	   HWN	   Howden	  Africa	  Hldgs	  Ltd	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59	   HYP	   Hyprop	  Inv	  Ltd	  
60	   IDQ	  	   Indequity	  Group	  Ltd	  
61	   ILV	  	   Illovo	  Sugar	  Ltd	  
62	   IMP	   Impala	  Platinum	  Hlgs	  Ltd	  
63	   ING	   Ingenuity	  Property	  Inv	  
64	   INL	  	   Investec	  Ltd	  
65	   IPL	  	   Imperial	  Holdings	  Ltd	  
66	   ISA	   Isa	  Holdings	  Limited	  
67	   ITE	   Italtile	  Ltd	  
68	   JCD	   Jci	  Ltd	  
69	   KAP	   Kap	  International	  Hldgs	  
70	   KGM	  	   Kagiso	  Media	  Ltd	  
71	   LBH	   Liberty	  Holdings	  Ltd	  
72	   LBHP	   Liberty	  Hldgs	  11C	  Pref	  
73	   LNF	   London	  Fin	  Inv	  Group	  Plc	  
74	   LON	   Lonmin	  Plc	  
75	   VLE	   Value	  Group	  Ltd	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Appendix	  3:	  NCSS	  Statistical	  Analyses	  Report	   	  
Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\jse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPAR 
 
Tests of Assumptions Section 
 Test Prob Decision 
Assumption Value Level (0.05) 
Skewness Normality of Residuals 41.3161 0.000000 Reject 
Kurtosis Normality of Residuals 27.7683 0.000000 Reject 
Omnibus Normality of Residuals 2478.0999 0.000000 Reject 
Modified-Levene Equal-Variance Test 16.9836 0.000000 Reject 
 




Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks 
Hypotheses 
H0: All medians are equal. 
Ha: At least two medians are different. 
 
Test Results 
  Chi-Square Prob 
Method DF (H) Level Decision(0.05) 
Not Corrected for Ties 4 3.608245 0.461611 Accept H0 
Corrected for Ties 4 3.608245 0.461611 Accept H0 
 
Number Sets of Ties 0 





  Sum of Mean 
Group Count Ranks Rank Z-Value Median 
1 456 541551.00 1187.61 1.7086 0.003498048 
2 456 520714.00 1141.92 0.0514 0.001961767 
3 456 509499.00 1117.32 -0.8406 0.002495189 
4 456 508262.00 1114.61 -0.9389 0.0006113497 






Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\jse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPAR 
 
Means and Effects Section 
   Standard  
Term Count Mean Error Effect 
All 2280 0.007958461  0.007958461 
A: Portfolio 
1 456 0.01361404 0.003264964 0.005655584 
2 456 0.003294444 0.003264964 -0.004664016 
3 456 0.0007429685 0.003264964 -0.007215492 
4 456 0.002907946 0.003264964 -0.005050514 
5 456 0.0192329 0.003264964 0.01127444 
 





Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
 
AHPAR 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0.0000 1.0481 1.6122 1.6744 1.0682 
2 1.0481 0.0000 0.5641 0.6263 0.0201 
3 1.6122 0.5641 0.0000 0.0622 0.5440 
4 1.6744 0.6263 0.0622 0.0000 0.6062 
5 1.0682 0.0201 0.5440 0.6062 0.0000 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 
Bonferroni Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 2.8070 
 




Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\jse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPAR 
 
Tests of Assumptions Section 
 Test Prob Decision 
Assumption Value Level (0.05) 
Skewness Normality of Residuals 41.3116 0.000000 Reject 
Kurtosis Normality of Residuals 27.7443 0.000000 Reject 
Omnibus Normality of Residuals 2476.3926 0.000000 Reject 
Modified-Levene Equal-Variance Test 7.8900 0.000000 Reject 
 








Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\jse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPAR 
 
Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks 
Hypotheses 
H0: All medians are equal. 
Ha: At least two medians are different. 
 
Test Results 
  Chi-Square Prob 
Method DF (H) Level Decision(0.05) 
Not Corrected for Ties 11 90.80025 0.000000 Reject H0 
Corrected for Ties 11 90.80025 0.000000 Reject H0 
 
Number Sets of Ties 0 
Multiplicity Factor 0 
 
Group Detail 
  Sum of Mean 
Group Count Ranks Rank Z-Value Median 
Apr 190 231523.00 1218.54 1.7067 0.006785138 
Aug 190 213974.00 1126.18 -0.3132 0.001384753 
Dec 190 208961.00 1099.79 -0.8902 0.0007620862 
Feb 190 232871.00 1225.64 1.8619 0.009490015 
Jan 190 240787.00 1267.30 2.7730 0.01113758 
Jul 190 203528.00 1071.20 -1.5155 -0.004448066 
Jun 190 237605.00 1250.55 2.4068 0.01081626 
Mar 190 172430.00 907.53 -5.0949 -0.01439465 
May 190 232543.00 1223.91 1.8241 0.006982313 
Nov 190 190762.00 1004.01 -2.9849 -0.009306663 
Oct 190 179915.00 946.92 -4.2334 -0.01412216 
Sep 190 255441.00 1344.43 4.4597 0.01474684 
 
Means and Effects Section 
   Standard  
Term Count Mean Error Effect 
All 2280 0.007958461  0.007958461 
A: Month 
Apr 190 0.01299782 0.005050557 0.005039361 
Aug 190 0.003741745 0.005050557 -0.004216715 
Dec 190 0.003031537 0.005050557 -0.004926923 
Feb 190 0.007050655 0.005050557 -0.000907805 
Jan 190 0.009331563 0.005050557 0.001373102 
Jul 190 -0.0008428862 0.005050557 -0.008801347 
Jun 190 0.009764351 0.005050557 0.00180589 
Mar 190 -0.006101619 0.005050557 -0.01406008 
May 190 0.008210718 0.005050557 0.0002522575 
Nov 190 -0.0004798482 0.005050557 -0.008438309 
Oct 190 0.02673484 0.005050557 0.01877638 




Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\jse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPAR 
 





Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
 
AHPAR Apr Aug Dec Feb Jan 
Apr 0.0000 1.3675 1.7581 0.1050 0.7219 
Aug 1.3675 0.0000 0.3906 1.4725 2.0894 
Dec 1.7581 0.3906 0.0000 1.8632 2.4800 
Feb 0.1050 1.4725 1.8632 0.0000 0.6168 
Jan 0.7219 2.0894 2.4800 0.6168 0.0000 
Jul 2.1815 0.8140 0.4234 2.2865 2.9034 
Jun 0.4739 1.8414 2.2320 0.3689 0.2480 
Mar 4.6047 3.2373 2.8466 4.7098 5.3266 
May 0.0795 1.4470 1.8376 0.0256 0.6424 
Nov 3.1762 1.8088 1.4181 3.2813 3.8981 
Oct 4.0215 2.6540 2.2634 4.1265 4.7434 
Sep 1.8638 3.2313 3.6219 1.7587 1.1419 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 





Analysis of Variance Report 




Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPAR Jul Jun Mar May Nov 
Apr 2.1815 0.4739 4.6047 0.0795 3.1762 
Aug 0.8140 1.8414 3.2373 1.4470 1.8088 
Dec 0.4234 2.2320 2.8466 1.8376 1.4181 
Feb 2.2865 0.3689 4.7098 0.0256 3.2813 
Jan 2.9034 0.2480 5.3266 0.6424 3.8981 
Jul 0.0000 2.6554 2.4233 2.2610 0.9948 
Jun 2.6554 0.0000 5.0787 0.3944 3.6502 
Mar 2.4233 5.0787 0.0000 4.6842 1.4285 
May 2.2610 0.3944 4.6842 0.0000 3.2557 
Nov 0.9948 3.6502 1.4285 3.2557 0.0000 
Oct 1.8400 4.4954 0.5833 4.1010 0.8452 
Sep 4.0452 1.3898 6.4685 1.7843 5.0400 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 
Bonferroni Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 3.3678 
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPAR Oct Sep 
Apr 4.0215 1.8638 
Aug 2.6540 3.2313 
Dec 2.2634 3.6219 
Feb 4.1265 1.7587 
Jan 4.7434 1.1419 
Jul 1.8400 4.0452 
Jun 4.4954 1.3898 
Mar 0.5833 6.4685 
May 4.1010 1.7843 
Nov 0.8452 5.0400 
Oct 0.0000 5.8853 
Sep 5.8853 0.0000 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 









Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\jse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPST 
 
Tests of Assumptions Section 
 Test Prob Decision 
Assumption Value Level (0.05) 
Skewness Normality of Residuals 55.5383 0.000000 Reject 
Kurtosis Normality of Residuals 31.8472 0.000000 Reject 
Omnibus Normality of Residuals 4098.7461 0.000000 Reject 
Modified-Levene Equal-Variance Test 11.2389 0.000000 Reject 
 




Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks 
Hypotheses 
H0: All medians are equal. 
Ha: At least two medians are different. 
 
Test Results 
  Chi-Square Prob 
Method DF (H) Level Decision(0.05) 
Not Corrected for Ties 4 209.135 0.000000 Reject H0 
Corrected for Ties 4 209.135 0.000000 Reject H0 
 
Number Sets of Ties 0 
Multiplicity Factor 0 
 




  Sum of Mean 
Group Count Ranks Rank Z-Value Median 
1 456 362098.00 794.07 -12.5634 0.001022544 
2 456 562836.00 1234.29 3.4014 0.001324498 
3 456 624839.00 1370.26 8.3325 0.001467351 
4 456 567209.00 1243.88 3.7491 0.001341278 





Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\jse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPST 
 
Means and Effects Section 
   Standard  
Term Count Mean Error Effect 
All 2280 0.003098353  0.003098353 
A: Portfolio 
1 456 0.001350745 0.001007872 -0.001747607 
2 456 0.009226056 0.001007872 0.006127703 
3 456 0.001746999 0.001007872 -0.001351354 
4 456 0.001433704 0.001007872 -0.001664649 
5 456 0.00173426 0.001007872 -0.001364092 
 





Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPST 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0.0000 10.0970 13.2157 10.3170 6.0993 
2 10.0970 0.0000 3.1187 0.2200 3.9977 
3 13.2157 3.1187 0.0000 2.8988 7.1164 
4 10.3170 0.2200 2.8988 0.0000 4.2177 
5 6.0993 3.9977 7.1164 4.2177 0.0000 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 







Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\jse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPST 
 
Tests of Assumptions Section 
 Test Prob Decision 
Assumption Value Level (0.05) 
Skewness Normality of Residuals 56.0676 0.000000 Reject 
Kurtosis Normality of Residuals 31.9606 0.000000 Reject 
Omnibus Normality of Residuals 4165.0509 0.000000 Reject 
Modified-Levene Equal-Variance Test 0.0408 0.999999 Accept 
 







Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\jse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPST 
 
Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks 
Hypotheses 
H0: All medians are equal. 
Ha: At least two medians are different. 
 
Test Results 
  Chi-Square Prob 
Method DF (H) Level Decision(0.05) 
Not Corrected for Ties 11 91.27676 0.000000 Reject H0 
Corrected for Ties 11 91.27676 0.000000 Reject H0 
 
Number Sets of Ties 0 




  Sum of Mean 
Group Count Ranks Rank Z-Value Median 
Apr 190 228981.00 1205.16 1.4141 0.001284712 
Aug 190 204297.00 1075.25 -1.4270 0.001216602 
Dec 190 168628.00 887.52 -5.5325 0.001107575 
Feb 190 235327.00 1238.56 2.1446 0.00133274 
Jan 190 174230.00 917.00 -4.8878 0.001129161 
Jul 190 195455.00 1028.71 -2.4447 0.001179333 
Jun 190 220402.00 1160.01 0.4267 0.001270023 
Mar 190 241464.00 1270.86 2.8509 0.001371596 
May 190 237231.00 1248.58 2.3637 0.001403432 
Nov 190 226267.00 1190.88 1.1017 0.001325912 
Oct 190 217327.00 1143.83 0.0727 0.00126722 
Sep 190 250731.00 1319.64 3.9176 0.001396766 
 
Means and Effects Section 
   Standard  
Term Count Mean Error Effect 
All 2280 0.003098353  0.003098353 
A: Month 
Apr 190 0.003025805 0.001579462 -7.254779E-05 
Aug 190 0.002925772 0.001579462 -0.0001725804 
Dec 190 0.002737084 0.001579462 -0.0003612688 
Feb 190 0.00321516 0.001579462 0.0001168069 
Jan 190 0.002786606 0.001579462 -0.0003117471 
Jul 190 0.003001225 0.001579462 -9.712781E-05 
Jun 190 0.004081507 0.001579462 0.0009831543 
Mar 190 0.003084078 0.001579462 -1.427481E-05 
May 190 0.003074137 0.001579462 -2.421525E-05 
Nov 190 0.003014877 0.001579462 -8.347572E-05 
Oct 190 0.003080165 0.001579462 -1.818775E-05 




Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\jse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPST 
 





Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPST Apr Aug Dec Feb Jan 
Apr 0.0000 1.9235 4.7029 0.4945 4.2664 
Aug 1.9235 0.0000 2.7795 2.4180 2.3429 
Dec 4.7029 2.7795 0.0000 5.1974 0.4365 
Feb 0.4945 2.4180 5.1974 0.0000 4.7609 
Jan 4.2664 2.3429 0.4365 4.7609 0.0000 
Jul 2.6125 0.6890 2.0905 3.1070 1.6539 
Jun 0.6685 1.2550 4.0344 1.1630 3.5979 
Mar 0.9727 2.8962 5.6756 0.4782 5.2391 
May 0.6429 2.5663 5.3458 0.1484 4.9093 
Nov 0.2115 1.7120 4.4914 0.7060 4.0549 
Oct 0.9081 1.0153 3.7948 1.4026 3.3583 
Sep 1.6948 3.6183 6.3978 1.2003 5.9612 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 





Analysis of Variance Report 




Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPST Jul Jun Mar May Nov 
Apr 2.6125 0.6685 0.9727 0.6429 0.2115 
Aug 0.6890 1.2550 2.8962 2.5663 1.7120 
Dec 2.0905 4.0344 5.6756 5.3458 4.4914 
Feb 3.1070 1.1630 0.4782 0.1484 0.7060 
Jan 1.6539 3.5979 5.2391 4.9093 4.0549 
Jul 0.0000 1.9440 3.5852 3.2553 2.4010 
Jun 1.9440 0.0000 1.6412 1.3114 0.4570 
Mar 3.5852 1.6412 0.0000 0.3299 1.1842 
May 3.2553 1.3114 0.3299 0.0000 0.8544 
Nov 2.4010 0.4570 1.1842 0.8544 0.0000 
Oct 1.7043 0.2396 1.8808 1.5510 0.6966 
Sep 4.3073 2.3633 0.7221 1.0520 1.9063 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 
Bonferroni Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 3.3678 
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPST Oct Sep 
Apr 0.9081 1.6948 
Aug 1.0153 3.6183 
Dec 3.7948 6.3978 
Feb 1.4026 1.2003 
Jan 3.3583 5.9612 
Jul 1.7043 4.3073 
Jun 0.2396 2.3633 
Mar 1.8808 0.7221 
May 1.5510 1.0520 
Nov 0.6966 1.9063 
Oct 0.0000 2.6030 
Sep 2.6030 0.0000 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 
Bonferroni Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 3.3678 
 
 





Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\nse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPAR 
 
Tests of Assumptions Section 
 Test Prob Decision 
Assumption Value Level (0.05) 
Skewness Normality of Residuals 57.2269 0.000000 Reject 
Kurtosis Normality of Residuals 32.5200 0.000000 Reject 
Omnibus Normality of Residuals 4332.4689 0.000000 Reject 
Modified-Levene Equal-Variance Test 0.7146 0.581906 Accept 
 




Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks 
Hypotheses 
H0: All medians are equal. 
Ha: At least two medians are different. 
 
Test Results 
  Chi-Square Prob 
Method DF (H) Level Decision(0.05) 
Not Corrected for Ties 4 13.31977 0.009815 Reject H0 
Corrected for Ties 4 13.31978 0.009815 Reject H0 
 
Number Sets of Ties 180 







  Sum of Mean 
Group Count Ranks Rank Z-Value Median 
1 456 519935.00 1140.21 -0.0106 0.007290974 
2 456 490483.00 1075.62 -2.3529 -0.001712296 
3 456 507514.00 1112.97 -0.9984 0.001531607 
4 456 522416.00 1145.65 0.1867 0.005590129 






Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\nse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPAR 
 
Means and Effects Section 
   Standard  
Term Count Mean Error Effect 
All 2280 0.0422451  0.0422451 
A: Portfolio 
1 456 0.03658571 0.01683029 -0.005659393 
2 456 0.0205865 0.01683029 -0.02165861 
3 456 0.0345799 0.01683029 -0.007665202 
4 456 0.04867619 0.01683029 0.00643109 
5 456 0.07079721 0.01683029 0.02855211 
 





Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPAR 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0.0000 1.4814 0.6248 0.1248 2.0148 
2 1.4814 0.0000 0.8566 1.6062 3.4963 
3 0.6248 0.8566 0.0000 0.7496 2.6396 
4 0.1248 1.6062 0.7496 0.0000 1.8901 
5 2.0148 3.4963 2.6396 1.8901 0.0000 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 
Bonferroni Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 2.8070 
 
 





Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\nse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPAR 
 
Tests of Assumptions Section 
 Test Prob Decision 
Assumption Value Level (0.05) 
Skewness Normality of Residuals 56.9244 0.000000 Reject 
Kurtosis Normality of Residuals 32.4633 0.000000 Reject 
Omnibus Normality of Residuals 4294.2562 0.000000 Reject 
Modified-Levene Equal-Variance Test 5.6884 0.000000 Reject 
 







Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\nse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPAR 
 
Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks 
Hypotheses 
H0: All medians are equal. 
Ha: At least two medians are different. 
 
Test Results 
  Chi-Square Prob 
Method DF (H) Level Decision(0.05) 
Not Corrected for Ties 11 241.0178 0.000000 Reject H0 
Corrected for Ties 11 241.0179 0.000000 Reject H0 
 
Number Sets of Ties 180 




  Sum of Mean 
Group Count Ranks Rank Z-Value Median 
Apr 190 176391.00 928.37 -4.6390 -0.01508332 
Aug 190 237142.00 1248.12 2.3535 0.02066036 
Dec 190 175076.00 921.45 -4.7904 -0.01255408 
Feb 190 259191.00 1364.16 4.8913 0.0177944 
Jan 190 271837.00 1430.72 6.3469 0.04407622 
Jul 190 162656.00 856.08 -6.2199 -0.01605322 
Jun 190 212119.00 1116.42 -0.5267 0.0009530014 
Mar 190 240693.00 1266.81 2.7622 0.02247539 
May 190 142237.00 748.62 -8.5702 -0.02453966 
Nov 190 242532.00 1276.48 2.9739 0.01518636 
Oct 190 226295.00 1191.03 1.1050 0.01479874 
Sep 190 254171.00 1337.74 4.3135 0.02633867 
 
Means and Effects Section 
   Standard  
Term Count Mean Error Effect 
All 2280 0.0422451  0.0422451 
A: Month 
Apr 190 -0.006052889 0.02572402 -0.04829799 
Aug 190 0.01908218 0.02572402 -0.02316292 
Dec 190 0.002267322 0.02572402 -0.03997778 
Feb 190 0.2061734 0.02572402 0.1639283 
Jan 190 0.05552144 0.02572402 0.01327633 
Jul 190 -0.008299578 0.02572402 -0.05054468 
Jun 190 0.1383079 0.02572402 0.09606276 
Mar 190 0.02770652 0.02572402 -0.01453859 
May 190 -0.02793368 0.02572402 -0.07017878 
Nov 190 0.0515848 0.02572402 0.009339699 
Oct 190 0.0202568 0.02572402 -0.0219883 
Sep 190 0.02832705 0.02572402 -0.01391805  
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Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\nse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPAR 
 





Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPAR Apr Aug Dec Feb Jan 
Apr 0.0000 4.7339 0.1025 6.4521 7.4375 
Aug 4.7339 0.0000 4.8364 1.7181 2.7036 
Dec 0.1025 4.8364 0.0000 6.5545 7.5400 
Feb 6.4521 1.7181 6.5545 0.0000 0.9854 
Jan 7.4375 2.7036 7.5400 0.9854 0.0000 
Jul 1.0703 5.8042 0.9678 7.5224 8.5078 
Jun 2.7841 1.9499 2.8865 3.6680 4.6534 
Mar 5.0106 0.2767 5.1131 1.4414 2.4269 
May 2.6614 7.3953 2.5589 9.1135 10.0989 
Nov 5.1539 0.4200 5.2564 1.2981 2.2835 
Oct 3.8887 0.8452 3.9912 2.5634 3.5488 
Sep 6.0609 1.3270 6.1634 0.3912 1.3766 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 




Analysis of Variance Report 




Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPAR Jul Jun Mar May Nov 
Apr 1.0703 2.7841 5.0106 2.6614 5.1539 
Aug 5.8042 1.9499 0.2767 7.3953 0.4200 
Dec 0.9678 2.8865 5.1131 2.5589 5.2564 
Feb 7.5224 3.6680 1.4414 9.1135 1.2981 
Jan 8.5078 4.6534 2.4269 10.0989 2.2835 
Jul 0.0000 3.8543 6.0809 1.5911 6.2242 
Jun 3.8543 0.0000 2.2266 5.4455 2.3699 
Mar 6.0809 2.2266 0.0000 7.6720 0.1433 
May 1.5911 5.4455 7.6720 0.0000 7.8153 
Nov 6.2242 2.3699 0.1433 7.8153 0.0000 
Oct 4.9590 1.1046 1.1219 6.5501 1.2652 
Sep 7.1312 3.2768 1.0503 8.7223 0.9070 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 
Bonferroni Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 3.3678 
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPAR Oct Sep 
Apr 3.8887 6.0609 
Aug 0.8452 1.3270 
Dec 3.9912 6.1634 
Feb 2.5634 0.3912 
Jan 3.5488 1.3766 
Jul 4.9590 7.1312 
Jun 1.1046 3.2768 
Mar 1.1219 1.0503 
May 6.5501 8.7223 
Nov 1.2652 0.9070 
Oct 0.0000 2.1722 
Sep 2.1722 0.0000 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 
Bonferroni Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 3.3678 
 
 





Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\nse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPST 
 
Tests of Assumptions Section 
 Test Prob Decision 
Assumption Value Level (0.05) 
Skewness Normality of Residuals 53.7434 0.000000 Reject 
Kurtosis Normality of Residuals 31.8148 0.000000 Reject 
Omnibus Normality of Residuals 3900.5371 0.000000 Reject 
Modified-Levene Equal-Variance Test 4.1004 0.002584 Reject 
 




Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks 
Hypotheses 
H0: All medians are equal. 
Ha: At least two medians are different. 
 
Test Results 
  Chi-Square Prob 
Method DF (H) Level Decision(0.05) 
Not Corrected for Ties 4 63.94954 0.000000 Reject H0 
Corrected for Ties 4 63.94954 0.000000 Reject H0 
 
Number Sets of Ties 240 
Multiplicity Factor 1440 
 




  Sum of Mean 
Group Count Ranks Rank Z-Value Median 
1 456 437467.00 959.36 -6.5693 0.0001440386 
2 456 513661.00 1126.45 -0.5096 0.0002293833 
3 456 528079.00 1158.07 0.6371 0.0002313137 
4 456 525712.00 1152.88 0.4489 0.0002498111 






Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\nse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPST 
 
Means and Effects Section 
   Standard  
Term Count Mean Error Effect 
All 2280 0.0004596893  0.0004596893 
A: Portfolio 
1 456 0.0003183477 5.413653E-05 -0.0001413416 
2 456 0.000402005 5.413653E-05 -5.768433E-05 
3 456 0.0004967565 5.413653E-05 3.706713E-05 
4 456 0.0006295532 5.413653E-05 0.0001698639 
5 456 0.0004517843 5.413653E-05 -7.905063E-06 
 





Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPST 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0.0000 3.8325 4.5577 4.4387 7.9450 
2 3.8325 0.0000 0.7252 0.6062 4.1125 
3 4.5577 0.7252 0.0000 0.1191 3.3873 
4 4.4387 0.6062 0.1191 0.0000 3.5063 
5 7.9450 4.1125 3.3873 3.5063 0.0000 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 
Bonferroni Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 2.8070 
 
 





Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\nse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPST 
 
Tests of Assumptions Section 
 Test Prob Decision 
Assumption Value Level (0.05) 
Skewness Normality of Residuals 53.6734 0.000000 Reject 
Kurtosis Normality of Residuals 31.7974 0.000000 Reject 
Omnibus Normality of Residuals 3891.9042 0.000000 Reject 
Modified-Levene Equal-Variance Test 2.7350 0.001616 Reject 
 








Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\nse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPST 
 
Kruskal-Wallis One-Way ANOVA on Ranks 
Hypotheses 
H0: All medians are equal. 
Ha: At least two medians are different. 
 
Test Results 
  Chi-Square Prob 
Method DF (H) Level Decision(0.05) 
Not Corrected for Ties 11 20.97861 0.033593 Reject H0 
Corrected for Ties 11 20.97861 0.033593 Reject H0 
 
Number Sets of Ties 240 




  Sum of Mean 
Group Count Ranks Rank Z-Value Median 
Apr 190 221963.00 1168.23 0.6064 0.000237925 
Aug 190 212040.00 1116.00 -0.5358 0.0002310263 
Dec 190 217949.00 1147.10 0.1443 0.0002337526 
Feb 190 224006.00 1178.98 0.8415 0.0002523445 
Jan 190 183629.00 966.47 -3.8059 0.000158072 
Jul 190 213424.00 1123.28 -0.3765 0.0002422282 
Jun 190 222485.00 1170.97 0.6664 0.0002811582 
Mar 190 209886.00 1104.66 -0.7837 0.0001973242 
May 190 212731.00 1119.64 -0.4563 0.0002168406 
Nov 190 227440.00 1197.05 1.2368 0.0002765841 
Oct 190 221109.00 1163.73 0.5081 0.0002526607 
Sep 190 233678.00 1229.88 1.9548 0.000268019 
 
Means and Effects Section 
   Standard  
Term Count Mean Error Effect 
All 2280 0.0004596893  0.0004596893 
A: Month 
Apr 190 0.00044644 8.379477E-05 -1.324939E-05 
Aug 190 0.0003088745 8.379477E-05 -0.0001508149 
Dec 190 0.0006914234 8.379477E-05 0.000231734 
Feb 190 0.0006003864 8.379477E-05 0.0001406971 
Jan 190 0.0003666207 8.379477E-05 -9.306862E-05 
Jul 190 0.0002821237 8.379477E-05 -0.0001775657 
Jun 190 0.0003312363 8.379477E-05 -0.000128453 
Mar 190 0.0005517898 8.379477E-05 9.210048E-05 
May 190 0.0003556691 8.379477E-05 -0.0001040202 
Nov 190 0.00064137 8.379477E-05 0.0001816807 
Oct 190 0.0004650934 8.379477E-05 5.404058E-06 




Analysis of Variance Report 
Dataset C:\...\Desktop\nse ahpar_ahpst_months_portfolio.NCSS 
Response AHPST 
 





Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPST Apr Aug Dec Feb Jan 
Apr 0.0000 0.7732 0.3128 0.1592 2.9871 
Aug 0.7732 0.0000 0.4605 0.9324 2.2139 
Dec 0.3128 0.4605 0.0000 0.4720 2.6743 
Feb 0.1592 0.9324 0.4720 0.0000 3.1463 
Jan 2.9871 2.2139 2.6743 3.1463 0.0000 
Jul 0.6654 0.1078 0.3526 0.8246 2.3217 
Jun 0.0407 0.8139 0.3535 0.1185 3.0278 
Mar 0.9411 0.1678 0.6283 1.1003 2.0460 
May 0.7194 0.0538 0.4066 0.8786 2.2677 
Nov 0.4268 1.2000 0.7396 0.2676 3.4139 
Oct 0.0665 0.7067 0.2462 0.2257 2.9206 
Sep 0.9129 1.6861 1.2257 0.7537 3.9000 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 




Analysis of Variance Report 




Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPST Jul Jun Mar May Nov 
Apr 0.6654 0.0407 0.9411 0.7194 0.4268 
Aug 0.1078 0.8139 0.1678 0.0538 1.2000 
Dec 0.3526 0.3535 0.6283 0.4066 0.7396 
Feb 0.8246 0.1185 1.1003 0.8786 0.2676 
Jan 2.3217 3.0278 2.0460 2.2677 3.4139 
Jul 0.0000 0.7061 0.2757 0.0540 1.0922 
Jun 0.7061 0.0000 0.9818 0.7601 0.3861 
Mar 0.2757 0.9818 0.0000 0.2217 1.3679 
May 0.0540 0.7601 0.2217 0.0000 1.1462 
Nov 1.0922 0.3861 1.3679 1.1462 0.0000 
Oct 0.5988 0.1072 0.8745 0.6528 0.4933 
Sep 1.5783 0.8722 1.8540 1.6323 0.4861 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 
Bonferroni Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 3.3678 
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Multiple-Comparison Z-Value Test (Dunn's Test) 
AHPST Oct Sep 
Apr 0.0665 0.9129 
Aug 0.7067 1.6861 
Dec 0.2462 1.2257 
Feb 0.2257 0.7537 
Jan 2.9206 3.9000 
Jul 0.5988 1.5783 
Jun 0.1072 0.8722 
Mar 0.8745 1.8540 
May 0.6528 1.6323 
Nov 0.4933 0.4861 
Oct 0.0000 0.9794 
Sep 0.9794 0.0000 
Regular Test: Medians significantly different if z-value > 1.9600 
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